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Abstract 
 
This thesis sets out to investigate the relationship between economic policy and the politics of Hindu 
nationalism. It argues that the economic record of the Bharatiya Janata Party which formed two 
coalition governments in India between the years 1998-2004 was driven by transnational elites 
within senior positions in key ministries and in the Prime Minister’s Office. It argues that while the 
factors usually associated with economic policy formation such as ideological legacy, domestic 
politics or international pressures can provide some limited insights, transnational elites are the key 
to explaining the neoliberal economic policies pursued by this government.  
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Chapter 1: Problematizing the Political Economy of Hindu 
nationalism 
 
1.1. Purpose 
  
Since the conclusion of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition government, led by 
the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), academic studies on Hindu nationalism in 
India have moved beyond an initial focus on the historical sources and political emergence 
of the movement (Jaffrelot 1999) to a critical examination of the performance of the first 
Hindu nationalist coalition government (Mcguire and Copland 2009). This broadened focus 
encompasses a number of areas, from strategic security to the politics of caste and the 
influence of diaspora communities. While research on each of these areas has yielded useful 
results, one subject remains largely untouched: the economic record of the BJP led NDA 
coalition government.  
 
This is a significant lacuna, given that the rise of the BJP on the national level occurred in the 
decade of India's own neoliberal economic reforms. The concurrence of these two 
developments, one political and the other economic, begs the question of whether it was 
more than simply coincidence that neoliberal economic reform and the ascendance of 
Hindu nationalism transpired a mere few years apart. Indeed a broader academic literature 
on democracy, neoliberalism and the emergence of identity-based politics, suggests that 
this nearly simultaneous emergence merits a closer examination (Barber 1995; Castells 
1997). 
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This thesis will attempt to bridge this knowledge gap by making two original contributions. 
The first is an extended discussion of the economic ideas of Hindu nationalism. The second 
is a key to explaining the economic record of the BJP-led government. Through an extensive 
and original engagement with primary sources, this thesis will argue that there is a 
distinctive Hindu nationalist approach to economics. A subsequent examination of the BJP’s 
economic record at the head of the NDA government will show that despite this distinctive 
economic legacy, the BJP pursued a set of neoliberal economic policies that conflicted with 
its own ideological heritage. I will argue that these policies were driven by a core of 
transnational elites, working in senior government ministry positions as well in the office of 
the Prime Minister. I will conclude that the influence of these individuals was the key to 
shaping the economic policies of the NDA government, against the ideological heritage of 
Hindu nationalism and alongside the influence of domestic politics and international 
pressures.   
 
This chapter will set out the background to this argument, its rationale and method of 
investigation. In the first section I provide an overview of the existing literature on the topic. 
In the second section I elaborate the main research question and define the key terms and 
the explanatory framework. Subsequent sections discuss the elements of my explanatory 
framework at length, defining what they are and how I will utilize them in this thesis. The 
chapter will conclude with a brief outline of the arguments made in each of the remaining 
chapters of the thesis. 
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1.2. Relevance and focus 
 
After decades of economic stagnation and an unsuccessful experiment with economic 
planning, the Indian economy underwent a period of dramatic reform during the 1990s. 
Concomitantly a political evolution took place as the fortunes of the once dominant (and 
ostensibly secular) Congress Party declined against the rise of Hindu nationalist BJP. Within 
the space of just ten years the political and economic landscape in India changed, from what 
scholars referred to as a ‘secular-socialist consensus’ (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, 25-26) to 
a landscape dominated by Hindu nationalism and economic neoliberalism. 
 
Each of these trends, the emergence of economic neoliberalism and Hindu nationalism, 
were significant in their own right and have been explored at length in the academic 
literature. The rise of Hindu nationalism has been ascribed to a number of factors. Key 
among these were the rise of a new middle class and the successful mobilization of anxieties 
about the ‘special privileges’ of minorities (Hansen 1999, 7-8), a program of mass populism 
centred around alleged historic wrongs committed at a holy site in the city of Ayodhya 
(Abraham 2005) and a new strategy of alliance building with regional political partners 
(Heath 1999).  The economic reforms in India are often ascribed to the economic crisis of 
1991, although new perspectives place the origins of reforms further back to the Congress 
government under Rajiv Gandhi in 1985 (Kohli 2006a; Kohli 2006b; Panagariya 2008). Few 
academic studies have attempted to link these parallel trends: the rise of Hindu nationalism 
and economic neoliberalism. A few suggestive statements in the literature (Chhibber 2001, 
177; Varshney 1999, 225) have been followed by a total of three publications drawing 
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explicit attention to possible links: one working paper, one published journal article and one 
book chapter (Arulanantham 2004; Gopalakrishnan 2006; Hansen 2001).  
 
The suggestion that there is indeed a link between the emergence of Hindu nationalism and 
economic neoliberalism, opens up a provocative line of inquiry. The fact that a nationalist 
party emerged as a political force within a few years of a programme of economic reform 
suggests a familiar hypothesis: identity based nationalism in India was one of many 
worldwide reactions against a new aggressive modernity that promised progress but was 
not able to deliver (Castells 1997, 6-21). While this particular line of argumentation is not 
taken up in this thesis, the point is that even a popular hypothesis such as this has only been 
briefly examined in the literature on Hindu nationalism in India. 
  
Apart from such brief discussions in the literature, the lack of interest in exploring this 
relationship reflects the academic interest in, and broader enthusiasm for, the larger 
process of India's economic reforms. In academic studies on Indian economic reforms the 
focus has remained on the actual policies and their outcomes rather than the political 
processes that underlay the reforms (Panagariya 2008). However, none of this literature 
explicitly explores the relationship between neoliberal economic reform and Hindu 
nationalism. A lack of interest in the underlying political processes of economic reform in 
India may have originated in the seeming fact that a change in the governing political party 
(from Congress to BJP) made little difference to the direction of economic reform. However 
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it is exactly this continuity in economic reform between the governments of two distinct 
political parties which deserves further scrutiny. 
 
In order to understand this period of political change and economic transition, I examine 
how a government led by the BJP came to pursue a neoliberal economic policy. This is a 
significant question, given that the BJP belongs to a broader Hindu nationalist movement 
that has traditionally advocated a form of economic nationalism and self-sufficiency. In this 
thesis I show that the key to explaining this seeming inconsistency is a core of transnational 
elites who became embedded within the NDA government. It is these individuals, largely 
BJP ‘outsiders’ with intellectual and professional links to the global economy, who were 
responsible for shaping the BJP’s neoliberal economic policies. In this thesis I argue that the 
most plausible explanation for the neoliberal economic policies implemented by the BJP-led 
government stems from the transnational nature of the bureaucrats and advisors in the 
NDA government. By uncovering this connection, this thesis sheds light on why the process 
of economic reform in India remained relatively stable during a period of great political 
upheaval and change. 
 
1.3. The Research Question, Objections and Key Terms 
 
In order to investigate the relationship between Hindu nationalism and the neoliberalism, I 
focus on one key element of each of the political and economic trends described above; 
namely the emergence of Hindu nationalism and the rise of economic neoliberalism. The 
first of these elements is the distinctiveness of the Hindu nationalist position on economic 
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issues; the second is the formation of neoliberal economic policy under the first full-term 
Hindu nationalist led government in India. Together, these elements form the basis of my 
overall research question: What influenced the neoliberal orientation of key economic 
policies instituted by the National Democratic Alliance government (1998-2004) led by the 
Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party? In answering this question I show that there is a 
uniquely Hindu nationalist approach to economic issues against which the positions of the 
BJP-led NDA government can be contrasted. The policies pursued by the BJP in government 
have consistently been characterized as neoliberal economic policies. When considered 
against the intellectual lineage of Hindu nationalism, this gives the appearance of the 
following inconsistency: a Hindu nationalist government with traditionally nationalist 
economic views furthering a neoliberal economic program. My hypothesis is that the key 
factor which shaped these neoliberal economic policies was a core group of transnational 
elites within the NDA government.  
 
As I mention above, these issues have not received much attention in the literature. Some 
regard the continuity in neoliberal economic policy between the Congress and BJP-led 
governments as a demonstration of the 'centrist' tendency in Indian politics (Nayyar 2000, 
793). Such views, however, ignore the implicit political complexities that underlay the 
maintenance and furtherance of economic reforms under the new (BJP-led) government. 
Others acknowledge that the social stresses of economic liberalization are implicated in the 
reactionary politics of nationalism, but say nothing further on the exact nature of this 
relationship (Chhibber 1999, 177). Thus a deeper exploration of this significant phenomenon 
is lacking. It is my contention, however, that a deeper examination could yield new and 
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promising perspectives where the current explanations fail. For example, Nayyar's 'centrist' 
explanation begs the question of what is at the root of 'centrist' economic consensus across 
the Congress and BJP.  
 
However, before moving beyond this centrist explanation, I will consider the possible merits 
of its application to the research question. While the BJP is certainly a party with ideological 
roots in Hindutva, it is the moderate faction within the large family of Hindu nationalist 
parties (the Sangh Parivar). Indeed during the 1990s while the BJP was attempting to offer 
itself as a genuine alternative to Congress by taking a pragmatic approach towards building 
mass appeal among ‘lower’ caste voters, the traditionalist RSS became increasingly 
concerned about the maintenance of discipline and ideological purity in the Sangh Parivar 
(Hansen 1999, 224-225). Thus the BJP’s moderation and continuity on issues of economic 
policy reform may have simply been the result of its attempt to create greater mainstream 
appeal. It would therefore not have been entirely surprising if the BJP had demonstrated 
some ‘centrist’ moderation on the preferred economic nationalism of the Sangh and made 
some accommodations for the neoliberal policies already put in place by a previous 
government. 
 
Such an explanation, however, ignores the larger policy record of the BJP led government 
which demonstrated an overall reorientation of policy towards a Hindu nationalist agenda. 
The BJP’s record in office included, among other things, a round of nuclear tests, heightened 
tensions with Pakistan, greatly increased incidents of domestic communal conflict, attempts 
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to revise school textbooks to reflect perceptions of Hindu nationalist history and the 
constant opposition of traditionally minded Hindu nationalists to globalizing economic 
reforms. Despite its reputation for moderation, across several policy areas the BJP made 
radical breaks from the policies of the previous Congress governments. The new direction 
taken by the BJP on these policy areas was based on the political ideology of Hindu 
nationalism. It is therefore inconsistent to expect that economic policy would not have been 
formed on this ideological basis. Given this broader policy record, it was irregular and 
unusual for the BJP to have left economic policy untouched by the priorities of Hindu 
nationalism. What accounts for this difference? 
 
In addition it may be asked whether the fact that other factors, such as the influence of 
coalition partners, or the need to compromise and conform to the expectations of 
international states or markets may have forced the BJP to more centrist ground. I will 
examine the role of both coalition politics and international influences in this thesis. The 
analysis will show that the BJP’s reaction to these influences was uneven: sometimes 
conforming to and sometimes resisting these influences. Once again, this must not be 
mistaken for a middle-of-the-road centrism. The inconsistent influence of such factors 
cannot entirely account for the consistently neoliberal economic policy orientation of the 
BJP-led government which contrasted sharply with the ideological heritage of Hindu 
nationalism. 
 
20 
 
A further level of scrutiny must be applied to ask whether portraying the BJP's core 
approach to the economy as 'nationalist' is also an overstatement. The BJP's initial criticisms 
of Congress-led economic reforms could have simply stemmed from the BJP's role as an 
opposition party. The BJP would therefore have been providing opportunistic critiques of 
economic policy aimed at scoring political points, rather than expressing any substantive 
difference in views.  
 
This view, however, ignores the ideological heritage of the BJP. The chief economic thinker 
of the Hindu nationalist tradition, Deendayal Upadhyaya, formulated the economic 
counterpart to the political philosophy of Hindutva in his volume Integral Humanism (1965). 
In this volume, Upadhyaya provided a philosophy of self-sufficient and localised economic 
nationalism, distinct from either socialism or free market capitalism. Historically Hindu 
nationalism has espoused economic positions that are in tension with economic 
neoliberalism.  Thus a well-developed ideological framework was in place for the BJP to 
follow an alternative economic policy.  
 
There is therefore clearly a puzzle that needs to be solved, a puzzle which has important 
implications for understanding the workings of Indian democracy.  Why did the BJP, 
possessing both the intellectual heritage and political incentives to restrain and redirect 
economic policy, maintain and even enhance the path of neoliberal economic reform put in 
place by a previous government? This thesis sets out to answer this puzzle. In so doing, 
however, it makes a crucial assumption about the relationship between nationalism and 
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neoliberalism. This assumption must be clarified before proceeding to the rest of the 
argument. 
 
1.4 Economic Nationalism and Economic Neoliberalism 
In chapter 2 an extended discussion will show that the original economic approach of Hindu 
nationalism, exemplified by the philosophy of Integral Humanism, can be aptly described as 
a variety of economic nationalism. This economic nationalism contrasts sharply with the 
BJP’s neoliberal economic policies at the head of the NDA government. Some scholars 
would argue that a distinction between economic nationalism and economic neoliberalism 
is not always justified, given that the actual record of so called 'free-market' economies has 
consistently included the protection of politically sensitive national interests (Cable 1995). 
So-called liberal states frequently utilize elective protectionism while nationalist states 
occasionally advocate liberal economic policies. Further discussion is therefore warranted 
on the distinction I make between economic nationalism and economic neoliberalism. Are 
they always in tension with one another and how does this apply to the particular case of 
the BJP in government? 
 
Helleiner discusses the evolution of the concept of economic nationalism from an umbrella 
term used to describe non-liberal or protectionist ideas and regimes, to a set of economic 
policies that simply enhance the 'national identity’ or the state’s ‘power, prestige and 
prosperity’ (Helleiner 2001, 3-6). It is evident therefore that this term can refer to actual 
economic policies that occupy different ends of the policy spectrum: both protectionism and 
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open trade can be considered economic nationalism, depending on the state’s intentions 
and the political outcomes of its economic policies. Is economic nationalism therefore 
necessarily opposed to economic liberalism? In Helleiner’s understanding, while these 
concepts are theoretically opposed in reality they possess a somewhat more ambiguous 
relationship. In particular, economic liberalism and economic nationalism are opposed only 
when the formation of free-market economic policies is freed from the nationalist impulse 
of a state (Helleiner 2001, 30).  
 
I will show in chapter 2 that the BJS advocated economic nationalism in Helleiner’s first 
sense: a policy of self-sufficiency and protectionism. In its early years, the BJP also 
advocated a nationalist ‘India first’ economic agenda. This version of economic nationalism 
proposed limited economic liberalism in order to bolster the country’s international 
standing: a prestige seeking economic nationalism. At the head of the NDA government, the 
BJP occasionally co-opted the language of national pride ex post facto to justify its pursuit of 
economic reforms as a means of seeking greater global influence (Shulman 2002). Does this 
suggest that while in government the BJP was primarily motivated to pursue economic 
reform out of nationalist motivations to enhance the country’s global image?  
 
I view this as problematic for three reasons. In the first place the BJP’s appeal to national 
pride as a rationale for economic reform could have simply been a rhetorical strategy to 
appeal to its base. Rhetorical strategies do not necessarily equate to an underlying 
economic rationale. For example, Jenkins (2010, 601) points out that while in government, 
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the BJP retained the term swadeshi in its economic language to link itself to the moral 
legacy of the Janata Party. However, as I show in chapter 4, the BJP had by this point 
substantially reinterpreted this term to mean something quite different from the Janata 
Party’s Gandhian ideal of self-sufficiency (Business Line 1999, August 17). The simple use of 
such language does not therefore immediately qualify the underlying rationale as motivated 
by either swadeshi or prestige seeking economic nationalism. Rather, the motivation for 
such policies must derive substantially from the goal of enhancing the national prestige if 
economic policies are to be equated with economic nationalism.  
 
Secondly, the larger process of free-market reforms began under a Congress government, to 
preserve the India’s economic monetary stability and not to increase national prestige. Thus 
historically, neoliberal policies in India were not primarily instituted to enhance nationalist 
goals. Finally, as I show below, the further expansion of these free-market policies by the 
NDA government reversed the BJP’s earlier economic agenda of ‘patriotic capitalism’ 
(Hansen 1999, 220). It is this latter position, which advocated qualified support for free-
market policies, which could more accurately be described as a version of a prestige seeking 
economic nationalism. However, as I show in chapter 3, the BJP undertook a substantial 
reversal of this approach at the head of the NDA government. In their origin and 
implementation, the BJP’s economic reform policies were at odds with the economically 
nationalist positions historically advocated by Hindu nationalism and even the BJP’s own 
former policy positions. These free market reforms were primarily motivated by another set 
of factors than the state’s ‘nationalist impulse’ as Helleiner defines it. These reforms can 
therefore be more accurately described as a variety of economic liberalism.  
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A more detailed examination of the concept ‘neoliberalism’ is also warranted. In this thesis 
the term ‘neoliberalism’ refers to economic neoliberalism rather political neoliberalism. The 
latter seeks to promote liberal political values as a means of ensuring global security (Dunne 
2001, 171-72). The concept of economic neoliberalism is problematic and has evolved 
continuously through the course of the twentieth century (where it originated). In fact, what 
the term ‘neoliberal’ denoted in the early part of the century is almost the reverse of what it 
came to mean by the 1990s. In this latter usage, it largely serves as a negative short-hand 
description for pro-market policies among critics of economic globalization. According to 
Boas and Gans-Morse, who examined a series of 148 recent academic articles utilizing this 
concept, ‘the term is often undefined; it is employed unevenly across ideological divides; 
and it is used to characterize an excessively broad variety of phenomena’ (Boas and Gans-
Morse 2009, 137). These phenomena include a set of policies, a developmental mode, an 
ideology and an academic paradigm (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009, 145).  
 
Despite this conceptually blurry state of affairs, some positive definitions of the concept 
‘neoliberalism’ can be supplied relevant to the time period in which this investigation takes 
place. According to Palley (2005, 25) economic neoliberalism advocates the rejection of 
Keynesian interventionism in favour of a package of economic policies encompassing open 
trade, deregulation, privatisation, the mobility of capital, reduced government and fiscal 
austerity. Harvey provides a philosophical definition of neoliberalism as, ‘in the first instance 
a theory of political economic practices that proposes… liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
property rights, free markets and free trade (Harvey 2005, 2). 
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Thus neoliberalism can be broadly conceived of as a policy commitment to private free 
market and trade activity with the role of the state limited to providing the conditions in 
which this activity can be maintained. In this thesis I will use the terms ‘neoliberalism’ and 
‘neoliberal’ to describe a collection of economic policies and economic reforms that enable 
the operation of private free market and trade activities in the economy while decreasing 
the presence of the state in these very areas. Such policies and reforms may also be 
mutually reinforcing, which is to say that the implementation of a neoliberal policy in one 
area (e.g. industrial deregulation) may stimulate implementation in another (e.g. foreign 
investment). In this thesis I examine three policy areas in particular: fiscal reform, 
privatization (disinvestment) and the deregulation of trade and industrial policy. This narrow 
range of policy areas has been selected due to their significance in illustrating the extent of 
neoliberal reform and so that they can be engaged at depth. Where I show that reductions 
in government spending through fiscal consolidation, the shrinking of government 
ownership of industry in favour of private sector ownership, and an emphasis on free trade 
and industrial enterprise were actively advocated by the BJP-led government, together 
these economic policies may be properly described as neoliberal. 
 
Key studies of economic reform policies pursued by both Congress and BJP governments 
since the 1990s describe the economic policies pursued by both governments as ‘neoliberal’ 
(Battacharya 2013; Bobbio 2012; Chatterjee 2009; Panagariya 2008, 16, 18; Kohli 2006, 
1251). Critics are especially prone to describe such policies as neoliberal (Chandrashekar 
and Ghosh 2006). In these cases, ‘neoliberal’ refers to those reforms directed at 
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deregulation (in the trade, industry and finance sectors), privatization and fiscal 
consolidation among other policy areas. Chapter 3 illustrates the policy provisions made by 
the BJP-led government towards achieving these goals. This chapter also demonstrates a 
gradual and iterative process of reform in incremental steps with some limits on the extent 
of neoliberal policy implementation.  
 
Thus what the record shows is a gradual process of policy reforms, meeting with occasional 
resistance and achieving mixed success. Indeed India’s unique constitutional design, 
contentious electoral politics and tradition of organized opposition have considerably 
shaped (though not quashed) the implementation of neoliberal reforms in the country 
(Harriss 2011, 128). This record stands in contrast to the cruder caricature of a neoliberal 
laser-focus on ‘pure market’ reforms with no room for adjustment and negotiation within 
the individual social and political contexts of states (Jenkins 2010, 585). However, as far as 
the BJP’s economic policies can be shown to have prioritised and increased opportunities 
for private and free-market activity and decreased the active role of the state in these very 
areas, these economic reforms may be properly described as ‘neoliberal’.  
 
Two more concepts require brief clarification. By 'economic policy' I mean intentional 
policies promoted by a government through the passing of bills, budgets, the actions of 
individual ministries and the civil service in a concerted effort to further a particular 
economic programme. This thesis will look at all three aspects of economic policy formation, 
discussing the passage of key bills (such as the creation of the Insurance Regulatory and 
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Development Authority), key budgets that demonstrate neoliberal priorities and the 
influence of key bureaucrats in originating such policies. By 'economic reform', I mean those 
economic policies that have been implemented in order to further the market orientation of 
an economy (Rius and van de Walle 2003, 4). These concepts do not stand in contrast to one 
another. In fact, the process of economic policy formation that will be described in this 
thesis can largely be described as economic reform. As I shall show, the passage of bills, 
budgets and the actions of key policy leaders were directed at furthering the market 
orientation of the economy.   
 
1.5. Explanation: Domestic and International influences  
If neoliberalism is advanced by multiple factors (Cerny 2008, 29), how can the factors 
leading to the adoption of neoliberal policies by the BJP government be identified? A 
commonly used approach in international relations theory to account for the influence of 
multiple factors on policy formation, is the levels of analysis approach (Waltz, 1959; Singer, 
1961; Buzan, 1995). International Relations theorists account for the actions of states by 
ascribing them to influences at three distinct levels: individual, domestic and international. 
This approach provides a suitable starting point to scrutinize the implementation of globally 
oriented neoliberal economic reforms by individual states. 
 
This thesis utilizes factors drawn from two of these levels of analysis: namely domestic and 
international. The remaining ‘individual’ level of analysis concerns behavioural, 
psychological and philosophical understandings of human agency and motivation that are 
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beyond the thematic scope of this thesis. More pertinent and of immediate relevance are 
the role of domestic influences and international influences on the formation of the BJP-led 
government’s economic policies. This is apparent when the distinctive ideology of Hindu 
nationalism, the centrality of domestic factions to the Indian political system and the 
relatively dependent position of India in the global economy for most of its post-
independence history are taken into consideration. The relevance of these levels of analysis 
and what they might reveal regarding economic policy formation are explored more fully 
below.  
 
1.5.1. Domestic Factors 
The number of domestic factors influencing a matter of public policy are potentially 
numerous. Any of the following factors, or combinations thereof, can affect public policy 
outcomes: ideology, institutions (e.g. bureaucracy), structural factors (e.g. existing economic 
policies), public opinion, organized interest groups and the media. However, not all factors 
would affect a particular aspect of policy formation equally. Additionally, in order to engage 
any of these factors in depth, a means of identifying the most significant factors is 
necessary. 
 
Public Choice, a theory that attempts to link political processes with the formation of 
economic policies, identifies the most significant domestic influences in the process of policy 
formation as: the public bureaucracy, political parties, individual voters and interest groups 
(Frey 1984, 201). In the field of Political Economy, analyses of domestic influences on 
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economic policy formation are undertaken along a policy forming chain of causation: basic 
interests (such as ideology) coalescing around the organization of basic interests (e.g. into 
interest groups) resulting in the effects of organized interests on political institutions such as 
political parties and the bureaucracy (Frieden and Martin 2002, 126). Based on these 
considerations, the most significant factors for this particular investigation must be 
identified and investigated.  
 
This thesis will focus on four factors that have a particular relevance for the BJP-led 
government. These factors are ideology, coalition politics, organised interest groups and 
individual voters. In choosing these factors, I contend that together they are of greater 
significance to this particular investigation than alternatives that have been explored in the 
broader literature on Indian political economy. For example, other factors include the 
influence of rural and industrial elites or domestic ‘regimes’ (Gupta 1989). The argument 
pursued below does not necessarily exclude such factors. However, it does present the case 
that together the four factors described above are far more consistently relevant to 
explaining the formation of a broad range of economic policies by the NDA government. 
Together, they also cut across the domain of alternative factors.  The relevance and 
application of these four factors is discussed at greater length below. 
 
As a Hindu nationalist party with a distinctive political ideology, the BJP possessed a unique 
ideological inheritance that could potentially inform the formation of its economic policies. 
The ideology of Hindu nationalism has been described as the result of a dialogue between 
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modern Hindu revivalism and European nationalism (Jaffrelot 2007, 86-97). As an ideology, 
Hindu nationalism has been discussed at length in the literature so the present discussion 
will focus on the relevance of this ideology to economic policy. Historically, Hindu 
nationalism maintained a distinctive economic perspective from either Nehruvian socialism 
or economic neoliberalism. This is where a crucial locus of the discussion lies – how did the 
BJP balance its intellectual heritage with the neoliberal economic policies it implemented? 
What explains the party’s evolution or intellectual leap from a distinctly Hindu nationalist 
economic outlook to economic neoliberalism? These questions will be explored to gauge 
how far Hindu nationalism influenced the economic policy formation of the BJP-led 
government. 
 
Along with its intellectual heritage, the BJP had to contend with the practical demands of 
politics and the exertion of political pressures from outside the party. As the leader in a 
moribund government coalition of 13 political parties, the BJP had to balance the interests 
of multiple parties vying to influence policy in directions that would most favour them 
individually. The immediate historical setting of the NDA government consisted of 
successive short-term coalition governments. Unable to remain in power for extended 
periods, the high 'turnover' of these governments was largely due to the convergence of a 
number of factors. Chief among them was the new importance of coalition politics, forcing 
large national government-forming political parties to rely on the fickle support of regionally 
based counterparts. This emerging trend, the ubiquity of coalition politics, was true of the 
BJP-led government and the influence of coalition partners must be taken into account for a 
proper account of domestic economic policy formation. By taking this factor into account, 
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the thesis is also able to cut across issues of centre-state relations, political parties and 
state-level influences. Each of these topics overlap with coalition politics considerably. 
 
Outside the realm of the NDA coalition, various other groups also vied to influence the 
NDA’s economic policies. According to one classic study, interest groups are one of the keys 
to understanding the Indian political economy (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987). To be sure, the 
Rudolphs refer to ad hoc ‘demand’ groups formed around particular issues as they emerged 
in the informal economy as opposed to formally organized groups. Such demand groups 
used agitation as the primary means of influence rather than attempting to influence 
government policy through formal advisory channels (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, 248). As I 
will show, interest groups used both formal channels and agitation to influence the direction 
of the BJP’s economic policies. In addition, the lines of distinction defined by the Rudolphs 
blur when applied to groups within the Sangh Parivar.  
 
Though highly organized, during the term of the BJP-led government, interest groups 
engaged in a style of agitation more commonly associated with demand groups. As part of a 
family of Hindu nationalist organizations the BJP had to contend with these groups, who 
were partly responsible for maintaining the BJP’s mass political support. This thesis will look 
at one such Sangh Parivar group, Swadeshi Jagaran Manch (SJM) and its influence on the 
BJP government. The SJM has been chosen since its particular focus is economic policy. 
Among the groups in the Sangh Parivar it is therefore of the greatest relevance issues of 
economic policy.  
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However, organizations representing ideological interests would not have been the only 
source of interest group pressure on the NDA’s economic policy formation. The formation of 
economic policy attracted the attention of commercial and industrial interests, organized 
around apex business organizations and national chambers of commerce, who sought out 
the government to advance the interests of their commercial and industrial constituencies. 
Shaping economic policy in the interests of their members was the very raison d’etre of 
these advocacy groups. This thesis will therefore also look at the influence of two such 
groups in particular: the Confederation of Indian Industries and the Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 
 
Finally I come to the influence of voters. It may seem a given that among the significant 
domestic factors in a democracy, individual voters constitute a key source of influence on 
government policy. In simple terms, political parties must at the very least create policies 
that broadly address voter concerns in order to remain in power. While this thesis does not 
dispute this assertion, it brings up an entirely separate set of questions from the one I am 
seeking to answer. What is particularly relevant about the behaviour of voters towards the 
BJP-led government is the fact that this government came to power through a lengthy and 
deliberate electoral strategy of mass political appeal built around icons of religious and 
cultural significance. However, once in power, the BJP’s economic policies took on an 
increased profile in comparison to other policy areas and followed an unconventional policy 
direction. How did the BJP’s newly-won mass of voters react to the BJP’s radical agenda in a 
policy area that had largely remained in the background until the party came to power? 
Were voters surprised by these developments and did they react negatively? What 
33 
 
influence, if any, did voter reactions have on the BJP’s economic policy formation? This 
thesis will attempt to show what influence voters may have had on the policy choices made 
by the BJP. 
 
An investigation of these four domestic factors will reveal varying degrees of influence. For 
example, while coalition partners and interest groups influenced the NDA’s economic policy 
decisions to varying degrees, the ideological influence of Hindu nationalism was negligible. 
What I will conclude is that while the influence of domestic factors can clearly show how 
domestic groups influenced the process of economic policy formation, in cases where the 
BJP resisted the influence of coalition partners or interest groups we are left without an 
explanation of where the BJP’s policy stances originated. Where such factors fail to provide 
adequate explanations a second level of analysis will be introduced.  
 
1.5.2. International Factors 
Even if Hindu nationalism and neoliberalism made an unlikely acquaintance, it could be 
argued that any party in government during the 1990s would need to make a pragmatic 
adjustment to the new realities of the global economy. In the prevailing neoliberal economic 
consensus that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, it would have 
been inevitable for any ruling party in a state that wished to fully participate in the global 
economy to accede to this particular economic paradigm. Does this explain the economic 
policy agenda of the BJP at the head of the NDA government? 
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The second level of analysis looks at the role of international influences on the actions of the 
BJP-led government. The analysis in this thesis prioritizes the liberal institutionalist 
perspective. A more detailed justification of the institutionalist approach is provided in 
chapter 4. While staying clear of value judgements on the role of international institutions in 
the global economy (Stiglitz 2002; Peet 2003), I will attempt to demonstrate how far 
international institutions actually influenced the economic policy formation of the BJP-led 
government.  
 
Historically, the economy of the Indian state has been portrayed as isolationist. The 
established foreign policy of non-alignment aside, on matters of economic policy the post-
independence Indian state largely took its inspiration from the Soviet planned economy 
model. Institutionally, the country was the largest individual recipient of aid from the World 
Bank and was the subject of three IMF interventions. The formation of the WTO in 1995 had 
the potential to substantially change the country's trade landscape, given the conjunction of 
the institution's own formation and the economic reform agenda put in place in India a few 
years earlier. International factors have played a formative role in the country’s economic 
policy and I will investigate how far this continued to be so under the BJP-led government.  
 
An account of institutional influence at the international scale could not only directly 
address the formation of policies not entirely explained by the influence of domestic factors, 
but also add greater depth and richness to the overall investigation of the BJP’s economic 
policies. Formal rational expectation models employing two-level game theory have been 
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formulated to describe how the relationship between domestic and international factors 
affects the formation of foreign policy (Putnam 1988). In such models, policy adjustments at 
the international level are constrained by negotiations among domestic actors (such as 
coalition partners and interest groups). Where the terms of international adjustments and 
domestic negotiations coincide, a 'win-set' of successful policy formation is achieved. While I 
will not attempt to create a formal counterpart to Putnam’s model, I will attempt to 
demonstrate not only which international level factors were influential on economic policy 
formation, but furthermore whether their interaction with domestic factors can shed 
further light on the process of economic policy formation.  
 
The picture emerging at this stage of the thesis will be of an economic policy shaped by 
domestic and international factors and their mutual interaction. Yet the coalescence of the 
BJP’s economic policies, from these disparate influences, around a particular set of 
neoliberal priorities suggests something else may also be at work. What ties the influence of 
domestic and international influences together to actually shape a neoliberal economic 
agenda? The answer that I propose in this thesis is the role of transnational elites. 
 
1.6. Explanation: Transnational Elites  
I contend that transnational elites were the key drivers of the NDA government’s economic 
policies. A new class of professionals in the informational economy created incentives to 
further economic reform through increased economic productivity and consumer lifestyles. 
In turn, senior domestic government officials and advisors in the NDA government, who 
possessed strong intellectual and professional links to external institutions, acted on these 
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incentives to implement neoliberal economic reforms. I identify the latter group as the chief 
agents of the BJP-led government’s neoliberal reforms. On a theoretical level, the agents of 
a neoliberal global economy must essentially be ‘Janus-faced’: balancing both internal 
(domestic) and external (international) priorities to achieve their goals. I contend that it is 
the role of these agents, connecting the domestic policy agenda with international 
neoliberal priorities that is the key to explaining the economic policy formation of the BJP-
led government. 
 
Following Harvey and Castells, I contend that the current global economic context is 
characterized by the ascendency of neoliberalism, through the channels of an informational 
network society (Harvey 2005, 159; Castells 1996, 94). Two aspects of this context are of 
particular relevance to this investigation: the ideas that inform this context and the key 
personalities that shape it. Haas (following Ruggie) describes the first as an 'epistemic 
community', an informal transnational network of experts, sharing common norms and 
values, recruited into highly technical policy forming processes to further a global consensus 
that may be at odds with the needs of their own particular locale (Haas 1992; Ruggie 1982). 
Closely linked to the concept of an epistemic community are the personalities that advocate 
these ideas and shape the global economic context. Cerny calls such groups 
'transgovernmental networks' of regulators, legislators and other bureaucrats and 
politicians who share common values with their counterparts from other states (Cerny 2008, 
34). For Sklair the class of what he terms ‘transnational elites’ is comprised of corporate 
executives, politicians and bureaucrats, professionals (academics, managers, information 
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technology), merchants and media, all of whose chief professional and financial interests lay 
outside the borders of the nation states in which they are resident (Sklair 2001, 17).  
 
I maintain that the NDA’s economic policies originated among a class of transnational elites 
situated in key bureaucratic and advisory positions in the BJP-led government. At present, 
transnational perspectives on Hindu nationalism have largely focused on Hindu nationalist 
identity in diaspora communities (Jaffrelot 2007, 361-369). Economic policy in India has not 
received much attention from a transnational perspective. This is largely due to the fact that 
while recent studies (Pederson 2000, 267) have revisited the so called ‘Dependency’ 
perspective on the initiation of economic reforms in India, they have not done the same for 
the propagation of the reforms in subsequent governments. The Dependency perspective 
argues that India’s economic reforms derived exclusively from international pressures.  
 
I contend that a core of bureaucrats within the inner circle of the Indian Prime Minister's 
office were responsible for creating some of the major economic reforms of the BJP-led 
government. These bureaucrats were largely alumni of international institutions and 
possessed transnational linkages and intellectual orientations. I argue, that it is the influence 
of these individuals that most consistently explain the particular character of the economic 
policies pursued by the BJP-led government. 
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In summary, this thesis attempts to address a major gap in the academic literature by 
addressing the nexus of economic reform and Hindu nationalism in India. This is a 
potentially rich area of investigation that, so far, seems largely unacknowledged. This thesis 
draws upon a number of factors to answer how these two trends are related: domestic 
factors and international factors. Through original research, factors will be examined for 
their role in the process of economic policy formation. Finally, I will show that the 
underlying transnational context was central to the process of economic policy reform. Links 
to the global context through a class of transnational elites are what enabled the process of 
neoliberal reform to continue throughout the term of the NDA. In order to provide an 
outline of the argument in this thesis, a brief summary of the individual chapters is provided 
below. 
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1.7. An outline of the thesis by chapter 
This section will briefly outline the argument of the thesis by chapter. Following this 
introductory chapter, chapter 2 examines the role of ideology in influencing the BJP-led 
government’s economic policy formation. It begins by posing two related questions: can 
a uniquely Hindu nationalist economic vision be articulated and if so how did this vision 
influence the development of a Hindu nationalist economic policy? In seeking to answer 
the first question it examines the writings of Deendayal Upadhyaya and the philosophy of 
Integral Humanism, an early attempt to articulate a coherent Hindu nationalist economic 
policy. A Hindu nationalist economic agenda is broadly defined as synthesis of the liberal 
critique of socialism and Gandhianism, reformulated in the language of traditional Hindu 
concepts. This philosophy is summarized under the rubrics swadeshi and vikendrikaran.  
 
The influence of these ideas on the development of a Hindu nationalist economic policy 
is demonstrated through an engagement with the economic policy statements of the 
Bharatiya Jana Sangh (1951-1980). These statements document the responses of this 
political party to the then dominant deficit driven centralized planning model. The 
chapter concludes that Hindu nationalist ideas influenced the economic policy formation 
of this party and that therefore a historically ‘classic’ Hindu nationalist position on 
economic issues can be delineated. The significance of this finding is that the economic 
position of the BJP can be compared and contrasted with the ‘classic’ policy positions of 
40 
 
 
 
 
Integral Humanism and the BJS to see if there was indeed divergence from this original 
Hindu nationalist economic vision in the BJP-led NDA government. 
 
I argue that there was indeed a divergence in approach between the classis Hindu 
nationalist positions and the economic policy of the BJP led government. The rest of this 
thesis seeks to answer where this divergence came from. Chapter 3 is an examination of the 
domestic factors that influenced the economic policy formation of the NDA government. 
The choice of factors stems from the literature on decision making in the public realm 
(public choice) and the particular characteristics of the NDA government. These include the 
political allies in the NDA coalition, organized interest groups in the Sangh Parivar and 
organized commercial interest groups, and the voters who had newly elected the NDA 
coalition to power.  
 
The analysis shows that coalition partners both influenced and were influenced by the BJP. 
Particularly on the issue of fiscal policy, the BJP was able to influence the policies of state 
level coalition partners while on politically sensitive issues, such as subsidies, coalition 
partners were able to resist the influence of the BJP. Among organized interest groups, I 
show that the BJP was (counterintuitively) resistant to the input of the very Sangh Parivar 
body created to address economic issues, the Swadeshi Jagaran Manch. Meanwhile, the BJP 
maintained close relationships with at least one national commercial chamber of commerce 
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(FICCI) which helped the BJP formulate some of its key policy reforms (e.g. the deregulation 
of the insurance sector). Finally, among voters, I show that the BJP maintained a loyal 
constituency among upper and upper middle class voters and right of centre voters. 
However the BJP did not initially engender support from pro-business voters. The analysis 
indicates that dissatisfaction among these voters may well have influenced the BJP towards 
making eventual progress on privatization. 
 
Overall, an analysis of domestic factors gives the impression of policy created as an outcome 
of domestic influences vying for influence. Depending on the policy area, the influence of 
coalition partners, interest groups or the reaction of voters would have influenced the 
NDA’s decision on individual policies. This however, portrays the NDA’s economic policy 
formation as a reactive and ad hoc exercise with no underlying rationale. Given that an 
examination of domestic factors is only able to explain the process of economic policy 
formation in this limited (and unsatisfactory) manner, the investigation turns outward 
towards an examination of international factors.  
 
In an examination of international factors, the focus of chapter 4 is on international 
institutions which are a major source of policy influence in the international economy. This 
chapter concludes that the World Bank and World Trade Organization influenced the 
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policies of the NDA government although to differing degrees and for dissimilar reasons. A 
further examination of other possible incentives for reform, centres on Foreign Direct 
Investment from Multinational Corporations. This examination shows that while priming the 
economy for investment through the implementation of policies recommended by 
international institutions, the BJP-led government failed to meet its goals for international 
investment. Thus on their own international institutions can account for a limited level of 
influence on the BJP’s economic agenda. One key conclusion of this chapter is that the 
influence of international institutions was successful when it aligned with other factors such 
as domestic influences or global economic conditions. This was especially true for fiscal and 
trade policy reform. Once again, while providing a further layer of explanation, an 
examination of international factors fall short of providing a complete explanation for the 
NDA’s economic policy formation. For example, the NDA achieved significant policy 
milestones (e.g. disinvestment) with little input from international institutions. In addition, if 
policy formation depended on an alignment between international institutions and 
domestic factors, how do we explain how this alignment translated into actual policy?  
 
We are left with explanations for policy formation that suggest an underlying logic or 
rationale: a rationale that links the influence of domestic factors with the influence of 
international factors. This link is provided by the transnational agents of the global 
neoliberal informational economy. Since the focus of this thesis is the economy, chapter 5 
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examines the role of global cities and transnational policy officials in senior government and 
advisory roles. These agents account for both the origin and propagation of the whole series 
of economic policy reforms undertaken by the NDA government. Given their personal 
education at elite business and public administration institutions in the West and 
professional experiences at international institutions, these individuals linked domestic 
policy formation with the priorities of international institutions. I therefore provide a fuller 
picture of an economic policy formation process that originated with transnational 
bureaucrats and was assisted by the alignment of domestic and international factors.  
 
A concluding chapter sketches out the major argument again with evidence drawn from the 
individual chapters. It then discusses the trajectory of the BJP’s fall and re-emergence over 
the last ten years and the implications of these political fortunes on the economic positions 
of the BJP. It concludes with some comments on the future of the economy under a second 
BJP led government. 
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Chapter 2: In Search of Dharma: Integral Humanism, Economic 
Policy and the Bharatiya Jana Sangh 
 
2.1. Introduction  
The over-arching research question of this thesis is what influenced the neoliberal economic 
policy formation of the BJP-led NDA government. This chapter will address a key source of 
influence: the political ideology of Hindu nationalism and its contribution to economic policy 
formation. In narrowing the scope of the research question to the issue of ideological 
heritage this chapter poses the two following questions. First, what if anything can be said 
about a Hindu nationalist economic agenda? For example, is there a coherent set of ideas 
espoused by Hindu nationalist political parties that can be clearly distinguished from the 
ideas and policies of other political parties? Secondly, can these ideas be shown to have 
influenced the economic policy formation of Hindu nationalist political parties?  
 
This chapter responds with a yes to both questions. A historical review of the development 
of Hindu nationalist economic thinking reveals that a unique set of Hindu nationalist 
economic ideas (Integral Humanism) can be identified. A further investigation shows that 
these ideas in turn informed the economic policy positions of a Hindu nationalist political 
party. This chapter examines the influence of Integral Humanism on the economic policy 
formation the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), which was the historical antecedent to the BJP. By 
focusing on the BJS and the role of ideology on its economic policy positions, this chapter 
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demonstrates how the development of Integral Humanism as a critique of the Planning 
process deeply influenced the actual critique of Planning by a Hindu nationalist political 
party. Together, the discussion of Integral Humanism and its influence on the BJS will serve 
to provide an outline of the ‘classic’ economic positions of Hindu nationalism. 
 
This chapter takes the following trajectory. First, in order to set out the broader context for 
the discussion, it begins with a discussion of what it means to talk about a Hindu nationalist 
economics. It answers that a Hindu nationalist economics combines elements of classical 
Hindu philosophy, Gandhian thought and a critical stance against the prevailing socialism of 
the immediate post-independence era. The next section introduces the key personality 
behind the formulation of Hindu nationalist economic ideas, Deendayal Upadhyaya. It 
discusses his main economic ideas, in a system of philosophy he entitled Integral Humanism 
and how these ideas provided a critique of the dominant economic model of the time in 
India. This section will show that Upadhyaya attempted to build a unique synthesis of 
Gandhian thinking, concepts from classical Hindu philosophy and elements of 
contemporaneous political thought such the liberal critique of socialism. 
 
A subsequent section introduces the dominant economic policy paradigm of post-
independence India against which Integral Humanism was developed: the Planning process. 
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It will show that in failing to deliver expected levels of growth, Planning engendered an 
assortment of critiques, including Hindu nationalist alternatives to economic policy. The 
next sections focus on the second major point of this chapter by providing an account of the 
economic positions of the BJS. Chronologically, these sections begin with the establishment 
of the Indian government's Planning Commission (1950) until the devolution of the 
Bharatiya Jana Sangh party in the late 1970s.  
 
This section shows that in key policy areas, the BJS provided critiques and policy alternatives 
directly drawn from Integral Humanism’s emphases on economic self-sufficiency (swadeshi) 
and economic decentralization (vikendrikaran). The influence of Integral Humanism is 
demonstrated by first discussing the use of the terms swadeshi and vikendrikaran in the BJS 
economic policy documents. Next, illustrations of the actual use of these concepts in 
critiquing existing policies and proposing alternatives will be provided. The implementation 
of swadeshi into the economic policy positions of the BJS is demonstrated in the party’s 
critique of Planning. The implementation of vikendrikaran into the economic policy positions 
of the BJS is shown through a discussion of the party’s policy positions on industry. The 
chapter will conclude with a review of the major arguments.  
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2.2. Hindu nationalism and the economics of self-sufficient decentralization 
The secondary literature on Hindu nationalism often uses the terms Hindu, Hindu nationalist 
and Hindutva, without a clear sense of what each of these terms represent conceptually and 
how they are distinguished from one another. Indeed these terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably, even though there are significant but subtle differences among them. As 
these terms are employed heavily in this thesis, this section will apply the necessary scrutiny 
to employ them precisely. 
 
The word ‘Hindu’ is derived from a Sanskrit term for the Indus river (sindhu). This was the 
basis for the derivative Persian term ‘Hindoo’, referring to the area east of this river. This 
was first used as a term of geographical rather than religious reference (King 1999, 98-99). 
With the advent of colonialism, the term Hindoo came into the usage of modern European 
scholars who attempted to systematize the broad cross-section of religious texts and sacred 
practices they encountered in the region into a single monolithic religious tradition. This 
systemization came with inevitable distortions, namely in the emphasis on textual (largely 
Sanskrit) sources and the attempt to understand these traditions and practices against a 
normative paradigm derived from scholarly approaches towards Judeo-Christianity (King 
1999, 102).  
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Given the hegemonic influence of such ideas during the colonial period, it is not difficult to 
understand why such a systemization was even adopted by native Indian intellectuals and 
religious figures. The ‘semitification’ of these diverse traditions under the rubric ‘Hinduism’ 
resulted in an emphasis on practices that corresponded to Judeo-Christian exclusivism, 
monotheism, fundamentalism, revivalism and even nationalism (King 1999, 104-105).  While 
this thesis recognizes the problematic nature of the term Hindu, it is employed here as a 
description of a received cultural construction. Thus in this thesis, the term Hindu denotes 
the genealogically awkward but now ubiquitous systematization of these traditions and 
practices that is even accepted as a casual point of reference in the specialized academic 
discipline of Religious Studies (Smith 1991, 12). 
 
As a cognate to the word Hindu, the concept Hindutva was first used by the Indian 
nationalist V. D. Savarkar to denote a political identity rather than an identification of purely 
religious import. This is a significant distinction as Hindutva does not purport to be a variety 
of Hinduism.  In his foundational tract Hindutva: Who is a Hindu, Savarkar makes the 
following distinction: 
The concept of the term Hindutva – ‘Hinduness’ – is more comprehensive than the word ‘Hinduism’. 
It was to draw a pointed attention to this that I coined the words ‘Hindutva’, ‘Pan Hindu’, ‘Hindudom’ 
when I framed the definition of the word ‘Hindu’. Hinduism concerns with [sic] the religious system of 
the Hindus, their theology and dogma (Sharma 2003, 159). 
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Savarkar begins by making this sharp distinction. One the one hand he defines a religious 
and theological system: Hinduism. In contrast to this, he defines Hindutva as a 
comprehensive term for the political identity of the peninsula bounded by the Himalayas to 
the north and the ocean to the south (Jaffrelot 2007, 14). Religious (or Hindu) elements 
form only a part of this political identity, which includes a common language, racial lineage 
and geographical origin. Thus Hindutva aspires to be a more comprehensive cultural, racial 
and geographic identity of which the practice of the Hindu religion is only a part. Even the 
practice of the Hindu religion seems optional to a subject’s identification in Hindutva as long 
as the tripartite foundation (language, race and geography) is shared among subjects. In this 
regard Savarkar’s definition of Hindutva largely borrowed from European notions of ethnic 
nationhood (Sharma 2003, 1-13). 
 
Hindu nationalism is the term employed by scholars to identify the variety of ethno-religious 
nationalism that emerged in the milieu of early twentieth century India. This form of 
nationalism emerged largely through the aegis of Hindu revivalists (e.g. the Arya Samaj) and 
the identity based political mobilization that began with groups such as the Hindu 
Mahasabha (Jaffrelot 2007, 12-14). It is within this milieu that Savarkar formulated the ideas 
of Hindutva. In this thesis, ‘Hindu nationalism’ will be the broader term used to describe the 
political mobilization of Hindutva by intellectuals, parties such as the BJS and BJP and their 
affiliate groups in the Sangh Parivar. 
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With these clarifications made, how do they contribute to an understanding of a Hindu 
nationalist economic philosophy? Political parties such as the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and 
Bharatiya Janata Party and organizations that advocate Hindutva have commonly been 
placed toward the right of the political spectrum. As ‘right-wing’ nationalist groups, 
however, there appears to be little in common between the Hindu nationalist economic 
agenda and the corporate fascism of the ‘far-right’ parties of Europe, or even the pro-
market 'right-wing' policies that were espoused by India’s own Swatantra Party (Desai 2005, 
54). To be sure, some have pointed to the Sangh Parivar's opposition to the Nehruvian 
dirigisme as a shared cause with the economic liberalism common among ‘right’ political 
parties (Chhibber 2001, 164). However, as I shall show below, this is an incidental 
commonality rather than a reflection of ideological similarities.  
 
Hindutva implies a territorial sacrality where the ‘fatherland’ also becomes the ‘holy land’ 
(Savarkar 1942, 92-93). This sacred dimension to Hindutva suggests the influence of sacred 
traditions such as Hinduism. Do the ethical concerns of Hinduism inform the economic 
approach of Hindu nationalism? This necessitates a brief digression on what it means to 
speak of the nexus between ethics, religion and the economy. Within the European 
tradition, notions of redistributive justice are evident as far back as the Old Testament. The 
modern discipline of economics emerged from the moral philosophy of the European 
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Enlightenment where Adam Smith’s notion of commercial self-interest took shape within 
the larger framework of moral philosophy (Heilbroner 1999, 42-43).  
 
The most explicit connection between religious ethics and economics was proposed in 
Weber’s conception of the protestant work ethic, where he ascribed a fundamentally 
religious (Calvinist) origin to the capitalist system (Weber 1958). Weber's ideas were a 
German nationalist response to the Marxian proposition that ideology was exclusively 
rooted in the material economic relations of a society (Giddens 1971, 193-195). In this 
regard, Weber's motivations mirror those of the chief Hindu nationalist economic ideologue 
Deendayal Upadhyaya who was keen to provide a viable nationalist alternative to the purely 
material concerns of socialist Planning.  
   
In an historical context, the general economic view espoused by Hindu nationalists could be 
described as an opposition to Nehruvian socialism while espousing a variety of Gandhian 
traditionalism (Lal 1993, 418). As a rhetorical strategy, the appeal to Gandhian values is not 
restricted to Hindu nationalists. However, 'Gandhian economics' and the Hindu nationalist 
'Integral Humanism' share a number of common features that are worth exploring. Gandhi 
provides an appropriate starting point for this discussion, especially given the recent 
resurgence in the interest of Gandhi as an economic philosopher (Dasgupta 1996; Sharma 
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1997; Pani 2002). Gandhi's most well-known statements on economics took the form of 
pithy salvos aimed at the foundations of the modern economic system: from mechanized 
industrialization and agriculture to the law of supply and demand. However, beyond these 
statements, the substance of Gandhi's economic thinking advocated values drawn from 
India's social and cultural heritage including discerning consumption, ethical leadership and 
sustainability. 
 
In an attempt to emulate the Gandhian critique, foundational concepts from Hindu 
philosophy were mobilized to formulate a Hindu nationalist economic philosophy that 
would encourage self-sufficiency within the borders of the nation. To begin with, the 
existing economic systems were criticised from an ethical standpoint. Major criticisms 
included the propositions that modern economic systems dehumanized individuals through 
a narrow view of human nature; misdirected the proceeds of production; made competitors 
out of labour and technology; and, in at least the case of capitalism, reversed the 
relationship between human needs and production. This latter reversal in particular created 
an inherent instability within the system.  
 
A key moral concept in the Sanskrit sources, dharma offered a starting point for the first 
explicit exposition of a Hindu nationalist economic policy by Deendayal Upadhyaya (Jaffrelot 
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2007, 125). In place of the existing economic models, Upadhyaya outlined an alternative 
economic strategy that would promote dharma. This strategy consisted of the twin pillars of 
swadeshi (self-sufficiency) and vikendrikaran (decentralization): a Gandhian model without 
the total rejection of modernity. It is to a detailed examination of Upadhyaya’s economic 
system that this chapter now turns. 
 
2.3. Deendayal Upadhyaya (1916-1968): From Integral Humanism to a critique of 
Planning 
Most of the sources on the life and thought of Deendayal Upadhyaya consist of his own 
extant writings and the secondary accounts of loyal acolytes. The latter sources tend to be 
of a deeply sympathetic and almost hagiographic nature and a critical and sustained study 
of the man and his thinking is still lacking in the academic literature. It is tempting to 
attribute this relative obscurity to the unassuming personality Upadhyaya’s biographers 
ascribe to him. However, it is more likely that since even at the time of his death Hindu 
nationalism remained out of the political mainstream, his biography elicited little interest 
outside of this parochial circle.  
 
Upadhyaya's humble beginnings appear incontrovertible. Born into a Marwari family from 
Uttar Pradesh, he was orphaned at an early age and lost his only sibling while being raised 
by a maternal uncle. Despite these personal losses, the young Upadhyaya demonstrated 
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considerable application to his academic work, receiving a scholarship from the Maharaja of 
Sikar and passing his Intermediate Board Exams with, it is claimed, the highest marks 
achieved at the institution until that time. A double gold medal and a further scholarship 
took him to college where he completed a BA in mathematics and was introduced to the 
Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. Following an aborted MA in English Literature in Agra, he 
completed a second degree in engineering (B.T.) before being selected for the regional civil 
service in a competitive recruitment scheme. The biographers take obvious delight in 
maintaining that Upadhyaya rejected this offer in favour of joining the RSS as a full-time 
pracharak (Gain 1999; Soni n.d., 1-10).  
 
When Shyam Prasad Mookherjee (1901-1953) resigned from the first Indian government 
cabinet over the settlement of the Kashmir issue reached by Liaquat Khan and Nehru (in 
1951), Upadhyaya was appointed General Secretary of Mookherjee's newly formed 
Bharatiya Jana Sangh party. He later assumed de facto leadership after the sudden death of 
Mookherjee in 1953. Over the next fifteen years, Upadhyaya built the party into a small but 
significant political force until he too passed in 1968 under suspicious circumstances while 
taking an overnight train from Lucknow to Patna; his body was found the next morning by 
the tracks of a railway station in the town of Mughal Sarai near Varanasi (Soni n.d., 10). 
Apart from an impressive organizational legacy, Upadhyaya left behind a small corpus of 
writings which outlined his thoughts on politics, philosophy and economics. Among these, 
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the most significant for this thesis are The Two Plans (1958) and Integral Humanism (1965), 
which detail his thoughts on the economy. 
 
2.3.1. Integral Humanism  
This section will provide an overview of Upadhyaya's philosophical system, Integral 
Humanism, with special regard to its prescriptions for the economy. It will begin with some 
brief comments on the context in which this system was developed, its intellectual lineage 
and a brief synopsis of its central argument. This is followed by a deeper engagement with 
its main ideas and critiques.  
 
The first attempt at a formulation of Integral Humanism came in a BJS party resolution 
entitled 'Principles and Policies' adopted in January 1965. This was well into the period 
Upadhyaya assumed the role as the BJS General Secretary. These ideas were further 
developed in a series of four lectures given by Upadhyaya in Mumbai in April 1965. These 
lectures were given as an attempt to create a distinctive agenda for the Bharatiya Jana 
Sangh as it began to make small inroads into the political mainstream through its social 
activism on the issues of cow slaughter and its imminent participation in the Samyukta 
Vidhayak Dal state coalition governments (circa 1967). The talks were later collected into a 
volume eponymously entitled Integral Humanism (1965). Upadhyaya's own justification for 
the project was the concern that political parties in India had adopted 'Western' ideologies 
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that 'cannot fulfil the aspirations of Bharat' (Upadhyaya 1965b). Integral Humanism is 
nothing short of an attempt to provide a systematic philosophy of the individual and society 
from first principles.  
 
However the entire tract numbers less than seventy pages in total and is scarcely detailed. 
Facts, figures and concepts are not sourced. Historical illustrations, from the emergence of 
democracy in Europe to the leadership lessons of Lincoln and DeGaulle, are drawn from a 
variety of cases and discussed uncritically in the space of a few lines to support the 
argument being constructed. In crucial places, arguments are reduced to pithy analogies 
such as, 'if fire loses heat, it does not remain fire any longer' (Upadhyaya 1965). Despite 
such deficiencies, Upadhyaya’s aspiration was to develop an 'integral' approach to economic 
and social problems, as an alternative to what he criticized as the narrow materialist focus 
of the prevalent laissez-faire and socialist paradigms. This 'integral' approach would also 
incorporate non-material aspects of the human and social condition such as ethics, desire 
and patriotism and thereby provide a full-blown humanistic assessment of economic 
problems.  
 
Given the scarcity of reliable sources on Upadhyaya, it is difficult to provide a close 
delineation of his intellectual lineage. However some broad influences are evident. The idea 
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of a philosophical system that could integrate material and non-material concerns was by no 
means Upadhyaya's own innovation. Similar formulations were provided by his 
contemporaries including Aurobindo Ghosh (1999) in India and Arthur Koestler in Europe 
(1967). Although Upadhyaya mentions Gunnar Myrdal, Integral Humanism is otherwise 
surprisingly devoid of references to the theoretical considerations of the prominent 
developmental economists of the time such as Albert Hirschman, Raul Prebish or Arthur 
Lewis (Gilpin 2001, 307).  
 
The title Integral Humanism seems to have been inspired by the Catholic political 
philosopher Jacques Maritain whose own volume Integral Humanism (1936) also outlined a 
philosophy developed in response to social and political systems in Europe that assumed an 
a priori materialism. Hindu nationalist sources mention Maritain as something of an 
intellectual interlocutor but are reluctant to label him an influence on Upadhyaya 
(Deshmukh n.d.). However given Upadhyaya’s holistic view of human nature as both 
material and spiritual and his criticisms of both capitalism and communism as unable to 
enable the full actualization of an individual's humanity (Joyce 2000), Maritain deserves 
some credit as laying the foundations for a critique that Upadhyaya would transfer from the 
European to the Indian context.  
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On socio-economic issues Upadhyaya's thinking reflected Gandhi's rejection of the uncritical 
adoption of modern industrialism, and the latter’s advocacy of an alternative (though 
somewhat idealized) socio-political structure centred on village economies. Upadhyaya's 
unique contribution was a synthesis of these views communicated in familiar cultural and 
philosophical concepts. In the words of one contemporary advocate of Integral Humanism: 
The spiritual element is absent in the thinking of both Adam Smith and Karl Marx. Again Upadhyaya 
and Thengadi did not propound any new concept. They actually expounded the cultural orientation of 
India largely founded on the concept 'purushartha'... They were relating the contemporary times [sic] 
to the eternal values which have sustained India (S. Gurumurthy, Personal Email Communication, 
2012).  
 
According to this view, the general approach of Integral Humanism is not novel but rather 
the application of a framework from classical Hinduism (purushartha) to a critique of 
contemporary economic systems.  
 
In the early twentieth century, a popularization of integral thinking in India was 
accomplished through the modern Indian philosopher Aurobindo Ghosh's system of poorna 
yoga (Ghosh 1999) which attempted to integrate the various aspects of yoga practice into 
an integrated system. Integral Humanism situated its own holistic orientation within the 
framework of purushartha which is a taxonomy of human aspirations: dharma (order), artha 
(wealth) kama (desire) and moksha (salvation). In setting out his system, Upadhyaya 
appealed to this framework as well as to the Vedic analogy between the mirco and 
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macrocosm: Yat pinde tad brahmande (what is in the microcosm is also in the macrocosm). 
The distinctness of this approach is summarized by Upadhyaya in the following way: 
The first characteristic of Bharatiya culture is that it looks upon life as an integrated whole. It has  an 
integrated viewpoint. To think of parts may be proper for a specialist but it is not useful  from the 
practical standpoint. The confusion in the West arises primarily from its tendency to think of life in 
sections and then to attempt to put them together by patch work. We do admit that there is diversity 
and plurality in life but we have always attempted to discover the unity behind them. This attempt is 
thoroughly scientific (Upadhyaya 1965, 18). 
 
Whereas in an ideal world of Dharma Rajya, the state would be superfluous, the attempt to 
integrate various specialized and isolated developments of human aspiration in the current 
age requires the establishment of institutions (Upadhyaya 1965b). This is how Upadhyaya 
describes the origin and need for the institutions of the state. The goal of integration 
requires Upadhyaya to sketch out some preliminary alternative views on property, labour, 
economic structure and progress. Most significantly, no inalienable right to property exists 
in the view of integral Humanism – only a pragmatic arrangement that can properly 
promote social harmony. The ideal economic structure therefore is a decentralized 
economy that does not allow the centralization of private ownership (capitalism) or the 
centralization of institutions (communism). The ideal form of labour in such a system, freed 
of centralizing controls, would allow for the full development of all human attributes. This, 
for Upadhyaya, is the proper measure of progress and the key goal of Integral Humanism 
that distinguishes it from other economic models (Upadhyaya 1965b).  
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Having briefly looked at the intellectual roots and overall form of Integral Humanism, I now 
turn to a deeper engagement with its central ideas and its key criticisms of existing 
economic models. Upadhyaya’s economic thinking began with concerns about the shape the 
Indian economy was taking following independence (Gain 1999, 3). The first statements on 
economic philosophy argue for the place of economic democracy as part of the greater 
matrix of social and political democracy. Discussing the prevalent economic models, he 
argues that ‘laissez-faire, belongs only to the Krita-yuga’ (Upadhyaya, 1965b). A free market 
with minimal regulation can have relevance only in such an ideal state. This implies that ‘to 
ensure proper production, distribution and consumption of wealth, regulation of economy 
(Arthayama) is necessary.’ However, Upadhyaya is cautious about excessive reliance on the 
state as ‘to vest the ownership and control of all means of production to the state would 
lead to the centralisation of economic as well as political power. This would be wrong’ 
(Upadhyaya, 1965b). He then argues for a middle-ground position of the state undertaking a 
general level of economic management: 
To set the process of economic development moving, keep the economy on an even keel and for the 
attainment of the nation's basic objectives the state must undertake in general to plan, direct, 
regulate and control economic effort and in certain specific spheres and circumstances to accept the 
responsibility of ownership and management too (Upadhyaya, 1965b). 
 
Here Upadhyaya almost seems sympathetic to the project of economic planning. However, 
as I will show below, his vigorous critiques of both centrally planned and free market models 
open the way for an alternative ‘integral’ economic model. 
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This critique begins by contrasting the philosophical structure of Integral Humanism and 
Western economic models. In Upadhyaya’s interpretation dharma consists of the laws that 
maintain the indivisible national soul, or its chiti (Hansen and Jaffrelot 1998, 32; Jaffrelot, 
125). Economic issues are a subset of dharma. Inasmuch as they are related to the national 
chiti it is necessary propose a holistic alternative, an 'Integral Humanism', to the analytical 
divisions that are endemic in the Western tradition. Economic considerations are therefore 
part of a broader political and social philosophy and not removed from these 
considerations. Thus economic problems cannot be addressed in isolation from other social 
and political issues. It is this holistic approach alone, Upadhyaya maintains, that could allow 
for the full realization of individuals:  
We must have such an economic system which helps in the developments of our humane qualities, or 
civilization and enables us to attain a still higher level of all round perfection… which does not make 
us slaves of its own grinding wheels (Upadhyaya 1965). 
 
An integral approach puts human beings first, rejecting abstracting centralizated structures 
(both capitalist and communist) in favour of swadeshi and vikendrikaran. 
 
Upadhyaya shared Gandhi’s scepticism regarding modernity, specifically with regard to 
modern economic systems. Rather than improving the conditions of people, he believed 
that modern economic systems dehumanized them:  
Capitalism only has a concept of economic man, who (or whose labour) is to be  bought and sold as a 
commodity while Socialism only thinks of abstract man in a rigid framework, with no individual 
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freedom. The capitalistic system thought merely of the economic man, but left him free in other fields 
where he could exercise his individuality. The socialist system  went much further, thinking only of the 
abstract man. After that, there was no scope for the  development of the individual personality based 
on diverse tastes and abilities. Both these systems, capitalist as well as communist, have failed to take 
account of the Integral Man, his true and complete personality and his aspirations. One considers him 
a mere selfish being lingering after money, having only one law, the law of fierce competition, in 
essence the law of the jungle; whereas the other has viewed him as a feeble lifeless cog in the whole 
scheme of things, regulated by rigid rules, and incapable of any good unless directed. The 
centralization of power, economic and political, is implied in both. Both, therefore, result in 
dehumanization of man (Upadhyaya 1965). 
 
Even though they begin with different conceptions of human nature, Upadhyaya argues that 
both systems, capitalism and communism, ultimately fail to take into account the multi-
dimensional nature of human motivations, desire and capacities. Inevitably they even lead 
to the same result, which is economic and political centralization and the dehumanization of 
the individual. Furthermore, he argues, neither system is able to provide the even 
distribution of resources that they aspire to: 
The capitalists consider capital and enterprise as important components of production and hence 
they take a major share of profits; they think it is their due. On the other hand, communists believe 
only labour to be the main factor in production. Therefore they concede the major share of 
production to the labourers. Neither of these ideas is correct (Upadhyaya 1965). 
 
Under the capitalist system in particular, Upadhyaya, like Gandhi, criticized the neoclassical 
axiom of supply and demand, commenting on its connection to economic deprivation: 
 Normally desire precedes the efforts at producing the things desired... if the demand does not 
 exist, systematic efforts are made to create demand. This has become the chief characteristic of  the 
 western economic movement... If whatever is manufactured is not consumed, there will be 
 depression. Some of us may remember the great depression of 1930-32. There was abundance of 
 goods at that time but there was no demand (Upadhyaya 1965). 
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Here the inversion of the relationship between production and demand is where the source 
of economic depressions is identified. This inversion occurs where demand follows 
production rather than what Upadhyaya views as the more natural course of production 
following demand. When production is prioritized over demand, the source of prosperity 
and happiness is mistakenly rooted in the ability to find markets for goods already produced 
(Gain 1999, 15). 
 
This further implies that social inequality originates when consumers do not have according 
to their needs, but according to their purchasing power. This leads to an inevitable scarcity 
for essential goods among those of limited means (Gain 1999, 17). Consumption oriented 
societies also disturb the balance of nature. Man versus nature is a false image for 
Upadhyaya, with nature itself as an important factor of production. In a typically pithy 
analogy Upadhyaya argues that when fruits are taken from a tree, the tree itself should not 
be harmed – ‘milking’ rather than exploitation is the ideal. Thus contrary to the consumer 
philosophy, the happiness of individuals is achieved through the minimal use of resources 
(Upadhyaya 1965). 
 
By inverting the ‘natural’ relationships between work, production and consumption, these 
models are further criticized for distorting the labour market: 
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Similarly any system which obstructs the production activity of the people is self-destructive... The 
guarantee of work to every able bodied member of the society, should be the aim of our economic 
system. Today we witness a very strange situation. On the one hand, a ten-year-old child and seventy-
year-old man are toiling and on the other hand a youth of twenty five is driven to suicide for want of 
work. We shall have to remove this mismanagement (Upadhyaya 1965). 
 
Here Upadhyaya makes a telling statement about the ultimate goal of the economy under 
the view of Integral Humanism. The aim of the economic system is not necessarily high rates 
of growth, but the ability to afford those who are able to work the opportunity to do so. In 
an integral economic model, every able-bodied person must contribute to society, which 
necessitates the creation of full employment. How will this be achieved? Here Upadhyaya’s 
reasoning returns to its critique of the consumer economy. He argues that the capital 
required to create full employment is possible only through savings and restrained 
consumption – poor countries go into debt when they try to ape the rich for this reason 
(Gain 1999, 19).  
 
Upadhyaya is therefore able to connect his critique of the capitalist economy and 
consumers with the goal of creating suitable roles for workers in an integral economy. 
However, greater capital investment in a modern age could imply the loss of jobs to 
mechanized industry. In order to overcome this tension, Upadhyaya engages the critique of 
modernization which was also central to Gandhi’s economic thinking. Here, however, 
Upadhyaya charted a middle road between technology, labour and the needs of the 
country. Gandhi's chief criticism of industrialism was that machinery was unsuited to the 
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Indian context. He feared that this would remove employment opportunities from the 
majority of India’s vast population:  
What applies to America and England does not necessarily apply to India. India has in her teeming 
millions so many superfluous days that it does not need to free the energy of her sons for superior or 
more remunerative work through highly developed machinery. In her 350 million children she has so 
many living ready-made machines and if she can utilize their labour, half of which is running to waste, 
the double starvation of the body and the mind will cease (Gandhi 1999a, 324). 
 
As an alternative, Upadhyaya proposed a strategy to develop a 'Bharatiya technology' i.e. 
technology adapted to the country’s factor endowments: 
But if the machine is such that it requires only a few men to run it, then the rest of the people will be 
thrown out of employment... Whereas a machine ties up only the capital invested in it in past [sic], 
the unemployed people have to be fed... Full employment must be a primary consideration… We are 
importing the machines and hence, we have little knowledge. We shall have to develop a Bharatiya 
technology (Upadhyaya 1965). 
 
For Upadhyaya, machines are an important form of capital that must assist labour and not 
compete with it. Machines are both time and place relative, which is why ‘blindly’ importing 
machines would not create the best social and political outcomes. A Bharatiya technology 
would be a technology that is suited to India’s own factor endowments of plentiful labour 
and raw materials (Gain 1999, 20). Such technologies would emphasize human inputs. They 
would therefore be employed in small scale cottage industries rather than the heavy 
industry of the centralized models which come with all of the undesirable implications for 
the integral fulfilment of workers. A system integrating appropriate technology with 
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abundant human inputs would constitute a decentralized economy capable of enabling 
workers to achieve integral wholeness. 
 
Upadhyaya outlined his own economic vision broadly as swadeshi (self-sufficiency) and 
vikendrikaran (decentralization): the Gandhian model without the total rejection of 
modernity. The association of swadeshi with Hindu nationalism began as far back as the 
deployment of swadeshi as an exclusionary principle within the broader stream of Hindu 
revivalism where Hindu nationalism also had roots (Jenkins 2010, 603). However, 
Upadhyaya largely inherits his conceptualization of swadeshi from Gandhi. In Gandhi's use 
of the term, swadeshi constitutes a life philosophy that at its base constitutes altruistic 
service to one's neighbours in every action that is undertaken. In economic terms, this 
means only engaging in actions that would economically support one's local community. At 
the time of the independence movement, this was manifested in the use of domestic 
products e.g. cloths (khadi) over foreign imports.  The implementation of this philosophy in 
the Indian independence movement took the form of the economic nativism that was 
popularized by a swadeshi social movement (Goswami 1998, 623). Gandhi's own 
understanding of the term went beyond the cause of independence to a vision of localized 
economic self-sufficiency (Heredia 1999). Gandhi therefore promoted a 'weak' form of 
economic nationalism based on ethical preference and individual choice through which 
basic needs could be satisfied in local economies.  
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For Upadhyaya, the aim of development is for human beings to advance in all of their 
capacities rather than merely in their material endowments. This is only possible in a 
decentralized economic system, with an emphasis on swadeshi (Gain 1999, 21): 
'Swadeshi' and 'Decentralization' are the two words which can briefly summarize the economic policy 
suitable for the present circumstances... We have grown over-dependent upon foreign aid in 
everything from thinking, management, capital, methods of production, technology, etc. to even the 
standards and forms of consumption. This is not the road to progress and development. We shall 
forget our individuality and become virtual slaves once again (Upadhyaya 1965). 
 
In summary Upadhyaya’s economic vision consisted of an original synthesis of a Gandhian 
critique of modern economic systems and the proposal of a holistic alternative. The critique 
argued that modern economic models dehumanized individuals through a narrow view of 
human nature, misdirected the proceeds of production, made competitors out of labour 
and technology and, in at least the case of capitalism, reversed the natural relationship 
between human needs and production. Together, these created an inherent instability 
within modern economic systems. Upadhyaya’s solution was an alternative system that 
emphasized self-reliance (swadeshi) and decentralization (vikendrikaran). Together, these 
economic attributes would engage the capacity of India’s own abundant resources while 
allowing space for individuals to develop without the threat of a restrictive state or inverted 
economic priorities. Ultimately, in Upadhyaya's vision of Integral Humanism, such a 
framework would nourish the possibilities for human beings to grow in all of their various 
dimensions. Having examined the economic thought of Deendayal Upadhyaya, I now turn to 
its application to the process of centralized economic Planning in India. 
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2.3.2. Integral Humanism and Planning 
With this general overview of Upadhyaya’s economic philosophy in mind, this chapter now 
turns to his specific criticisms of economic policy in India. Upadhyaya’s most comprehensive 
statements on the Indian economy take form in his volume The Two Plans: Promises, 
Performance Prospects, where he presents his thoughts on the general idea of Planning and 
the first two Five Year Plans implemented by the Indian central government.  
 
On the rationale for Planning he states,  
Although most of the developed countries of the world have attained their present level of economic 
development without any plan and therefore some people feel that planning is not necessary but 
positively undesirable, yet the general consensus of opinion is that if the under-developed countries 
desire to achieve in a shorter span of time what the developed nations achieved during a century or 
more, they cannot leave it to an evolutionary process (Upadhyaya 1958, 17). 
 
For newly independent countries, Upadhyaya appreciated that Planning was the 
government’s means of exercising economic independence (Upadhyaya 1958, 22). He made 
the observation that the immediate post-War economy had ‘greater national barriers than 
were present at any time in the past’ (Upadhyaya 1958, 23) and with this the mobility of 
labour, capital, management and the entrepreneur had been reduced. Greater national 
integration and greater international disintegration left room for greater Planning. However, 
despite appreciating the context through which Planning emerged, Upadhyaya saw the 
potential for the system to devolve into an authoritarian dystopia: 
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However if planning implies complete denial of individual freedom of consumption, production and 
exchange, of expression and association, if it implies rigorous controls, rationing and procurement 
and all that is associated with the Soviet system of planning, most people except of course the 
communists, would prefer poverty of a free man to planned prosperity or bondage  (Upadhyaya 1958, 
17). 
 
Two points are of note here. First, Upadhyaya understands the origins of Planning as a 
consequence of the post-War international economic system. However, he is cautious about 
the application of this approach to development. In this concern, he echoes the criticisms of 
Planning made by economic liberals such as the British economist P.T. Bauer (1961) and 
Indian economist B.R. Shenoy (1958), both former students of Frederich Hayek at the 
London School of Economics.  
 
He goes on further to critique the process of Planning. Planning, he explains, was based on a 
fourfold process: public expenditure, production targets, targets for the economy as a 
whole and the control of private enterprise. Although commonly associated with the 
communist system, Upadhyaya maintains a somewhat more neutral view on the political 
orientation of Planning: ‘under a planned economy… the state is supposed to be content not 
only with taking wider policy decisions, but directly to assume upon itself the responsibilities 
of formulating and executing programmes for economic development’ (Upadhyaya 1958,  
18). 
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Thus while intrusive, Upadhyaya understands that Planning played a vital but politically 
neutral role in a country’s economic development. Similar provisions in the US and the UK, 
were more broadly labelled as ‘policy’ rather than ‘Plans’, which he claims left the 
(necessary) illusion of vast individual freedom (Upadhyaya 1958, 18). Upadhyaya also took 
note of the irony that those who saw the germs of Marxism and totalitarianism in the 
planned approach to economic development still generally regard democracy and Planning 
as compatible. He maintained that experts, including economist Gunnar Myrdal, 
recommend central planning because of their own misplaced assumptions regarding the 
general populace: too poor ignorant and bound into old patterns to help themselves. For 
Upadhyaya this showed a ‘lack of faith in the capacities of the people’ (Upadhyaya 1958, 
21). Furthermore he maintained that: 
These conclusions are forced upon all Western experts because of their lack of faith in the philosophy 
they profess as also in their unflinching faith in the nineteenth century technology and the modern 
economic development (Upadhyaya 1958, 22). 
 
At this fundamental level, there was little difference between the Soviet Union, Europe and 
the USA. The economic systems of all three countries showed a lack of faith in individuals. 
Although Planning was in vogue, its desirability, feasibility and relationship to social and 
political values needed to be examined. In Upadhyaya's view, the cases of China and Russia 
showed that Planning and democracy are ultimately incompatible – in both states, the party 
in government and the small caucus that ruled them retained all of the power (Upadhyaya 
1958, 23).   
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Myrdal and others, Upadhyaya observed, seemed to believe even further that Planning was 
needed to preserve democracy. This was a cause of concern for Upadhyaya since to pursue 
Planning a state needed to 'assume supreme powers of controlling consumption, production 
and distribution of commodities… all this implies restricting individual freedom… so to 
preserve democracy they suggest a way where, ultimately, democracy is smothered' 
(Upadhyaya 1958, 24). While in advanced democracies (with 'deep democratic roots') this 
would not be a problem, in new democracies, Upadhyaya claimed, such an approach could 
nip democracy in the bud. Once again, Upadhyaya's concerns are reflective of his more 
illustrious contemporaries. In this case, he appears to mirror Isaiah Berlin's concerns about 
the adverse effects of positive freedom, where a government would strive on behalf on 
individuals to create the conditions for the achievement of individual self-realization, only to 
inadvertently create a restrictive system of paternalism (Berlin 1958). However, what direct 
influence, if any, Berlin's own work had on Upadhyaya is difficult to say, even if we can 
conjecture that he may have been familiar with its general tenets, given their popularity in 
the political discussions of the time.   
 
After a consideration of its theoretical dimensions, Upadhyaya moves on to an examination 
of the historical circumstances around which Planning emerged in India. Here he 
demonstrates a shrewd analysis of the international influences and domestic machinations 
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through which Planning was implemented. He begins by ascribing the historical origins of 
Planning in India to the circumstances around the independence of the country. During the 
Second World War, he recounts, the British government became concerned about the 
potential for social discontent and formed the Department of Planning to pre-empt the 
potential for such instability. Following the War the committee was charged with the 
welfare of demobbed soldiers, to prevent depressed economic conditions (due to the lack of 
war production) from stoking unrest. Furthermore, the department was charged with 
spending India’s sterling balances and re-establishing markets for British made goods – both 
policies once again in favour of the colonial power. Upadhyaya implies that these policies 
were implemented at the expense of the Indian people (Upadhyaya 1958, 29). Thus, in 
Upadhyaya's view, early Planning was a product of a colonial power's efforts to maintain its 
hegemony and extinguish the potential for social disorder. This criticism significantly 
implicates the process of Planning, at least in its origins, in the colonial project.  
 
With the onset of decolonialization following the war, economists and newly elected 
governments, conscious of the failures of laissez-faire in the 1920s, were sympathetic to the 
notion of Planning. In a less overt form of Planning, Upadhyaya cites Roosevelt and Keynes 
among others who maintained that government intervention, especially through fiscal 
policy, could keep up the demand for consumer goods (Upadhyaya 1958, 26). Here 
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Upadhyaya equates the Western Keynesian economics with the Soviet economic system as 
part of the same spectrum of planned economies.  
 
As a model for the Planning Commission, however, Upadhyaya looks closer to home and like 
Hanson (1966), whose work followed Upadhyaya chronologically, he singles out 
Visvesvarayya’s decidedly technical Planned Economy for India (1933) as the model to which 
Nehru's Planning Commission aspired. The rationale behind Visvesvarayya’s work lay in a 
concern that a poor country like India could not offer the high rate of entrepreneurial failure 
against success. However, Visvesvarayya himself was also suspicious of the potential for 
economic Planning to devolve into political authoritarianism (Upadhyaya 1958, 27).  
 
Though Visvesvarayya's recommendations were not pursued by the colonial government of 
the time, Upadhyaya maintains that this work was the basis of the efforts of the 1938 
Congress meeting chaired by Subhash Chandra Bose. At this meeting, it was resolved that 
National Planning was a necessary step to achieve the industrial development needed to 
address poverty and economic regeneration. This work also formed the basis of the National 
Planning Committee under Nehru (Upadhyaya 1958, 28). In the immediate post-
independence period Upadhyaya maintains that the Commission was keenly aware of the 
lack of reliable statistical data upon which to create an economic strategy. However, eager 
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to 'deliver something spectacular' in light of the government's failures with respect to the 
process of partition (Upadhyaya 1958, 30), Upadhyaya argues that incomplete plans from 
the colonial period were recycled in efforts that were largely uncoordinated and half-
conceived by a bureaucracy lacking the capacity to carry them through (Upadhyaya 1958, 
30, 33). The Planning enterprise was therefore lacking in the capacity to carry its work 
through properly from the very beginning.  
  
Upadhyaya's criticisms also take on an international dimension. Before the Planning 
Commission could take up its work, it was called upon by the Colombo Plan consultative 
committee to provide a six-year plan to be incorporated into the larger regional cooperative 
development strategy (Upadhyaya 1958, 34). For Upadhyaya this was an unnecessary 
distraction that had anti-nationalist implications for the Planning Commission's work. A plan 
that was purposed towards regional coordination was developed, presented and promptly 
incorporated into the first Five Year Plan. Thus the Plan's priorities, from its limits on sterling 
withdrawals and its agricultural development policy dependent on foreign aid, were 
conceived originally to coordinate with foreign interests and not with the national interest 
at heart (Upadhyaya 1958, 34).  
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In this section I have reviewed Upadhyaya’s evaluation of the Planning model. While 
understanding the need for some level of government directed economic stewardship, a 
view in line with Integral Humanism, he was nevertheless critical of several aspects of 
Planning. He was concerned about the potential for Planning to turn into political 
authoritarianism and suspicious of the colonial origins of Planning. His interpretation of the 
early history of the Planning process showed that it was both under-resourced in quality 
data on which to base its decisions and anti-national in its derivation from a larger plan for 
regional cooperation. These critiques begin with some of the concerns of Integral Humanism 
but go much further into the historical particularities of the first two Plans. Together these 
perspectives were adopted by the Bharatiya Jana Sangh and would lay the foundations for 
the first economic policy proposals of a Hindu nationalist political party. 
 
2.4. Towards an Economic Policy for Hindu Nationalism 
So far this chapter has reviewed the economic philosophy of Integral Humanism and the 
criticisms of the Planning process formulated by Deendayal Upadhyaya. By drawing out the 
economic positions of Integral Humanism, the chapter has documented the synthesis of 
ideas and resulting economic positions undertaken by Integral Humanism. It has argued that 
there is a unique set of economic positions taken by Hindu nationalism and that these ideas, 
along with the historical circumstances of the time, informed the criticisms of the Indian 
government’s planned economic model. This section will build on the previous sections to 
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show how a Hindu nationalist party, the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, viewed the Planning process. 
It will also show how the BJS drew from Integral Humanism to both critique Planning and 
propose its own economic agenda. 
 
The remainder of this chapter provides an extended overview of the economic policy 
proposals of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh. These are gathered from the party's economic 
resolutions passed at their national executive meetings in response to the government's 
successive Five Year Plans. Along with the party's election manifestos, these statements 
provide by far the most comprehensive record of the economic platforms of the BJS. The 
resolutions are critical appraisals of the form, achievements and shortfalls of the Planning 
process and provide both critiques of existing policy and outlines of policy alternatives. They 
cover a great deal of ground, taking to task everything from the technical aspects of the 
Planning model  to avuncular concerns about the 'wasteful expenditure of foreign exchange 
by our foreign missions and other delegations roaming abroad' (BJS 1956, 35).  
 
The purpose of the remainder of the chapter is two-fold: to show that a Hindu nationalist 
party proposed a unique set of criticisms and policies on economic issues and that these 
positions drew from the economic philosophy of Integral Humanism. Integral Humanism 
was first named as the ethical framework for the BJS in its document 'Principles and Policy' 
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in 1965 (Graham 2007, 215). As we have seen above, at the core of Integral Humanism’s 
economic philosophy is a system of self-reliance (swadeshi) and decentralization 
(vikendrikaran) that it claims is necessary to encourage human flourishing in all its 
dimensions. Integral Humanism is critical of other economic systems (such as Planning) due 
to their inability to address human needs in their multiple dimensions and this view is 
reflected in the economic position of the BJS. 
 
The rest of this chapter therefore makes the case that the chief influence on the economic 
agenda of the BJS was Integral Humanism. However, before proceeding, I must briefly 
consider whether this unnecessarily narrows the scope of this investigation. Much as 
Upadhyaya drew out his economic philosophy by engaging with both traditional and 
contemporary ideas, the economic programme of the BJS could well have benefited from 
interactions with their political interlocutors. Here the Swatantra Party, and its agenda of 
liberal economic reform, is of particular relevance. Indeed the formation of state level 
Samyukta Vidhayak Dal coalition governments that included both the BJS and the Swatantra 
Party also suggest the possibility that informal dialogue or discussions on economic issues 
may have taken place between the parties. Occasionally in its critiques of the Planning 
model, the BJS mirrors the liberal economic views of the Swatantra Party (Swatantra Party 
1962). For example, an early Presidential address in 1956 given by Deva Prasad Ghosh 
states: 
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Logically and inevitably, socialism leads to totalitarian states of the monolithic type - in which one 
party reigns  supreme, all activities of the State are controlled by the party, elections become a farce 
and a mockery, and all  initiative and enterprise (and not merely in the economic field) banned... 
Individuals are reduced to the status of mere cogs in the wheels of a vast State machinery which 
controls all social activities and becomes a Leviathan under the pressure of which the people are 
smothered. A socialist State becomes a slave State; and if socialism does bring about equality, it is 
equality in slavery and serfdom (Jhangiani 1969, 74). 
 
This statement gives the impression of a ‘Hayekian’ criticism of the dangers of economic 
Planning, where a lack of economic freedom would inevitably lead to a lack of political 
freedom. This is a critique along the classic Swatantra Party line (Erdman 1967, 67). 
However on other points, such as the Swatantra Party’s advocacy of modernised industry, 
there are significant differences with the BJS especially given the latter’s advocacy of 
‘appropriate technology’. It would therefore be inaccurate to portray the Swatantra Party as 
a direct source of influence. Even on the seemingly economically liberal BJS criticisms of 
Planning, similar ideas had already been part of the larger policy conversation in the country 
(Shenoy 1958). Thus such ideas need not be necessarily ascribed to the influence of the 
Swatantra Party. 
 
It is also not entirely clear whether the internal debates and rivalries within the party or 
even the Sangh at large included aspects of economic policy. Statements on economic 
issues from the broader Sangh constituency, in key sources such M. S. Golwalkar’s Bunch of 
Thoughts (1966), closely align with the orientation of BJS and Integral Humanism. This is 
especially so in their common criticisms of centralized Planning and the need to emphasize 
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economic self-sufficiency and decentralization. There are also little difference with the views 
of other leaders within the party including Balraj Madhok and Dattopant Thengadi 
(Thengadi 1995). Within the BJS, it can only be speculated whether those in the ‘populist’ 
faction (such as Vajpayee and Advani) harboured sympathies for a more liberal economic 
approach against the traditional views of the stalwarts of Hindu nationalist economics such 
as Upadhyaya and Thengadi. Clear differences in economic approach are not evident at this 
particular juncture of Hindu nationalist history. The level of debate and rivalry on economic 
matters that would emerge between Vajpayee’s government and Thengadi’s Swadeshi 
Jagaran Manch economic advocacy group (discussed in chapter 3) would only become 
evident once the BJP came to power. These differences will be discussed in greater detail in 
the next chapter. I return now to the exploration of the economic policy positions of the BJS.  
 
 The BJS policy statements discussed below have been selected for their relevance to these 
key positions of Integral Humanism. To illustrate the implementation of the concept 
swadeshi in the economic policy proposals of the BJS, two sections below document BJS 
statements on swadeshi and the critique dominant economic model (Planning) based on 
swadeshi. A subsequent section will document the BJS position on Governance and its 
advocacy of the decentralization of economic production. A further will show how the BJS 
proposals apply the ideal of decentralization to the industrial sector. This review therefore 
attempts to provide an illustration of the actual policies derived from the economic model 
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advocated by Integral Humanism: self-reliance and decentralization, and their application to 
major sectors within the economy. 
 
2.4.1. Swadeshi 
It is important to note that, as pointed out above, the concept of swadeshi was not the 
creation of Integral Humanism or of Hindu nationalism. However, the BJS inherited its 
concern with this economic concept from Integral Humanism. In one of its first economic 
resolutions, the party began to employ this concept in a provocative criticism:  
 This session of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh expresses concern at the increasing use of foreign goods in 
 the country since the dawn of independence, instead of there being strengthening of the love for 
 swadeshi. The swadeshi movement began in the days of our struggle for independence. But as the 
 basic urge behind it was anti-British and not a positive sentiment, the swadeshi feeling did not remain 
 a permanent feature of our national life and in consequence today there is evidence of a general 
 attitude of indifference among the people towards swadeshi articles (BJS 1954a, 42). 
 
Thus the BJS maintained that by discarding the idea that was central to the independence 
movement, the project of self-rule was left incomplete. A love for a country's own goods 
would be the first step towards economic reconstruction and self-sufficiency. Such views 
express an even more radical sentiment of economic self-sufficiency than the Planning 
model of self-reliance through import substitution. 
  
As the First economic plan progressed in implementation the BJS offered an interpretation 
of swadeshi as a focus on the production of domestic goods. Policy proposals included a 
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(somewhat tautologically formulated) export-import policy based on the main consideration 
swadeshi and requiring central and state governments to make use of swadeshi goods. In 
the absence of import competition, and in order to maintain standards of quality, local 
manufacturers and businessmen were encouraged to set standards in their production that 
would compare favourably with foreign goods. The quality of consumer goods could be 
ensured through a cooperative body composed of representatives from government, 
industry and consumers. Here the party hints at a stakeholder based economic system. On 
an individual level, the party echoed Gandhian values, advocating 'simple living and high 
thinking' among citizens making use of swadeshi goods exclusively in their daily lives (BJS 
1957, 37).  
 
Despite its application in the critique of the very first Plan, it is not until a resolution on the 
Fourth Plan (1969-1974), a mere three years before the BJS itself would dissolve, that the 
BJS provided its first outline of an actual economic policy based on self-reliance. This outline 
begins by restating the BJS criticisms of foreign dependence and its stance on the need to 
generate full employment. It goes on to rehearse the party’s policy on the development of 
appropriate technology and then express its scepticism about the government’s brief 
reference to a similar policy.  For the first time in its resolutions, the BJS then explicitly 
proposes a swadeshi plan as an alternative. In outline such a plan will: maintain an emphasis 
on using the country’s own resources, set 'realistic' targets for the growth rate, take care to 
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avoid price rises and deficit financing, ensure adequate price levels to enable tillers to earn a 
livelihood, create a buffer stocks as security against possible future shortfalls in agricultural 
output, perform administrative and tax structure reviews to make products more export 
competitive, and make public sector enterprises more efficient (BJS 1968a, 20).  
 
From its conception in Integral Humanism, the Hindu nationalist interpretation of swadeshi 
evolved as a critical response to the shortcomings of the various Plans. In consonance with 
its Gandhian roots, swadeshi was envisioned as the domestic production of quality goods, 
supported by demand from the public sector and a public practicing 'simple living'. The BJS 
party's contribution was to further propose a strategy for achieving swadeshi by relying on 
the abundance of labour, reducing deficit spending, keeping prices stable and enhancing the 
domestic production of consumer goods. The party’s critiques of the Planning process 
emphasized all of these aspects of swadeshi. It is to this that I now turn. 
 
2.4.2. Planning 
Chaired by Prime Minister Nehru, the Planning Commission of India was set up in March, 
1950 through a resolution of the Government of India to provide an adequate level of 
livelihood, ensure distribution of resources for the common good and to prevent 
disproportionate concentrations of wealth (Government of India 2010, 18-23). Following an 
intellectual formation deeply shaped by correspondence with British Fabians and a visit to 
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the Soviet Union in 1927, Nehru envisioned an economy where the profit motive was 
minimized and public control was maintained in all areas of the economy. This included the 
trade and industry sectors so that dependence on imported capital and foreign markets 
could be minimized (Nehru 1946, 395; Zachariah 2005 226-23; Singh 1975, 143).  
 
The first two Plans (1951-56; 1956-61) focused on increasing the capacity of the agricultural 
and industrial sectors respectively, and witnessed important milestones in the 
modernization of the country. These milestones included the building of large hydroelectric 
projects, transportation infrastructure, steel plants, higher educational and research 
institutes.  Although the First Plan managed to exceeded expectations in some crucial areas, 
achieving a growth rate of 3.6 percent against a projected rate of 2.1 percent (Dash 2000, 
114), the Second Plan failed to meet targets in several areas, despite its basis in a model 
developed by the famed statistician P.C. Mahalanobis. 
 
The BJS party's first major statement on Planning ‘Relate Third Plan to Realities’ was 
adopted in 1961, on the completion of the Second Five Year Plan and a decade into the 
process of planning. This duration of time provided a reasonable experience of planning to 
which the party could respond. The party had also been in existence for almost a decade 
and while maintaining a growing support base, it had yet to achieve political significance as 
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a member of a state or federal government. The response to the first and second Plans 
therefore provides critical evaluations rather than alternative policy prescriptions.  
 
In the spirit of swadeshi, a particular source of anxiety was the Second Plan's reliance on 
foreign aid which the party derisively described as the 'fake-arithmetic' of resource 
mobilization funded through increases in indirect taxes (BJS 1974, 7). Here, the party 
appears to have drawn from the critiques on the Planning process devised by the liberal 
Indian economist B.R. Shenoy (1958). The BJS expresses its anxiety about the reliance on 
foreign aid through statements which maintain that:  
 All promises of self-reliance by the Government have been betrayed... The Government now expects 
 Rs. 600 crores of foreign aid from 'friendly countries' against the current inflow of Rs. 550 crores. The 
 Government is now talking of importing foodgrains once again, presumably from the USA, since the 
 socialist countries such as the USSR are themselves food-importing countries (BJS 1969a, 12).  
 
The resolution seems to express a double frustration in what it calls a betrayal to the cause 
of self-reliance and the need to rely on one of the two superpowers for assistance. 
 
By the Third Plan (1961-66) the BJS had begun to form coalition state governments 
(Samyukta Vidhayak Dal) and it is partly out of a need to formulate a distinctive political 
agenda that Integral Humanism was formulated. With the disappointing results of the 
Second Plan, the Third Plan was initially slated by the government as a return to agricultural 
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priorities and the implementation of local level reforms. These included panchayati voting 
and state directed development (Jackson 1961, 264). The questionable success of the 
Second Plan led the BJS to express frustration at the increased projected outlays for these 
programs to 11,350 crores. Furthermore, a foreign aid request of up to 3,200 crores 
quashed any short-term hopes of achieving self-sufficiency (BJS 1961a, 25). According to the 
party:  
 In the last year of the Second Plan it can clearly be seen that the Plan has failed to achieve its 
 predetermined targets and objectives. So far as the people are concerned, they bore unbearable 
 taxation and pinched their stomach because of the rising prices in order to enable the government to 
 mop up the necessary resources... It is a matter of regret that while drafting the Third Five-Year Plan 
 the Commission has not learnt anything from its past experience (BJS 1961a, 24). 
The party revisited the Third Plan with, ‘Objectives and Formulation of Third Plan’ adopted 
in November, 1961. Here the BJS makes an explicit appeal to swadeshi, maintaining that the 
Plan should utilize the country’s natural resources without 'blindly following' foreign 
agricultural (namely US and Russian) models. A vague outline of its counter economic 
programme is also provided: maximum production, equitable distribution, guaranteed 
minimum living standards, maximum employment and balanced development of all sections 
of society (BJS 1961b, 27-29). While expressing the party’s philosophical differences from 
the project of Planning through the concept of swadeshi, the resolution does not provide an 
economic programme distinct from Planning. The goals listed above appear to be merely 
aspirational.    
 
87 
 
 
 
 
Significant adjustments to the Third Plan were necessitated by military engagements with 
China (1962) and Pakistan (1965-66). However, this along with the demise of the Prime 
Minister and founding Planning Commission chairman Nehru (who died in 1964) and a 
looming food crisis (due to successive failed monsoons) ushered a new political climate into 
the country. As a result, the dogmatic commitment to Planning was challenged from even 
within the Congress Party now under the leadership of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri 
(Mukherji 2000, 379).  
 
The BJS provides its most detailed criticism of Planning in a resolution entitled, ‘Revise the 
whole concept of Planning’ adopted in New Delhi on 17 August, 1965. In this resolution the 
party argues that Planning needs to be revised from Nehruvian dogmatism to pragmatic and 
complementary public-private initiatives that can increase self-sufficiency (BJS 1965, 21-23). 
The first clear formulation of the party's policy priorities are provided in this resolution. The 
party proposes limits on the expansion of heavy industry to prevent both deficit financed 
outlays and, more importantly, to prevent the underutilized capacity of manpower and 
infrastructure. As discussed above, this was a central concern of Integral Humanism. 
Appropriate Bharatiya technology would better match industrial production to the supply of 
manpower and raw materials and ensure self-sufficiency in the production of goods. In the 
interest of self-reliance, the resolution also proposes restricting the public sector to the 
consolidation of steel, minerals, power and defence, leaving other areas open to private 
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sector development. Finally on public administration and finance, there is an even more 
radical break with Planning, in which the party proposes a complete halt to deficit financing 
and abandoning the policy of nationalized monopolies on consumer goods (BJS 1965, 21-
23). 
 
By 1968, Nehru's Prime Ministerial successor Lal Bahadur Shastri had also died and the 
political leadership of the Congress Party passed on to Nehru's daughter Indira. Keen to 
consolidate her own position within the powerful Congress 'syndicate' of state party bosses, 
Indira moved political and economic policies in a distinctively populist direction while trying 
to stem the gathering tide of challenges to Nehruvian Planning (Kaviraj 1986, 1699-1700). 
Her key strategies to accomplish this included the nationalization of key industries as well as 
a reversal of the gestures towards deregulation and private incentive that were discussed by 
her predecessor's advisors. These actions, which reinforced the country’s economic 
isolation, were especially symbolic given that the rupee had just been devalued in order to 
keep food aid (PL 480) flowing from the American government (Mukherji 2000, 380).  
 
Given a deeper entrenchment in the socialist model, the BJS party's impatience began to 
show in a resolution on the Fourth Plan (1969-74), where it laments a lack of reforms 
despite the considerable failures of Planning. Chief among these are what it calls 
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unrealistically ambitious targets and an obsession with industrialization.  Even though only a 
2.5 percent rate of growth (against a planned target of 5) was achieved under the previous 
(Third) plan (leaving out the years '65-'66 due to drought), the BJS maintains that the target 
of 5-6 percent growth under the Fourth Plan is unrealistic. The misplaced emphasis on 
heavy and capital goods industries, against the neglect of agricultural and consumer goods, 
was acutely felt given the droughts of 1965-66 (BJS 1968a, 18-19).  
 
These criticisms were at least partially vindicated in the third military engagement with 
Pakistan in 1971 over East Pakistan where, once again, resources had to be diverted from 
the Planning process to fund the war effort. This inevitably resulted in shortages and a lower 
than targeted growth rate. However, the implementation of genetic technologies through 
the Ford Foundation in what was called the Green Revolution, significantly increased 
agricultural yields during the implementation of the Fourth Plan (Chakravarti 1973).  
 
 In a final resolution on Planning (addressing the Fifth Plan, 1974-77) the BJS portrays the 
Planning Commission as engaged in a 'cart-before-wheel' methodology. The Plan, it argues, 
is not resource based; having already established a growth target, Planners then look for 
ways to achieve it. Such an overly ambitious Plan would therefore not be able to raise the 
needed revenues (BJS 1969a, 12-13). The inevitable deficit financing and subsequent 
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inflation would lead to the vicious spiral of rising costs – making outlays even higher than 
planned for. The only counter measure proposed by the Plan is entirely unacceptable to the 
instinct of the BJS party: an estimate of Rs. 3,730 crore in foreign aid. As it turned out the 
Plan was halted in 1977 with the election of the Janata coalition, of which the BJS was a 
member.    
 
In summary, The BJS criticism of Planning focused on the lack of self-sufficiency engendered 
by the model of heavy industrialization funded through deficit financing. This inevitably led 
to reliance on foreign countries and particular shortages in the rural and agricultural sectors. 
The policy statements are explicit in their appeals to swadeshi, constant concerns about the 
use of inappropriate capital (debt and not manpower), inadequate availability of consumer 
goods and the resulting low growth. It is therefore clear that such criticisms of the Planning 
process are drawn from the alternative view of a self-reliant economy first formulated by 
Deendayal Upadhyaya.  
 
2.4.3. Governance 
Swadeshi constitutes the first pillar of the economic vision of Integral Humanism. As 
demonstrated above, it had a significant influence on the economic policy proposals of the 
BJS. Decentralization (vikendrikaran) forms the second core concept of the BJS party’s 
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economic vision and the next two sections will demonstrate the influence of this concept on 
the BJS economic policy statements. 
 
The BJS advocated decentralization primarily as an economic production model where the 
means of production would not be concentrated in deficit funded heavy industry but spread 
out among cottage industries utilizing abundant manpower. Central Planning was 
undesirable not only due concerns that it would induce economic dependence abroad and 
vulnerability (inflation) at home, but also because of fears that a centrally directed 
economic system would leave a population vulnerable to both the totalitarian impulses of 
the government and a public sector unable or unwilling to provide the necessary public 
services. The proposed solution to this dilemma was the decentralization of the public 
sector which alone could deliver the proper provision of services and stable economic 
growth. Examples of this policy directed at the industrial sector will be documented below. 
Here I begin with some observations on the BJS party’s broader discussion of 
decentralization, governance and public services.  
 
The BJS criticisms levelled against the government sector mostly centre on public service 
inefficiency and the feared tendency towards totalitarianism. A resolution adopted in July, 
1956 'Second Plan: Over-Centralised and Totalitarian' provides an outline of these criticisms. 
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Here, the Second Plan is described as a partisan exercise, which does not include input from 
other political parties (BJS 1956a, 37-40). A lack of political accountability fed a culture of 
inefficiency within the public sector, leading to a lack of provision of the most basic needs. 
Due to such circumstances the larger issues of unemployment, literacy and public 
cooperation remain unaddressed and any provision for moral and cultural development is 
entirely absent from the Second Plan.  
 
The party's fears about an overall trend towards 'totalitarianism' is evident in resolutions 
that addressed the nationalization of the banking and insurance sectors during the early 
Prime Ministership of Indira Gandhi. After Nehru's death in 1964, momentum had been 
building in several quarters to liberalize sectors of the economy. This was especially so after 
the elections of 1967 when voters reacted to the failed economic policies of the Congress  
party by voting them out of several state governments (Frankel 2005, 396). The 
nationalization of these sectors was the means by which the new Prime Minister sought to 
keep reformist forces at bay. The impending nationalization of life insurance, cement 
production and distribution and the increased activities of the State Trading Corporation 
(instead of private trading across state boundaries) constituted what the BJS describes as a 
totalitarian trend on the part of the government (BJS 1956a, 37-40). The BJS maintains that 
'giving control into the hands of an administration that is corrupt, dishonest and 
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incompetent, from top to bottom, would prove detrimental to the interests of the people' 
(BJS 1952, 44-45).  
 
The resolutions that examine the government's approach towards poverty reduction 
provide some insight to the BJS party's own approach towards the issue of governance and 
economic development. In response to the Fifth Plan the BJS takes to task a wholesale 
reversal in the government’s focus on poverty (garibi hatao). In particular it chastises the 
Congress government for its claim that poverty in India is too big and complex a problem to 
be overcome in the span of five years (BJS 1974, 5). A properly functioning public sector, the 
BJS argues, had to be able to provide full employment to all able-bodied persons, capital to 
the educated and technically skilled, primary health and education to all citizens. 
Furthermore, the provision of clean drinking water in every village, stable prices to protect 
both producer and consumer through relevant fiscal and monetary policy, land ceilings and 
redistribution of waste-land to landless peasants are listed as the responsibilities of the 
government and public sector (BJS 1969b, 15-18).  
 
The party outlines its counter-proposal to accomplish this in a resolution on the Fifth Plan. 
Here, in a brooding document, the BJS envisions an alternative Five Year plan which will 
focus on swadeshi and the country living within its resources. A fully decentralized 
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production process will create employment. Multinationals will be banned from producing 
consumer goods, which would be reserved for the small-scale and cottage industries. The 
modernization of agriculture will be accomplished through expanded irrigation and through 
an agro-nuclear complex. Rural industries and dairy farming will be further encouraged with 
an integrated price policy for minimum needs; fair prices will be guaranteed for producers 
and price stability for consumers. A simplified tax structure with reduced income tax, raised 
income exemption levels and a penal consumption tax will create the fiscal framework for 
such a plan without the need to accumulate deficits (BJS 1974, 8).  
 
In summary, the devolution of centralism and the banning of multinationals to maximize 
employment the industrialization of agriculture, price management, lower income and 
higher consumer taxes are therefore the BJS party's outline for tackling the urgent problem 
of poverty. Key to this is the decentralization of production and the encouragement of 
small-scale cottage industries. How will this be achieved? I turn to an examination of the 
industrial policy of the BJS to demonstrate how the party envisioned a decentralized 
industrial sector. 
 
2.4.4. Industry 
The centrality of heavy industrial development to the Planning process, means that this 
topic occupies a large share of the BJS party's economic resolutions.  The party’s views on 
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industry, inherited from Integral Humanism, bypass the preoccupations of 
contemporaneous developmental theorists on increasing capital accumulation (Gilpin 2001, 
307). Instead it criticizes the organizational and fiscal structure of the industrial sector while 
proposing the alternate vision of a rural economy driven by decentralized cottage industries.  
 
Concerns about industrialization first emerge in the BJS party resolutions on the Second 
Plan. Here the BJS equates greater democratisation and decentralisation of the sector with 
creating a viable cottage industry that is not dependent on government funds or threatened 
by 'big industry' (BJS 1956a, 37-40). A second resolution entitled 'Second Plan: Over 
Centralized and Totalitarian' proposes that small cottage industries with requisite capital 
and mechanical skill and labour be made the basis of industrial policy: 
 Bharatiya Jana Sangh is of the definite view that any plan for India must avoid the dangers of over 
 centralization and totalitarianism which are inherent in the present Plan. Jana Sangh stands for 
 democracy and de-centralization of power, so as to make the maximum number of people a partner 
 in economic and political development of the country. To that end it aims at making the cottage 
 industries the basis of the industrial policy of the country. It stands for an integrated industrial plan in 
 which the cottage industry is not left on the mercy of the doles from the Government for all times but 
 is able to stand on its own legs without fear of destructive competition from the big industry (BJS 
 1956a, 39-40). 
 
Beginning with a critique of the operational and governance implications of the Second Plan, 
the BJS maintains that its alternative to central planning would not only ensure higher 
employment but also increase the democratic potential and self-reliance of the population. 
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While the goal of decentralization was inherited from Integral Humanism, this policy was 
also directed at consolidating the party's voter base. Among this base of small trader 
families, the BJS advocated the family unit as the ideal organizing framework for the 
economy. Thus the emphasis on small industries, which could be run on the organizational 
principles of family units, was a strategy advocated on behalf of the party's core 
constituencies (Graham 2007, 159).  
 
The 'malaise' of heavy industrialization is described in a resolution entitled, 'Fourth Plan – 
An Appraisal', which leaves no dimension of the central industrialization programme 
unrepresented. This resolution draws attention to the 'large idle capacity in our industries, a 
dull capital market, a stagnant per-capita income, rising prices of most necessities, big drain 
on account of interest and annuity payments resulting from huge foreign indebtedness, 
increasing disparity of incomes with declining consumption of food grains, cloth and edible 
oils and an ever-growing unemployment.' (BJS 1969a, 11-12). These symptoms are entirely 
ascribed to centralized heavy industrialization. In its place, the BJS consistently advocates a 
decentralized cottage industry based economic model. 
 
Specific policies to support cottage industries are spelled out in greater detail in a resolution 
concerning the handloom industry. The chief concern of this policy is maintaining 
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employment for some ten million weavers. It is proposed that ubiquitous items of clothing 
such as dhotis and saris will be reserved for production on handlooms, while sales tax on 
handloom products removed to encourage consumption of these products. In order to 
create a ready market for these goods:  
 The Jana Sangh also recommends that the handloom products be used for the necessities in 
 Government offices and for the uniform of Government employees, both in the Centre and in the 
 States. The Jana Sangh further calls upon the people to use handloom cloth as much as possible. The 
 Jana Sangh urges upon the Central Government to direct our Embassies to make planned and 
 systematic efforts to popularise our handloom-products in their respective countries, so as to secure 
 for it a wider market abroad (BJS 1954b, 125). 
 
The purpose of supporting cottage industries provided here are to maintain employment in 
the rural sector and enhance self-reliance. However, the impression made by these 
proposals is of a static employment equilibrium with no indication of where savings, 
investment and increased productivity would fit into such an idyllic state.  
 
Finally, the resolutions go on to tackle growth rates. The BJS argues that the low growth 
rates of all Plans since the Second (both real and targeted) was primarily the result of an 
economic inertia caused by having to mobilize resources centrally through taxation and 
deficits. However relatively low targets are also cited as a source of this arrested growth. In 
a resolution on the Fifth Plan, the targeted growth rate of 5.5 percent is described as 'puny' 
when measured against the needs of the economy. The BJS argues, somewhat 
hyperbolically, that a growth of at least 10 percent could be achieved (BJS 1974, 7).  
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It is clear from this discussion that the BJS party's criticisms of the Planning Commission's 
industrial policies draw directly from Integral Humanism's preference for decentralized 
cottage industries. The party argues that such industries will maximize employment, keep 
costs low and maintain an efficient allocation of abundant local resources. However, in this 
particular area, there is some evidence that even the BJS recognized the limitations of its 
alternative proposals. Among others, Upadhyaya recognized that small industries were not 
growing at a rate that was sustainable (Graham 2007, 162). Advocating mechanization and 
temporary protectionism to increase productivity, he blamed this lack of growth on 
insufficient government expenditure into the rural sector, even though expenditures were 
in fact increased during the Second and Third Plans (Graham 2007, 162-166). The BJS 
criticisms of centralized industry and advocacy of a decentralized cottage based alternative 
therefore appears to have been more problematic than its other economic policy platforms.  
 
2.5. Conclusions 
This chapter set out to answer two questions. First, is there a distinct set of economic ideas 
advocated by Hindu nationalism? Second, can such ideas be shown to have actually 
influenced the economic policies of Hindu nationalist political parties? This chapter has 
responded in the affirmative to both questions. Two extended engagements with historical 
sources have been used to support these conclusions. The first presented a detailed account 
of the economic ideas of Hindu nationalism sourced from its chief economic ideologue, 
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Deendayal Upadhyaya. The second delineated a Hindu nationalist economic programme 
proposed by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Jana Sangh which developed these ideas from 
philosophical concepts to critiques of existing policies and alternative policy proposals. In 
doing this, the latter part of the chapter has also repudiated a commonly held assumption 
that Hindu nationalism does not possess a distinctive economic agenda. Critically reviewing 
the scholarly literature of this era, one scholar described this assumption as, 'the general 
belief that the [BJS] party does not have any definite economic programme' (Jhangiani 1969, 
73). I summarize my findings below. 
 
Upadhyaya’s critique of modern economic thinking, based on his larger framework of 
humanist philosophy, was an attempt to step toward a holistic development of individuals 
beyond an exclusive focus on either technology or wealth creation. Planning for Upadhyaya 
was an inadequate approach to development since it was an enterprise that was built on a 
notion of human insufficiency. For Upadhyaya, the ideal economic system would emphasize 
decentralized production and self-sufficiency. These attributes would allow individuals to 
flourish in their multiple dimensions. 
 
The BJS party documents extend into greater detail on specific points of economic policy. 
Discerning the influence of Integral Humanism on the BJS is not a simple question of a point 
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for point correlation between Upadhyaya's ideas and party proposals. However, the major 
themes in Upadhyaya's economic writings (self-reliance and decentralization) are infused 
throughout BJS party resolutions on key policy areas. This clearly demonstrates the 
underlying influence of Integral Humanism on the BJS party’s economic approach. There is a 
distinctive and consistent thread encompassing these two themes woven through the 
economic policy formulations of the BJS.  
 
The BJS resolutions themselves, are mostly commentaries on what it regarded the failures 
and shortcomings of Planning. They therefore read largely as reactive criticism rather than 
proactive policy. However, it is clear that they heavily utilize the approach of Integral 
Humanism in their criticisms. In places, the acuity of these criticisms is apparent through 
similar criticisms in the academic literature. For example, in their seminal work on Indian 
Planning, Bhagwati and Desai concurred with some of the major concerns of the BJS. These 
included concerns over unrealistic and overly ambitious targets inevitably fell back on deficit 
spending, stymied economic activity due to the over-regulation of a highly centralized 
economy and lop-sided expenditures that focused on heavy industry at the cost of 
agriculture (Bhagwati and Desai 1970, 5).   
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Occasionally the party does make policy proposals that outline the priorities described 
above. These are useful in demonstrating a concrete economic policy based on Integral 
Humanism. This was still one-step removed from the possibility of actual policy 
implementation – a prospect that would be made possible through their successor, the BJP 
and its coalition government some two decades later. By the time the BJS was absorbed into 
the Janata coalition government of 1977-1980, and re-emerged as the Bharatiya Janata 
Party, Hindu nationalist political engagement had moved as a whole towards the centre in 
order the generate greater mass appeal. Economic thinking also shifted to more ‘centrist’ 
ground (Puri, 2005: xx-xxi). This is where the next chapter begins.  
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Chapter 3: At Home with Hindutva – The Formation of the BJP's 
Domestic Economic Policy 
 
 
3.1. Introduction    
This chapter is an analysis of the influence of domestic factors on the NDA government's 
economic policies. It sets out to accomplish two goals. The first is to demonstrate the BJP’s 
economic reorientation from an emphasis on the values of Integral Humanism to a new set 
of neoliberal priorities. The second is to explore the role of domestic factors in creating this 
reorientation. This chapter will seek to demonstrate how far domestic factors supported or 
restricted the neoliberal reorientation of these economic policies.   
 
This section provides a brief overview of the context, rationale and structure for the 
chapter. The next section will provide a short chronological overview of the BJP’s economic 
policies form its formation to its election at the head of the NDA government. The next 
three sections will assess the influence of coalition partners, interest groups and voters in 
shaping the NDA government’s economic policies. They will draw conclusions based on the 
analysis of primary and secondary sources as well as survey data. A concluding section will 
show where domestic factors influenced the BJP’s neoliberal economic policy formation and 
where further investigation (pursued in chapter 4) is needed. 
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The BJP was formed out of the remnants of the Janata coalition which lost its election bid to 
Congress in 1980. From the beginning, the party attempted to portray itself as a real 
alternative to Congress. It continued to do this even as Congress experienced increasing 
electoral success in the elections of 1980 and 1984. This success belied a growing alienation 
between the Congress and regional state governments as regional political parties began to 
win significant numbers of seats in the Lok Sabha. Even within the Congress party, the style 
of leadership that had emerged by the 1980s concentrated the reins of major policy 
formation in the hands a close circle of trusted advisors around the Prime Minister. These 
advisors were picked for both their experience and personal loyalty to the Nehru-Gandhi 
family (Brass 1990, 53).  
 
Throughout the next decade, increasing centralization of government power within the 
Congress party, at the expense of government institutions, created an environment in which 
regional parties and caste based demand groups became increasingly significant brokers of 
power. Despite sweeping electoral success in 1984, the ill-fated response to separatist 
activities in Punjab and tepid steps towards industrial de-licensing failed to ensure the 
necessary political and economic stability for the Congress party to remain in power. The 
formation of the Janata Dal government (1989) and its implementation of caste-based 
reservations was an illustration that the political domination of Congress was unravelling. 
Under the Janata Dal, a lack of economic opportunity compounded by resentments over the 
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institutionalization of so-called lower caste ‘privileges’ created a fertile environment for 
political newcomers such as the BJP to gain a populist base among an alienated emerging 
middle class (Biswas 2004, 111).  
 
From the 1980s onwards, the BJP began its political ascendancy through an intensive 
programme of mass political campaigns and close collaboration with regional partners and 
the Sangh Parivar. Jenkins describes the 1990s as an era of particularly tumultuous relations 
among fundamental social forces he characterizes acronymically as the four ‘Ms’: the 
politics of the ‘Mandal’ caste reservations, Hindu nationalist mobilization around the icon of 
the Ayodhya ‘Mandir’, demand based social ‘Movements’ and the newly introduced social 
forces of the ‘Market’ (Jenkins 2010, 597). With other political alternatives exhausted, the 
BJP emerged from this turbulent social brew to create a stable coalition government (1998-
1999, 1999-2004).  
 
Once in government, the BJP led NDA government put forward an aggressive program of 
neoliberal reforms. This chapter examines how a reorientation in economic priorities was 
accomplished, from the priorities of Integral Humanism to economic liberalism. The chapter 
investigates various domestic influences on the party's policy formation while in 
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government. The main influences considered are the BJP's coalition partners within the NDA 
government, organized interest groups and voters.  
 
The examination of these three domestic factors: coalition partners, organized interest 
groups and voters have been chosen for their ubiquity in the literature on domestic policy 
formation in India (the influence of ideology has been discussed in the previous chapter). In 
one classic study, the most formative influences on domestic policy formation are identified 
as coalition politics, ‘demand’ groups and individual voters (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, 
178-200; 220-246; 247-255). These factors also resemble some of the key elements within 
the theory of public choice. The first chapter has already supplied a rationale for the 
inclusion of these factors in the analysis below. In summary, the BJP’s position as a party 
within a large coalition, newly elected to government through a novel electoral strategy and 
addressing a policy area contested by both commercially focused and Sangh interest groups 
would imply that the influence of coalition partners, voters and interest groups would be 
significant influences on policy formation. Since these factors provide the basis upon which I 
will pursue this investigation, some further consideration must be given as to how I 
understand and utilize these factors. 
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This chapter will examine the crucial role of political parties within the NDA coalition and 
their influence on economic policy formation. In public choice analyses, the category of 
‘political party’ may be cast widely and could include the influence of opposition parties 
(e.g. Congress, Left Front) through the ‘politicization’ of policy issues (Seeberg 2013). 
However this approach sees the formation of policy in a somewhat reactive and even ad hoc 
manner. This could distract from an identification of the underlying rationale for shifts in 
economic approach that were responsible for the majority of the novel economic reform 
policies implemented by the NDA government. Moreover, the NDA’s economic agenda was 
an expansion of policies that had already been put in place by a Congress government (now 
in opposition) that was sympathetic to the overall economic direction taken by the BJP. 
Reactions to pressures from opposition parties cannot therefore explain these policy 
innovations. For the most part, the major opposition party (Congress) was sympathetic with 
the overall economic direction undertaken by the NDA government. The role of political 
party influence can be much more fruitfully investigated by examining the policy forming 
dynamics at play within the NDA coalition. Thus the focus will remain on the BJP’s coalition 
partners and their influence on policy formation.  
 
Likewise the influence of interest groups on economic policy formation is restricted to 
interest groups that had a direct stake in economic issues. While it is possible that other 
interest groups (e.g. caste based advocacy groups) may well have had an interest in the 
108 
 
 
 
 
NDA’s economic policies, it is the interest groups formed around economic issues that are 
the focus of this analysis. This focus is based on the assumption that these groups would 
have tried to influence the economic policy formation process more intentionally and more 
substantially than other groups. It is these groups that the NDA and the BJP in particular 
would have contended with most consistently in the formation of its economic policies, 
whether in a supportive or critical capacity.  
 
Finally, examining the support for the BJP among individual voters conveys an idea of how 
the NDA’s economic policies were perceived by voters themselves. The perception of voters 
would have determined the electoral fortunes of the BJP. For a party that had successfully 
strategized its political ascendancy in the span of a decade, a new awareness of voter 
satisfaction, within both the party and among coalition partners, would have acted as a 
strong influence on policy formation. This is not to crudely imply that economic policies 
were formed simply to appeal to voters. However these economic policies would have been 
implemented within a larger framework of electoral strategies aimed at maintaining or even 
growing the BJP’s support. In taking a radically new direction in its economic policies, how 
did the BJP and its NDA coalition partners respond to the reactions of its hard won core and 
coalition voters? This is the key question that the final section will attempt to answer. 
 
109 
 
 
 
 
Together an examination of these factors will develop a rich and complex picture that will 
seek to illustrate how the economic policies of the NDA government were shaped 
domestically. Each of these factors will be shown to have had some limited influence in 
shaping the policy approach of the BJP while in power. However before I get to an analysis 
of the individual factors, I examine the evolution of the BJP’s economic approach over the 
preceding decades. 
 
3.2. From BJS to BJP 
This section briefly recounts the development of the BJP’s economic perspectives from its 
formation to its leadership of the NDA government. It shows that while the party began with 
an economic agenda broadly in line with its predecessor (the BJS) its economic perspectives 
began to gradually evolve. By the time it formed the NDA government, the BJP adopted a 
full-blown neoliberal agenda. 
 
At the end of the Janata coalition, former members of the dissolved BJS regrouped to form 
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The leaders of this new party (L. K. Advani, A. B. Vajpayee) 
were former lieutenants of Deendayal Upadhyaya. They had been instrumental in trying to 
broaden the Bharatiya Jana Sangh’s popular base, despite opposition from more 
conservative factions within the party and the Sangh at large (Hansen 1999, 129). However, 
this new leadership carried this populist approach into the newly created BJP and began 
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building a populist base during the early 1980s. These efforts were geared towards 
transcending the strong support the BJP (and its predecessor, the BJS) had enjoyed among 
high caste Hindus and appealing towards a broader caste constituency and even Dalits. This 
was accomplished both through mass political campaigns and regional coalition building. 
 
In terms of its economic perspectives, there is at first not much to distinguish the BJP’s 
positions from its predecessor. The BJP remained critical of economic centralization while 
cautiously supporting gradual economic reforms under both the Indira and Rajiv Gandhi 
Congress governments. As an illustration, the party’s 1980 Economic Policy Statement 
castigated the centralized economy model for producing low rates of growth and creating a 
culture of corruption. In line with Upadhyaya’s original critique, these symptoms were 
attributed to the adoption of 'foreign' economic models with no relevance to India (Ralhan 
1998, 1-18).  
 
When the first limited economic reforms were introduced by Congress governments that 
followed the Janata coalition in the 1980s, the BJP was quick to criticize their impact. While 
attempting to build an electoral base among the broader constituency of the ‘common man’ 
the Party argued: 
 There is a consistently anti-poor and pro-rich bias in Government's policy. In this year's budget, direct 
 taxes were reduced, both on corporate and personal incomes, thus triggering one of the biggest 
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 boom [sic] in the stock market. However, indirect taxes were raised substantially as a result of which 
 prices of most commodities have risen... The Government should have begun with indirect taxes, 
 which impinge directly on the expenditure levels of the common man and then tackled direct taxes 
 which in any case account for a fraction of the revenue (BJP 1986). 
 
However, political developments began to expose the BJP to new economic perspectives. 
With the decline of Congress hegemony and the resulting process of political 
decentralization, large regional parties collectively gained ten percent of seats in the Lok 
Sabha, formerly the exclusive demesne of national parties (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, 178-
207; Guha 2007, 418-429). A new focus on regional level political priorities aggregated to a 
blurring of lines between centre and state level politics. Through this development, state 
based political parties were able to make themselves indispensable to governments at the 
centre.  
 
Partly due to the exposure to new ideas made possible by political coalition building, the BJP 
developed a greater appreciation for the fact that the factors that had sustained the 
economic stagnation of the previous decades had passed. In light of these new realities a 
more critical assessment of the party’s ideological heritage began to develop. For example, 
there was some recognition that the idea of decentralized village economies, the ideal 
model of Gandhian and Integral Humanist thinking, had questionable contemporary 
relevance. Factors such as high population growth, the Green Revolution, the growth of 
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industry (replacing tradition with contract) and the growth of modern education made this 
ideal somewhat irrelevant (Lal 1993, 423).  
Even as the party began to reflect on its economic positions, it was quick to appeal to its 
ideological roots in response to major economic events. This included the economic 
liberalization of 1990. At the time, the Rao government's model was explicitly criticized in 
preference of a model based on Integral Humanism:  
The economic policies initiated by this Government with so much fanfare and promise have also been 
tested and tried over the last three years. It is clear that these policies are nothing but a rehash of the 
IMF/World Bank model which has been followed with disastrous results in Mexico, Brazil, the former 
Soviet Union and some other countries... The Rao/Manmohan Singh model rests on three legs 1) 
Fiscal stabilisation 2) Economic restructuring 3) Foreign investment and globalization. As far as this is 
concerned, the BJP does not share the misplaced faith of the Government in foreign investment  and 
globalisation as a panacea for all our ills. Unrestrained globalisation in effect means wholesale and 
shameless capitulation before foreign vested interests (BJP 1996c). 
 
It is significant that at this stage the BJP rejected outright the legitimacy of fiscal 
restructuring and foreign investment as suitable economic policies. As I will demonstrate, 
the BJP eventually embraced both policies wholeheartedly at the head of the NDA 
government. At the time, the BJP demanded a white paper from the government on the 
balance of payments crisis and castigated what it called Congress 'capitulation' to policy 
adjustments linked to IMF and World Bank assistance. Such policies included the slashing of 
agricultural subsidies, the entry of multinational corporations into the economy and the 
selling of gold to shore up foreign reserves. The BJP proposed nationally-centred policy 
alternatives such as providing incentives for Non-Resident Indians to invest foreign currency 
into the economy to make up for the loss of foreign reserves. In the face of the 
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government’s policies, and even what that BJP called the Left’s surprising enthusiasm about 
globalization, the party portrayed itself as the sole remaining champion of swadeshi. It 
described its own policy agenda as broad-based agricultural development, total youth 
employment and a lingering support of village based small-industries (BJP 1997a).  
 
The BJP formed a 13-day government in 1996. While this government did not enact any 
major policy milestones during this period, cracks in the façade of ideological continuity with 
the BJS were slowly beginning to appear. According to one advisor to the BJP who would 
later serve as a senior finance ministry official in the NDA government: 
It [the BJS] was an ultra-nationalist party opposed to any foreign investment. And these were the 
resolutions of the party: that foreign investment is bad and everything must be done inside, foreign 
cars are bad... everything is bad. Investment should come for computer chips not potato chips and 
people like me argued that potato chips created more jobs than computer chips (M. Guruswamy, 
Telephone Interview, July 17 2012).   
 
The use of the term ‘ultra-nationalist’ provides a clear understanding of the way the BJS was 
perceived among senior officials in the BJP government. The BJS is clearly depicted as a 
party that had extreme views on the economy with knee-jerk (and even simplistic) 
dismissals of foreign goods and services without due consideration to their possible 
benefits.  
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The reference to potato chips and computer chips, misattributed by this official to the BJS, 
actually comes from a BJP election slogan from its election campaign 1996: ‘Computer chips 
yes! Potato chips no!’ (Hansen 1999, 220). This slogan was originally conceived by Murli 
Manohar Joshi, a leading figure of the Hindu nationalist movement in the 1990s who would 
go on to become a ‘hard-line’ traditionalist cabinet minister in the NDA government. The 
slogan provides a window into the BJP’s evolving economic views in the years just prior to 
forming its stable coalition government.  
 
At the party level, Joshi played a leading role in the formation of economic policy 
statements. These statements enacted a cautious adjustment to the outright opposition to 
foreign investment advocated by the BJS while maintaining the priority of high employment 
in low-skilled work, inherited from the BJS. Hansen calls this the BJP’s ‘patriotic capitalism’ 
(Hansen 1999, 220) which emphasized the need to protect high employment low-skill 
domestic industries (the production of potato chips) while discerning the need for foreign 
investment and expertise for the development of other sectors such as technology 
(computer chips).  
 
The period from 1996 until 1999 was a period of short-term coalition governments. In 1998 
the BJP formed its first NDA coalition government. The economic programme that followed 
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would result in the major neoliberal economic policy milestones. This programme was 
exemplified by the BJP’s shift from the more traditional language of swadeshi, to the 
language of high-finance. By doing this, the party adopted a central concern among 
transnational elites or what Diwan, playing off the ubiquitous description of Indian 
emigrants (Non Resident Indian), disparagingly calls the ‘Resident Non-Indian’ (Diwan 1995, 
73). These policy milestones included the abolition of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act (MRTP) and industrial de-licensing, removal of foreign investment restrictions, 
decreases in tariffs and import licenses, the lifting of Quantitative Restrictions on consumer 
goods (in response to WTO requirements), the Insurance Regulatory and Development 
Authority  Bill and major initiatives on Public Sector Undertaking disinvestment and 
domestic fiscal consolidation (Panagariya 2008, 98-109).  
 
These policies marked a significant shift from the BJP’s swadeshi-based approach to a 
greater free market emphasis. Furthermore these policies constitute the main platforms of 
what key observers of the Indian economy have described as a neoliberal economic policy. 
Important markers of this policy were the deregulation of the economy, an openness to 
international goods and services, the shrinking of government and privatization over job 
security and full-employment (Chandrashekar and Ghosh 2006; Panagariya 2008, 16, 18; 
Kohli 2006, 1251).  
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What began as a gradual reassessment of economic perspectives while the BJP remained 
out of government, turned into a neoliberal economic agenda once the party was in power 
at the head of the NDA government. The rest of this chapter will focus on providing an 
explanation of how this reorientation took place. It will accomplish this by examining the 
influence of domestic influences on the BJP’s economic policy formation. In appropriate 
places it will draw from the economic policy statements of the BJP to show the gradual 
divergence from the approach of the BJS and Integral Humanism. 
 
3.3. Coalition Politics 
This section will place the discussion of economic policy and reform in the context of 
domestic coalition politics. It begins with the assumption that (during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s) coalition politics in India remained central to domestic politics at the federal 
level and therefore had the ability to directly or indirectly impact upon economic policy. This 
assumption is based on the fact that from 1996 until 2014, the central government has been 
headed by coalition governments. To situate economic policy within coalition politics is to 
ask: did economic policy remain on the side-lines of policy making as a by-product of 
collective-bargaining? Was it an instrument through which collective action problems were 
solved by the major party (BJP) in the NDA coalition? Or was it a key area of contestation 
among the various coalition members seeking to placate their individual constituencies. 
These questions and others are addressed below through a discussion of party politics. This 
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necessitates a brief theoretical account of the politics of political coalitions, focused on 
state-centre relations and their implication for economic policy. 
The theoretical work on government coalitions defines the range of coalition arrangements 
from single party majorities to 'minimal winning' and 'minimal connected' coalitions 
(Woldendorp et al 1993, 5; Mueller and Strom 2003, 13). The former is defined as a coalition 
government in which each party has the incentive to form a coalition with the smallest 
majority margin and the greatest level of flexibility regarding the actual power sharing 
agreement, ideology or policy. Such an opportunistic arrangement would allow each party 
to achieve the maximum pay-off as a part of a small group in government. Minimal 
connected coalitions are defined as coalitions of parties that are grouped around a common 
ideological spectrum (Sridharan 2008, 11). The European political experience, formed 
against the backdrop of a left-right ideological axis, provides evidence for the frequent 
occurrence of the latter (minimum connected coalitions). This, however, does not 
immediately translate into the Indian experience where the ideological axes are 
characterised as multiple and cross-cutting within an overall political climate in which party 
identification is also weak (Sridharan 1999, 278).  
 
Sridharan characterizes the Indian situation as distinctive for three reasons – almost all 
coalition governments have been minority governments, none have been minimal winning 
coalitions and these governments have been among the largest in the world in terms of the 
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actual number of parties involved. The other distinguishing feature of coalition politics in 
India is the significance of single-state 'regional' parties in central government coalitions. 
These parties, having little to no presence outside the states where they originate, were 
initially formed due to parochial concerns about local languages and regional identity that 
had not been addressed by regional Congress parties (Guha 2007, 418-429). The popularity 
of their regionally-focused platforms made them significant adversaries to the Congress 
party at the state level. Gradually Congress recognized the crucial need for regional support 
at the centre and in turn elevated regional parties to national significance. The most 
prominent examples of nationally significant regional parties are the Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam (DMK) in Tamil Nadu, concerned about the 'encroachment' of the Hindi language 
into the southern Tamil speaking state and the Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, initially formed 
around concerns at the migration of Gujarati and Tamil communities into the city of 
Mumbai (Fickett 1971, 194).  
 
In the case of the NDA government, the coalition was formed of 12 parties, some with a 
strong regional/identity orientation: the Shiv Sena based in Maharashtra, the Akali Dal 
based in Punjab and the DMK based in Tamil Nadu. Other coalition partners could be 
described as ideologically opportunistic depending on the prevailing electoral climate. The 
NDA coalition did not form a parliamentary majority. Instead, it relied on the external 
support of the Telegu Desam Party (led by Chandrababu Naidu) from Andhra Pradesh to 
119 
 
 
 
 
achieve stability. Thus the NDA coalition defied definition under the simple categorization in 
the literature as it maintained only some of the ideological connectivity necessary to be a 
minimally connected coalition while not being able to even form a majority in parliament. 
However, given the broad party base and its minority status, the stability of the NDA 
coalition government remains a significant political fact, especially since it constituted one 
of the largest coalition governments on record (Sridharan 2008, 17).  
 
Having briefly considered the NDA coalition from a theoretical standpoint, how was it that 
this group of parties formed their unlikely alliance? The roots of this coalition can be traced 
to the new possibilities opened up by the changing political landscape in India in the 1980s. 
Manor describes the 1980s as politically significant due to an increasing political awareness 
among younger voters and because for the first time, voters' social concerns and political 
loyalties began to diverge. Social cleavages began to take precedence over identification 
with a particular party at the national level even as the populace in general were less 
inclined to view the state and national politics as agents of change (Manor 1997, 104-105). 
This translated into a crucial role for state level regional parties at the centre, as part of 
ruling coalitions.  
 
Unstable coalitions between 1989-1991 (Janata Dal) and 1996-1998 (National Front) were 
stop-gapped by various coalition and minority governments. The election of 1996 produced 
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a hung parliament and the BJP was invited to form a government by securing the necessary 
support of other political parties within two weeks. Within 13 days the BJP conceded that it 
was not able to generate the necessary support and a new coalition government was 
formed by the Janata Dal. By the 1998 the  BJP had formed the National Democratic Alliance 
out of a coalition of twelve parties with the Telegu Desam Party (TDP), supporting it from 
the outside. The major coalition partners (by number of seats) included the Janata Dal, Shiv 
Sena (Maharashtra), All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Tamil Nadu), Biju Janata Dal 
(Orissa) and the All India Trinamool Congress (West Bengal and North East).  
 
Losing a confidence motion the following year (1999), the NDA coalition won the election of 
1999 with the BJP holding 182 seats out of a required 272 for a majority. Together the NDA 
coalition held 270 seats. Most parties in the original coalition remained with the major 
exception being the departure of the AIADMK in favour of its regional political rival the 
DMK. With the further external support of the TDP, the NDA became a minimal winning 
coalition with surplus external support (Election Commission of India n.d. 90-99). Having 
established the significance of coalition politics in India and for the NDA government in 
particular, the focus of this section returns to the role of coalition politics in the formation of 
economic policy.   
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As recounted above, minimal coalitions (both winning and connected) are seen as especially 
advantageous to smaller coalition members. As coalition members, these relatively minor 
political parties are able to leverage their positions in the ruling coalition to exert a 
disproportionate influence over policy formation. As one means of gauging the ability of 
NDA coalition partners to bargain within the BJP, McMillan discusses the significance of 
portfolio allocation within the NDA's council of ministers. Major portfolios were retained by 
the BJP (including Finance, Home and External Affairs) while the remaining allocations 
reflected the particular interests of various party agendas. The Janata Dal and Shiv Sena 
occupied most other posts. Overall, however, portfolio allocation reflected proportionality 
while the actual number of cabinet positions (including junior ministers) expanded 
considerably to 70 members (McMillan 2005, 28). 
 
The impact on actual policy engendered by this arrangement was evident to different 
degrees. On the one hand, regional coalition partners were able to extract concessions from 
the BJP on politically sensitive issues for their particular regions. This was, however, not a 
unidirectional pressure as the BJP was in turn able to negotiate agreements with coalition 
partners to consolidate its own position. The coalition presented two explicit occasions in 
which conflict over economic policy was apparent: early proposals to reduce subsidies and 
fiscal reform. Both conflicts were resolved through a combination of capitulation and 
management by the BJP. I discuss them in further detail below. 
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Under the NDA government’s reform agenda, the rural sector came under particular 
scrutiny for its reliance on government subsidies. Given the demographic fact that India's 
rural regions carry a higher proportion of votes than urban areas and given that 60 percent 
of the labour force is engaged in rural areas (Ahluwalia in Nayar 2007, 210) rural welfare is 
an especially acute electoral issue. An early proposal to discontinue food grains and fertilizer 
subsidies in order to secure savings of 10,000 crore during the 2000 financial year (Financial 
Express 2000, March 09) was stymied through pressure from coalition partners. The two 
parties that led this response, the Janata Dal (U) in Odisha and the Akali Dal in Punjab, were 
especially reliant on crucial votes from agricultural constituencies. These parties acted after 
their senior leaders were approached directly by rural representatives who expressed grave 
concerns about the subsidy reduction proposals (Sahay 2000). 
 
Populist expediencies also prevented the implementation of price hikes in petroleum (based 
on cutting subsidies) from NDA partners in Andhra Pradesh (Telegu Desam Party) and West 
Bengal (Trinamool Congress). Both parties were reluctant to implement cut-backs in fuel 
subsidies as they were about to face crucial polls in their individual states (Jha 2004, 286). A 
major point of contention was the BJP finance minister’s lack of consultation with coalition 
members before announcing these cuts in the annual budget. Coalition members even 
threatened to vote against the (minority government) in a joint memorandum presented 
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directly to the Prime Minister. The challenges of coordinating policy among diverse coalition 
members was aptly summarized by then BJP General Secretary Narendra Modi who 
commented that, ‘it is natural that disagreements will crop up amongst ourselves’ (Sahay 
2000). In his own recollection of the events, finance minister Yashwant Sinha rationalized 
the cuts in light of increased defence expenditures during the Kargil war (1999). He recalled 
severe political pressure exerted by coalition partners not only through meetings with the 
BJP leadership but also in parliamentary debates and criticisms in the media (Sinha 2001, 
81). 
 
Ultimately the proposals to cut subsidies were dropped in a major reversal of Sinha’s 
original determination to introduce the cuts in the budget that year. In these particular 
cases, the influence of regional coalition partners, acted as a restraint on economic reform 
policies advocated by the BJP. The major motivation for resistance from coalition partners 
was the fear that these policies would translate into electoral losses (Jha 2004, 291). The BJP 
was therefore strongly influenced by coalition partners on issues of rural welfare where 
coalition members went as far as threatening to bring down the government if policies were 
not withdrawn. 
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Even as the influence of regional parties increased at the federal level some scholars argue 
that post-liberalization, the centre was able to reassert some of its power. It did this by 
acting as a gate-keeper to global investment as states mobilized in order to attract 
investment (Sinha 2005). The Economic Surveys of the Ministry of Finance from 1999-2004 
point to the increasingly precarious picture of state level borrowing. This was a legacy of 
populist politics by state governments, which, following two phases of economic 
liberalization at the centre, were forced to maintain public spending to compensate for 
rising inflation. While the fiscal situation of previous governments remained a constant 
refrain for the BJP in opposition, the record of the NDA on fiscal management was 
somewhat mixed. As I have shown in the previous chapter, the BJS had maintained an 
alarmist view on deficits that were needed to fund the Planning process. However, these 
concerns stemmed from the threat of inflation within the domestic economy, rather than 
concerns that deficits would stem international investment.  
 
For the BJP, however, reducing the fiscal deficit was a priority in order to attract greater 
Foreign Direct Investment into the economy. In its early economic statements, the party 
situated the genesis of high fiscal deficits in the process of Planning. It claimed that Planning 
had led to increased levels of poverty and vulnerability to external shocks (with specific 
reference to the rise of oil prices in the 1970s). This vulnerability inevitably necessitated 
intervention from international institutions and induced high external debt servicing costs. 
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The party was originally not in favour of fiscal consolidation at any cost. The BJP accused 
Congress of negotiating a loan (in 1982) from the IMF ‘behind the back of Parliament’ and 
criticized the loan’s attendant conditions such as reduced subsidies, tighter fiscal and 
monetary policies, liberalized imports and investment policies, and a greater export 
orientation in industry. The BJP viewed this as a costly move the government could have 
avoided by creating fiscal and credit incentives to mobilize domestic production and 
‘unleash creativity’ (BJP 1981, 355-356). Thus the BJP’s original stance on fiscal 
consolidation was suspicious of the role of international institutions and focused on creating 
domestically focused solutions. Once in government, the BJP’s approach to this problem 
was substantially different.  
 
In a bold move to achieve fiscal consolidation, the NDA coalition government negotiated a 
package of reforms to shore up the fiscal circumstances of individual states. The BJP 
recruited a number of coalition partners to this initiative through the signing of fiscal 
reduction MoUs (Echeverri-Gent 2001, 10). Through a debt-swap scheme, the government 
sought to relieve states of the burden of high interest payments and allow them to 
substitute these payments by current, low-coupon-bearing small savings and Open Market 
Loans (Ministry of Finance 2003-2004). A former Secretary of the finance ministry described 
this process as regional state governments were recruited to the signing of the MOUs: 
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 I started signing fiscal reform MOUs with each State, linking the release of loans and grants to the 
 fulfilment of certain fiscal reform objectives. Though some States resisted it (strictly, loans and grants 
 are an entitlement under the Constitution in which the Finance Commission lays down the criteria), 
 still, taking advantage of the weak fiscal condition of some states and their acute need for resources 
 to run their respective administrative machineries, I found it feasible to make them sign such MOUs. 
 One State after another followed. Subsequently, I convinced the then Finance Commission to include 
 this as a formal institutional mechanism in its report to the Parliament. It did become a reality.  
 (E.A.S Sarma, Telephone Interview, July 26 2012). 
 
Based on this account, it is clear that the central government, and the finance ministry in 
particular, was able to exert substantial influence over fiscal reform at the state level. 
Where states were resistant to this reform, the ministry even went so far as to leverage the 
diminished fiscal circumstances of a state to their own advantage and ensure the 
implementation of fiscal reforms. The inclusion of this as a formal mechanism in the report 
of the Finance Commission, an independent body set up by the President to advise on the 
distribution of taxation revenues between the states and centre, is particularly significant. 
This demonstrates that while capitulating on the issue of subsidies, the centre was able to 
reassert its influence at least on fiscal matters.  
 
Among the nine states that came on board with the fiscal reforms, four were represented in 
government by regional coalition partners (Orissa, Rajasthan, Punjab, Himachal Pradesh). 
This demonstrates that as coalition leader, the BJP influenced its coalition partners on fiscal 
reform. However, despite these successes, for various other reasons state level fiscal deficits 
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remained high during the term of the NDA government, continuing an upwards trend from 
previous governments before peaking during the fiscal years 2001-2002 and 2002-2003.  
 
Difficult relations over fiscal concerns was mirrored in other policy areas. The cornerstone 
policy of public sector disinvestment was opposed by cabinet ministers from regional 
parties. Disinvestment remained one of the most controversial points of the NDA’s 
economic reform agenda, especially in the appointment and method of the process. While 
the BJP initially followed the BJS in criticizing the public sector for its heavily centralized 
approach to the provision of goods, the proposed alternative emphasized swadeshi and 
decentralization rather than privatization. In contrast to this, the policies of the NDA took an 
even more aggressive stance on privatization than the previous Congress government.  
 
A fundamental catalyst for this process was the NDA’s creation of an entirely new 
government department to supervise disinvestment (the Department for Disinvestment) 
and provide a systematic approach toward the privatisation process. A former secretary of 
the Disinvestment Ministry explained the rationale behind its formation in the following 
way: 
When you sold [public] assets, there were questions to be asked in the parliament for instance. Now a 
minister could not take the responsibility of answering on behalf of a Disinvestment Commission that 
was independent. So therefore it was felt that there was need for a Disinvestment Ministry and that is 
how it was created (P. Baijal, Personal Communication, July 14, 2012). 
128 
 
 
 
 
 
According to this view, the Disinvestment Ministry was formed in order to provide greater 
parliamentary accountability to the process of public sector privatization. Ironically, the 
disinvestment process would come under heavy criticism within parliament on various 
points including the scope and method of disinvestment.  
On coming to power the NDA government’s stated target was to reduce government equity 
in all ‘non-strategic’ (i.e. non- defence or energy related) Public Sector Undertakings to 26 
percent or less. Budget announcements were careful to maintain that the interests of public 
sector workers would be 'fully protected' and that the receipts from these sales would be 
used to retire public debt and maintain the competitiveness of profitable public sector 
companies (Ministry of Finance 2000-2001). By the second year of the full-term NDA 
government, the privatization of 27 companies was approved (Ministry of Finance 2001-
2002). Sales in a further 7 public sector companies and properties belonging to the 
government owned Hotel Corporation of India (HCI) and the India Tourism Development 
Corporation were completed a year later (Ministry of Finance 2002-2003). 
 
However, disinvestment formed a particularly thorny point of contention among coalition 
partners. Whether due to differences in ideology that would be expected within such a large 
coalition or due to the machinations of cabinet level politics, there were clear instances of 
difference over, and even resistance to, disinvestment among coalition members. Early 
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proposals for the disinvestment of Air India, a Public Sector Undertaking under the portfolio 
of the Minister for Aviation Sharad Yadav (Janata Dal U) and similar proposals for the 
disinvestment of Mahanagar Telephone Nigam (MTNL) a Public Sector Undertaking under 
the portfolio of Minister for Communications Ram Vilas Paswan (Janata Dal U and Lok 
Janshakti Party) were met with resistance (Mishra et. al. 2003, 501-502).  
 
Significant delays that frustrated the BJP’s plans for rapid disinvestment were suspected to 
have originated with the Ministers’ alleged resentment of Disinvestment Minister Arun 
Shourie’s supposed ‘encroachment’ into Public Sector Undertakings within their own 
portfolios. The actions of these ministers are highly suggestive of stonewalling tactics. For 
example, mere weeks before the planned disinvestment of Air India, aviation minister 
Sharad Yadav suddenly announced the dismissal (on corruption charges) of the pro-
privatization Managing Director of Air India, Michael Mascheranas (Frontline 2001, June 09). 
This dismissal put the plans for privatization on temporary hold. In order to clear the way for 
the progress of disinvestment, these two Ministers were reshuffled to alternative cabinet 
positions (Business Line 2001, September 02). Here the BJP exercised an ability to manage 
opposition within the coalition, rather than capitulating to coalition pressure as on the issue 
of subsidies. The reshuffle enabled the Disinvestment Ministry to carry out an aggressive 
programme of privatization unhindered (McMillan 2005, 28-29).  
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These incidents point to another possible source of influence on policy formation within the 
government that strictly falls outside the scope of ‘coalition’ politics. While I have accounted 
for debates among coalition partners, what of debates within the parties? How would these 
have influenced the policy direction of the NDA government? Of particular importance are 
the ideological debates within the BJP which, given the legacy of Integral Humanism, would 
have surely been a point of contention within the party. The record shows that this was 
indeed the case. While drafting the 1998 economic policy manifesto, the BJP side-lined 
swadeshi advocate and senior party figure Murli Manohar Joshi, to enable the formulation 
of policies more sympathetic to a neoliberal economic agenda (India Today February 09, 
1998). This is especially significant given that Joshi was closely involved in the drafting of the 
BJP’s swadeshi oriented economic policy manifesto in 1996. 
 
As the government progressed with its program, differences became all the more apparent. 
On the introduction of the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Bill, the 
president of the BJP was particularly strident in public criticisms of the government’s 
economic policies. However, through the intervention of the Deputy Prime Minister (and 
Home Minister) L. K. Advani, even traditionalists were eventually brought on side. In the 
words of one such BJP Member of Parliament, ‘We had planned a big showdown on the IRA 
[Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Bill] issue. We held back after it was clear 
that Advani wasn't backing us’ (India Today February 09, 1998).  
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Differences between hardliners advocating a swadeshi approach and ‘progressives’ pushing 
for neoliberal policies would bubble over into public disagreements between the BJP and 
traditionalist Sangh organizations, which I will discuss further below. However, within the 
party, traditionalist opinions on economic issues appear to have been largely quarantined 
after the BJP formed its government in 1998. The Prime Minister increasingly relied on 
advisors in the Prime Minister’s Office and appointed Advisory Councils to craft an economic 
approach that would appeal to a transnational economic sector rather than to its ideological 
supporters. This will be the topic of discussion in chapter 5.  
 
To sum up, what can we say about the influence of coalition partners on the economic 
policies of the NDA government? The evidence presented here demonstrates that while the 
politics of coalition placed real pressures on the policy direction of the NDA government, 
coalition partners were also co-opted or simply bypassed in the formation of other reform 
policies such as fiscal reform or disinvestment. Thus what we have is a picture of a two-way 
relationship. Coalition partners had some limited influence on the economic agenda of the 
NDA government relating to sensitive political matters. However, on other economic 
matters, the BJP was clearly successful in containing opposition and pressing ahead with its 
economic agenda. The influence of coalition partners on the economic policy of the NDA 
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government was therefore somewhat mixed. What of the other avenues of influence? The 
next section investigates the role of interest groups. 
 
3.4. Interest Groups 
This section examines the influence of organized interest groups on the economic policies of 
the NDA government. While interest groups in India span the range of advocacy areas, from 
minority issues to the environment, this discussion will focus on groups particularly involved 
in advocacy concerning economic issues. This section examines the influence of the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) and the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry (FICCI) which are two of the leading Chambers of Commerce in the country. In 
addition, it examines the role of a Hindu Nationalist group and BJP affiliate, the Swadeshi 
Jagaran Manch (SJM), founded in 1991 in order to respond to the economic liberalization 
policies of the then Congress government. An examination of primary and secondary 
sources will show that the BJP was able to resist the criticisms and political pressure of the 
swadeshi focused SJM while benefitting from its close relationship with FICCI as it crafted its 
economic policies. First some theoretical comments are in order to provide context.  
 
Interest group theory emerged from the concerns of post-War American political scientists 
eager to describe the manner in which an increasingly expansionary Keynesian state would 
maintain its connections with the needs of people. Classical models include the 
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proportionate equilibrium view pioneered by Truman and Dahl and Olson's response in the 
free-rider problem (Berry 1978, 385). One prominent stream in the literature on economic 
transitions attempts to describe economic reform as the result of compromises or 
bargaining among various interest groups (Haggard 2000, 26). Applied to the present 
inquiry, interest groups served to connect the BJP with constituents in commercial industry 
(FICCI) and to connect Hindu nationalist constituents with economic concerns (SJM). In their 
efforts to influence the NDA government, we will see how far the process of bargaining and 
compromise affected the NDA’s economic policy formation. 
 
By the mid-1990s economic globalization had achieved momentum in East and South East 
Asia as well as in India. The BJP had initially taken a grim view of the general globalization 
trend, accusing developed countries of using pressure through international institutions and 
foreign consultants (in particular Jeffrey Sachs) to loosen trade regulations. This, the party 
maintained, would only jeopardise food security and the health of the small scale sector. 
There was also much scepticism regarding the importance of globalization for the Indian 
economy. This scepticism arose from the seeming fact that even after 1991 Foreign Direct 
Investment remained at 1 percent of GDP; and this was mostly concentrated in the services 
sector as opposed to high technology research or infrastructure (BJP 1997b). 
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Since the early 1990s, under the ever expanding legitimacy of the neoliberal paradigm, 
organized commercially focused interest groups such as the CII and FICCI moved from a 
merely advisory role to one of negotiation, cooperation and consultation with successive 
governments to build a business friendly economic environment in the country. A senior 
official in the CII described their role in the following way: ‘essentially a conduit between the 
private sector and the government... we work for the membership which is industry at 
large… and we take up their issues with the government’ (Bidisha Ganguly, Personal 
Interview, December 22 2010). 
 
The multiple levels of engagement with policy issues included everything from the legal 
framework and physical infrastructure to creating a positive image of business among the 
public through the media and corporate social responsibility (Hardgrave and Kochanek 
2008, 468). Multilevel engagement was particularly true for the CII. During the 1990s the 
organization undertook a significant expansion, placing an office in every Indian state and 
establishing a department of public policy to lobby Members of Parliament (CII, 2010). 
Revision of labour laws, improvements to sea and air ports, road infrastructure as well as 
the general promotion of business and entrepreneurship through the media during this 
period could be partly attributed to the work of such organisations. 
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A senior official at FICCI described their growing importance to the government in the 
following manner: 
It was extremely difficult for anyone in government to start talking to twenty different organizations... 
but if they were really keen to do something, then they needed to do something with a body that 
could be more educative and supportive of the way things should happen and maybe come up with 
some new ideas; and at the same time be responsible for whom they are standing up and speaking 
for. So that created [sic] this apex organization into a real functionally apex organization because we 
in FICCI would represent the entire cross-section of industry (V. Topa, Personal Interview, December 
24 2010). 
 
What is implied in this description is that the role and purpose of these organizations had 
evolved. During a period of neoliberal reform, the government required an efficient means 
of communicating and consulting with multiple stakeholders in the business community, 
and this was the role that these organizations stepped in to fill. Furthermore, they played an 
intermediary role as a trouble-shooter between government and industry: 
Any proposal that government would have would benefit some and not others. So there would 
always be pulls and counterpulls. So it became our responsibility in the process to be able to manage 
that. So when we put our proposal to government, they felt comfortable that this process of 
managing the differences of opinion or complexities in terms of what could be good or bad for people 
has been taken care of. And if there was something that went wrong for any cross-section, they 
would say go and talk to FICCI. So it became a buffer (V. Topa, Personal Interview, December 24 
2010).  
 
These organizations were therefore deeply involved in the process of bargaining among 
various commercial interests that was at the heart of economic policy formation. 
Furthermore, rather than simply acting as an intermediary, such organizations also existed 
to facilitate the vertical and horizontal consensus in the process of policy formation: 
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The other side was that you always wanted ideas. You always wanted newer ways of looking 
at things and it’s not that in government you could be repository of all that is available to 
seek [sic]. Chambers had the advantage of various international connectivities through joint 
business councils... so therefore there was an opportunity for us to gather a lot more 
information from others, put it together and assimilate it and put some proposals to 
government. We also… could interact with various cross sections of society who would 
influence the decision-making process, whether it was parliamentarians, legislative 
assemblies, general political other think tanks, journalists; you had an advantage, you could 
put all of these people together and start a debate or discussion and evolve a process (V. 
Topa, Personal Interview, December 24 2010). 
 
While these organizations saw themselves as a crucial partner and enabler of the reform 
process, others remain sceptical of the value added to the process of policy formation by 
these associations. A former Secretary of the Finance Ministry under the NDA government 
maintained that: 
 The Chamber of Commerce on the other side were only a bunch of lobbyists. They were  always 
 lobbying for something some giveaway some tax reduction, some quote some permit some 
 protection… you know against foreign capital. They also had no difference when it came to 
 foreign capital. They wanted foreign capital but under their thumb you know. And they didn't want 
 better management practices. And they'd give awards to themselves you know son of the head of 
 TATA, the head of Reliance would get management awards by this chamber of commerce for being 
 best manager, best entrepreneur, best leader. So it's a tight incestuous circle a bit of a cesspool of a 
 zone (M. Guruswamy, Telephone Interview, July 17 2012). 
 
Thus among some government officials, commercial interest groups were viewed as acting 
purely in the interest of a closed group of actors. Political critics, such as opposition Member 
of Parliament H.D. Deve Gowda, expressed discomfort at the unequal level of access 
business associations had to the government when compared to other constituents: 
Day in and day out, the FICCI holds several meetings, symposiums and conferences. The CII, the 
ASSOCHAM and other organisations always try to invite the Prime Minister, the experts, the Minister 
of Finance, the Commerce Minister and others and try to ventilate their problems. They try to 
persuade the rulers or administrators to see that their problems are solved. Where is such a lobby for 
the farmers? (Lok Sabha Debates 2002, December 04) 
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Even among critics of the organizations, the prevailing view was of undue influence and 
access these organizations had with the government. The influence of these interest groups 
is not in dispute; only the character of this influence.  
 
However, even among these organizations, the level of access and influence was uneven. 
These interest groups maintained close relationships with the governments led by the party 
with which they had historic links. Over the course of the NDA's term, FICCI was observed to 
have a closer working relationship with the BJP than CII. The secretary general of FICCI, Amit 
Mitra, was a former member of the Sangh Parivar affiliate Akhil Bharatiya Vidhyarthi 
Parishad and had personal relationships with several BJP leaders. FICCI’s general 
constituency of migrant business communities (marwaris) also had strong cultural 
inclinations towards the BJP. FICCI even was the first business organization to hold official 
meetings with the RSS (The Financial Express 2004, May 14). This close relationship was 
reflected in the fact that Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee chose to announce major initiatives 
(e.g. the golden quadrilateral project) at FICCI events. The reverse was true of the CII whose 
Director General Tarun Das had close personal ties with Rajiv Gandhi and several senior 
figures in the Congress party.  
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Having established that the groups enjoyed unequal access to the two main political parties, 
what can be said of the actual policy influence? Even though the CII maintained a cooler 
relationship with the NDA government than FICCI, both bodies supported similar policies on 
deregulation, the passing of the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA) 
Bill, the institution of patent reforms and disinvestment (Asia Pulse 1999, February 22). The 
efforts of FICCI and the Swadeshi Jagaran Manch offer the opportunity to observe the 
influence of interest groups close to the NDA government. Here relations took somewhat a 
surprising turn with the SJM, a fellow member of the Sangh Parivar, maintaining a harshly 
critical stance against the NDA government's policies. Meanwhile FICCI maintained a quietly 
supportive position.  
 
The SJM was the strongest flag-bearer for the traditional policy of swadeshi during the term 
of the NDA government. Its chief irritation with the BJP stemmed from the fact that while 
the party relied on the political support of its 15 million members, the BJP had largely 
'capitulated' to a non-swadeshi agenda. From the very beginning of the NDA government’s 
term in office, the SJM was keen to make its presence felt, criticizing the Prime Minister's 
decision to appoint economic and trade advisory councils (discussed further in chapter 5) 
and fill them with 'persons who are hostile to the very idea of swadeshi' (The Financial 
Express 1998, September 01). Already claiming a multinational 'casualty' in the cancellation 
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of the Enron power contract in Maharashtra (under the BJP-Shiv Sena government), the SJM 
was emboldened to make its presence felt on the national scene. 
 
Relations between the SJM and BJP were not, however, entirely negative. Estimations of 
finance minister Yashwant Sinha’s early performance and opinions on the first budgets were 
sympathetic. SJM convenor S. Gurumurthy commended the 'Pokhran Spirit' of the first 
budget, with its increased investments into the rural sector and small scale industries (The 
Hindu 1998, June 03). The finance ministry and SJM held meetings before the second budget 
to work out a common position on a comprehensive range of key issues, including the WTO, 
agriculture and small scale industries, capital account convertibility, foreign investment in 
the insurance sector and increasing tariffs to protect domestic goods (The Indian Express 
1998, May 07). Through such high-level meetings the NDA leadership would have been 
induced to adhere to the traditional Hindu nationalist economic approach based on Integral 
Humanism.  
 
Despite the SJM's arguments against the liberalization of the insurance sector (The Indian 
Express 1998, November 03), the sector was opened up to foreign investment in the first 
year of the NDA's first full-term government (1999). In its policy statements, the BJP hailed 
the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Bill as an opportunity to improve 
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efficiency as long as foreign investment was limited to 26 percent ownership and the 
relevant rules ensured that premium monies did not leave the country (BJP 1999a). A senior 
advisor to FICCI, pointed to this milestone as an important accomplishment for the 
organization in the post-liberalization period, as they had been active in putting together 
the reports that formed the basis of this particular policy reform over the six previous years. 
One of the leading things that we always felt proud of saying was the opening of the insurance sector 
which FICCI was primarily responsible for [sic]. We put together groups of people who produced 
various reports on various aspects of it which ultimately were used by the regulator to bring up the 
regulatory system that he developed (V. Topa, Personal Interview, December 24 2010).  
 
In a tribute to the organization's efforts in this initiative, the announcement of the insurance 
sector reform bill was made at a FICCI annual general meeting. Meanwhile, despite showing 
a united front in public, internal divisions within the Sangh were becoming increasingly 
evident with stinging criticisms from both the head of the RSS and the SJM directed at Prime 
Minister Vajpayee and finance minister Yashwant Sinha (The Hindu 2001, July 07).  
 
The BJP leadership was sensitive to the fact that the growing gulf with the SJM needed to be 
bridged. Several high ranking officials were recruited to participate in joint meetings 
including the ministers for law (Arun Jaitley), disinvestment (Arun Shourie) and finance 
(Yashwant Sinha). The powerful Home Minister L.K. Advani, trusted by the RSS as an 'insider' 
was also recruited by the government to give credence to the argument that reforms were 
inevitable. The BJP took the line that while some of their policies (e.g. WTO regulations, 
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insurance) were against its electoral platform, having been introduced by the previous 
government they had to be fulfilled (The Statesman 2000, May 24). Even after a four hour 
meeting between the BJP and SJM on this particular issue, a compromise was not reached 
(Hindustan Times July 26, 2000).  
 
As the NDA government's reforms progressed, a consortium of swadeshi organizations, 
including the SJM and Hindu nationalist trade and farmer unions, organised rallies in order 
to demonstrate the difficulties faced by the agricultural and small scale sectors as a result of 
these reforms (Business Line October 05, 2002). The BJP's frustration with the SJM was 
evident in the Prime Minister's irritation at the organisation's criticisms and lack of practical 
alternative suggestions (The Statesman 2003, January 29).  A former secretary in the NDA 
Ministry of Finance described the contentious relationship between the BJP and SJM in the 
following manner: 
SJM has no point. They are opposed to any foreign FDI. They are opposed to anything foreign. 
Whereas I didn't see McDonald's as particularly bad. If McDonald's came in and put money [in] here 
and opened shops and bought real estate and hired people and bought all their raw materials here, it 
was a good thing; it created the value addition chain. So what the hell do I care if it's called 
McDonald's: it's like any halvai shop. But SJM is opposed to that. But SJM doesn't have a refined view 
of economics. It's a kind of a very primitive view of capital: foreigners have been bad for India, the 
influence of foreigners has been bad, women behave badly and all kinds of primitive notions they 
carry. So I don't think SJM should be taken seriously; it's just a damn nuisance bunch of crackpots (M. 
Guruswamy, Telephone Interview, July 17 2012).  
 
From this particular perspective, SJM opposition to foreign investment is seen as part of a 
narrow social and cultural attitude that includes such base instincts as the suspicion of 
142 
 
 
 
 
foreigners. However there is also the clear implication that the SJM’s economic viewpoints 
stem from a lack of analytic sophistication. 
 
The SJM appears to take such criticisms in their stride: 
The criticism of SJM has been as old as the criticism of Mahatma Gandhi himself. The criticism is 
posited on the Western worldview and is in disregard of the facts of Indian life. Even today there are 
60 million farming families with 330 million people dependent on it [agriculture] with as much 
landless labour who share 60 percent of the farm products on barter basis; and only 40 percent of the 
farm products gets into the commercial stream. This functioning vikendrikaran in distribution is what 
is sustaining India and its food security and not centralised government distribution system[s]. Social 
security is almost completely decentralised in India. 700,000 villages and some 8000 towns have only 
12,800 police stations. Yet India has the lowest crime rate in the world according to the UNDP Human 
Development Index (S. Gurumurthy, Email interview, 2012). 
 
The implication is clear. Criticisms of the SJM are associated with the criticisms of Gandhi’s 
own economic positions. Such criticisms assume the position of someone in the Western 
world, far removed from the social realities of rural India. In an illustration of a viewpoint 
particular to the Hindu nationalist view of economics (criticized as ‘primitive’ by the NDA 
government advisor above), this SJM official maintains that decentralization of resources 
(food, security) takes place naturally and only needs be enhanced rather than subsumed by 
the priorities of the central government.  
 
However, even sympathizers within the BJP began to lose their patience with the group. 
One Sangh Parivar member and head of the BJP’s economic cell discussed the SJM’s 
opposition to foreign investment in the following terms: 
143 
 
 
 
 
In fact I had a difference with the SJM also, because they were opposing all [the] foreign goods and 
MNCs. They started involving themselves in things like breaking Pepsi bottles. Even going by Gandhian 
philosophy you cannot oppose MNCs. As far as MNCs and foreign investors are concerned, you're not 
importing. They are setting up a base here and they are contributing to the GDP of the country; they 
are generating employment opportunities for the people. So they are contributing to the national 
interest and you have to support them. But somehow I could not convince them [the SJM] (J. 
Shettigar, Personal Interview, December 21 2010). 
 
Here the SJM appeal to Gandhianism is turned on its head. Inasmuch as foreign investment 
contributes to the national economy, it coincides with Gandhian priorities far more than the 
superficial actions of damaging foreign made goods. The government’s distance from the 
SJM’s approach to economic issues appears to have been wide even at the level of 
interpreting basic Gandhian principles.  
 
In the heat of the policy forming process, criticisms also abounded on the other side of the 
interest group spectrum from the SJM. The CII issued public criticisms that not enough had 
been done by the NDA government to progress reforms. Within three years of publishing 
their policy paper for the new government The Agenda for the New Government (CII 1998), 
the CII became disillusioned by what it termed the gap between the NDA government's 
official policy and its implementation. Director-General Tarun Das publicly criticized what he 
called the government's inertia on implementing disinvestment and increasing 
infrastructure capacity. He blamed the former on what he called ‘internal resistance’ within 
the government, clearly implying the restrictive influence of groups such as the Swadeshi 
Jagaran Manch (Hardgrave and Kochanek 2008, 465).  
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In 2002 the CII’s distance from the government was further exacerbated by their vocal 
criticisms of the NDA government's handling of the anti-Muslim pogrom in Gujarat. The 
same year the CII broke with convention at its national gathering, inviting the leader of the 
opposition, Sonia Gandhi to give their inaugural address. This was in opposition to the usual 
practice of inviting the sitting Prime Minister (Hardgrave and Kochanek 2008, 465). In the 
meanwhile, FICCI was a major partner in the Vibrant Gujarat Summit held in 2003 to bolster 
Gujarat’s business-friendly face in the aftermath of the Godhra violence. 
 
At their annual convention the same year, the SJM turned its focus to the disinvestment 
policy of the NDA government. The disinvestment process enabled the expansion of private 
capital into significant sectors of the economy, until now largely monopolized by the 
government. It was successful in attracting small levels of Foreign Direct Investment. 
However, despite these successes, the process was dogged by critics. Controversy over the 
procedure for privatization emerged when the process was, in the government's reasoning, 
streamlined. The process was accelerated from the sale of small lots of shares in an open 
auction to the sales of share blocs to strategic investors. The newer method was criticized as 
less transparent and wasteful, due to the discount prices used to incentive potential buyers 
(Chandrashekar and Ghosh 2002, 89). 
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Disinvestment brought about a rare alignment between the Left and some of the more 
conservative elements among the Hindu nationalist Sangh Parivar. Together they criticized 
the need for disinvestment itself and the method that was used for this process. The Sangh 
advocated the decentralization of public units (i.e. loosening the purview of the central 
government over their operations) rather than the wholesale privatization pursued by the 
BJP in government. Echoing the criticisms of the Left parties, the SJM accused the 
government of being non-transparent in its private sales of share blocs. They were also 
accused of destroying national assets while encouraging private monopolies.  
 
The SJM took direct issue with Disinvestment Minister Arun Shourie who was accused of 
ignoring the national interest and having vested interests. It lamented that economic policy 
had been ‘taken over by former World Bank executives who have no stake in nationalistic 
vision’ (The Statesman 2003, October 15). Like the SJM, FICCI also supported a public 
offerings method for disinvestment, as opposed to the bloc method devised by 
disinvestment minister Arun Shourie. The former, it argued, was a more transparent and 
efficient method. Floating shares in international markets would avoid the possibility of 
encouraging domestic monopolies. However, rather than taking the SJM line, FICCI blamed 
coalition politics for the poor coordination of the disinvestment process (The Economic 
Times 2003, January 07).  
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Reforms that stemmed from WTO commitments also attracted the ire of the SJM which 
initiated a two month long agitation against policies it felt were endangering indigenous 
small scale and agriculture sectors. The convenor of the BJP's economic cell Jagdish 
Shettigar was left to make the case for these policies by arguing that they were in fact in the 
national interest. He explained his rationale in the following manner: 
When it comes to the WTO; in the absence of the WTO you have to indulge in bilateral negotiations, 
which means that instead of one negotiation at WTO binding more than 148 members, you have to 
negotiate with each and every country, which is a gigantic effort, which is not possible. And then you 
do the bilateral negotiation you may end up, going by the China example… America extracted more 
from China before it became a member of the WTO. So bilateral negotiations are not an easy joke; 
not an alternative. WTO certain things [sic] are not in the interests of countries like India… like farm 
subsidy. But that is because of our negotiating failure (J. Shettigar, Personal Interview, December 21 
2010). 
 
Thus the BJP appreciated that WTO membership allowed for a more efficient way to deal 
with matters on international trade in one venue rather than engaging in an almost 
exponential series of bilateral agreements. The alternative of bilateral agreements was also 
unrealistic because it could very well leave the country at a greater disadvantage. While 
criticisms of the WTO’s undue influence are acknowledged, it is argued that this stems more 
from the inability of the country’s representatives to negotiate appropriately rather than 
anything innately wrong with the WTO. These arguments were made to the SJM who 
retorted that despite numerous consultations, their input into the dialogue on trade policy 
was not evident (The Financial Express 2003, April 14; The Hindu 2003, April 15; The 
Financial Express 2003, April 17).  
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As an expression of these frustrations, the SJM organized a large joint rally in the capital 
ahead of the WTO talks in Cancun to put pressure on the government to 'change' the WTO 
or quit (The Indian Express 2003, July 21). The numbers at the event reached the tens of 
thousands and the speeches and entertainment provided at the event castigated the WTO 
and multinational organisations, even if sceptical journalists were able to ascertain that 
members of the audience were barely conversant in the details (one confusing Cancun with 
the Indian city of Kanpur). A joint resolution was adopted by other Sangh organizations 
present (representing labour and farmer interests) and sent to the Commerce Minister. The 
SJM then convened a six-member team to attend the WTO meeting in order to maintain its 
pressure on the Indian delegation (The Financial Express 2003, August 13). On this particular 
issue the SJM expressed satisfaction that the BJP minister (Arun Jaitley) had maintained the 
national interest by taking a tougher line over agricultural subsidies at the Cancun meeting. 
However, it is likely that the influence of coalition partners and state level interests in 
maintaining subsidies (described above) was an even more significant influence than any 
pressure coming from the SJM.  
 
What can be concluded about interest group influence over the NDA government? The NDA 
government maintained close ties with interest groups during its tenure in government. It 
was particularly close with FICCI, although this was not true for all commercial interest 
groups. There is at a first glance a pattern of relationships based on political kinship. As a 
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member of the Sangh Parivar, the Swadeshi Jagaran Manch had unencumbered and regular 
contact with the BJP and NDA government leaders. This was also the case for FICCI whose 
leaders had Sangh associations and members that had broad Sangh sympathies.  
 
However, access did not immediately translate into influence. The SJM's recommendations 
were resisted and when necessary the BJP learned to manage dissent from such groups 
through its networks of affiliates both within the Hindu nationalist Sangh and outside (e.g. 
through FICCI). 'Outside' groups such as the CII were at first cautiously supportive, then 
unhappy about the government's policies, both economic and political. Of the three groups, 
the BJP’s relationship with FICCI appears to have been the most significant for the formation 
of economic policies. Despite some differences (e.g. on the method of disinvestment) the 
influence of this organization on the economic policy formation of the NDA is clear. Even as 
the BJP was able to satisfy some commercial and business constituencies, it would also need 
to connect with the larger constituency of the voting public, a theme to which I now turn. 
 
3.5. Voter Opinion 
In this section I examine voter opinion in order to assess whether the influence of voters can 
be discerned on the BJP’s economic policies. An examination of support for the BJP as it 
correlates with social, political and economic voter attributes, will shed light on how voters 
responded to the economic reform policies described above and how these responses could 
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have further influenced the government’s overall economic agenda. According to Wlezien 
(2004) recent studies demonstrate that government policy decisions do in fact respond to 
public opinion. While this is depended on a number of conditions, including the policy 
domain, the salience (relative priority) of a policy and the level of awareness among the 
voting public, such studies suggest that democratic accountability is possible under certain 
conditions. This section does not aim to build an equivalent argument for India and Hindu 
nationalism. However, the analysis will show that the evidence strongly suggests that the 
BJP strengthened its resolve to pursue economic reform in response to the opinions of at 
least one voting constituency. 
 
The backdrop against which this analysis takes place is the electoral strategy the BJP 
pursued in the 1990s. Chhibber differentiates between the two chief electoral strategies of 
this period: cleavage based and catch-all strategies. The former is a description of an 
electoral strategy directed at expanding a party’s voter base among groups that are aligned 
to particular social, cultural or economic priorities. The latter applies to a strategy of 
appealing to voter groups across these priorities. Chhibber argues that the volatility of 
politics at the central government during the 1990s was fundamentally the result of a 
change in the electoral strategies of Congress and the BJP. This change involved a move 
from cleavage based strategies that appealed to narrow interests to a catch-all strategy in 
which parties attempted to maximize their votes through the broadest possible appeal 
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(Chhibber 2001, 1-24). Heath investigates the source of the BJPs electoral fortunes in the 
1990s and attributes this to the expansion of support out of its traditional ‘home’ in the 
heartland of the central north region and into the various regions of the country through 
strategic alliances with regional political partners (Heath 1999).  
 
Against this background Kumar (2004) presents a study on the relationship between voting 
patterns and perceptions of economic policy. Looking at the 1996 and 1998 election surveys 
conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), he establishes that a 
greater number of Congress voters approved of the economic reforms instituted in 1991 
(39% and 30% respectively) than disapproved (20% and 22% respectively) while a larger 
number of BJP voters disapproved of the reforms (37% and 37%) than approved (28% and 
26%) (Kumar 2004, 1623). Going into the era of the NDA coalition government, therefore, a 
larger number of voters for the BJP disapproved of the Congress led economic reforms.  
 
Kumar's analysis is further qualified by an identification of how various social groupings 
responded to the economic reforms. He demonstrates that white collar, highly educated 
and rich voters maintained above average support for the reforms. From one election to the 
next election, the average proportion of voters who approved of the reforms increased 
across all of the above categories, especially among older voters for whom support moved 
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from below average to significantly above average. Furthermore he makes the important 
argument that awareness of the economic reforms remained below average among the 
uneducated, manual and agricultural labourers and among the poor. Taken together with 
his analysis of support for the reforms among social groups, Kumar's point is simply that 
better educated, older and wealthier individuals not only showed greater support for the 
economic reforms but actually demonstrated greater awareness of these reforms (Kumar 
2004, 1624). Lack of support for the reforms therefore may not simply imply disapproval but 
also a general lack of awareness about these reforms.  
 
By the end of the NDA coalition's term, Kumar observes that, in the sample taken from the 
election in 2004, it was largely the upper castes that communicated satisfaction with the 
economic progress of the country. This group also maintained that the overall effects of the 
reforms were positive and widespread (Kumar 2004, 1628). Thus any conclusions regarding 
the opinions of various social groups must be qualified with the understanding that it is 
among such groups that there is an actual awareness of the process of economic reforms.  
 
In this section I intend to extend this analysis further to shed light on voter opinion 
regarding the BJP's economic policies. This section asks what influence voter opinion may 
have exerted on the BJP’s economic policies. I examine the data for each of the years 1995, 
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2001 and 2006 drawn from the World Value Surveys which are conveniently near-
contemporary with the national elections of 1998, 1999 and 2004. They can therefore 
provide an idea of opinion trends roughly before during and after the NDA’s term in power. 
 
The analysis utilizes indicators that convey the level of BJP support along three axes: class, 
political self-placement and business model preference. The class indicator is a categorical 
variable that asks respondents to position themselves on a social scale of upper, upper 
middle, lower middle, working and lower class. The political self-placement indicator is an 
ordinal variable that asks respondents to rate themselves politically on a scale of left (1) to 
right (10). The business model preference indicator is an ordinal variable that asks 
respondents to rate themselves on a scale of private (1) to public (10). Private indicates a 
responder’s preference for a greater role for private business in the economy while public 
indicates a responder’s preference for a greater role for government in the economy. The 
analysis tests the correlation of these indicators with the likelihood of voting for the BJP. 
These opinions in each of the three periods: roughly before, during and after the term of the 
BJP government, provide a sense of how electoral incentives may have shaped the 
economic policies of the BJP.   
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These are the results we can expect on the basis of the analysis so far in this chapter. Before 
the BJP came to power it expressed a cautious support for some of the Congress Party’s 
neoliberal policies. On coming to power, however, it began to pursue a neoliberal agenda, 
with some early opposition from domestic quarters. We can expect to see this reflected in 
the analysis for the years 1995 and 2001. Upper class voters and right wing voters would 
support the BJP in 1995 although not for purely economic reasons while pro-private 
business voters would not especially favour the BJP over another party. In 2001, with the 
NDA already in power and pursuing an agenda of economic reform, we can expect to see 
significant support across all three categories. Upper class voters would benefit from the 
reforms personally, right wing voters would support the reforms for ideological reasons 
while pro-private business voters would support the party’s economic agenda 
professionally. In 2006, with the UPA in power and a scaling back of neoliberal reforms due 
to the influence of the Left Front we can once again expect to see support for the BJP across 
at least the right wing and pro-private business categories. Right-wing voters would oppose 
the UPA alliance with the Left Front while pro-private business voters would oppose the 
UPA’s scaling back of disinvestment. 
 
What we will in fact observe contrasts with these expectations slightly. This analysis will 
show that the BJP’s social base of support remained consistent among the upper and upper 
middle classes. It will also show that support for the BJP was consistent on the ‘right’ side of 
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the political scale and that this support increased significantly on the BJP coming to power. 
The application of a ‘right’ to ‘left’ political scale to the Indian context is contested, even if it 
has become a common means of referring to Hindu nationalist parties in the scholarly 
literature. The World Values Survey questionnaire does not offer a definition of these terms 
to respondents so a response that scores on the ‘right’ side of the scale may indicate a 
genuine social and cultural conservatism and free market orientation or simply a reflexive 
oppositional reaction against identification with parties commonly associated in the popular 
perception with the 'left'. Finally, starting with no particular political party preference, 
voters who wished to see more privately owned businesses became less likely to vote for 
the BJP when the NDA was in power. However, following the NDA’s term in government 
these voters became more likely to vote for the BJP. Among the BJP’s allies, the analysis will 
show that over the three periods, typical coalition party voters became more socially, 
politically and economically aligned with BJP voters. 
  
A multivariate time series analysis tests correlations among the dependent categorical 
variable (first choice for party in vote) and a series of independent variables (class, self-
positioning, business model preference). For this analysis, the variables for first choice for 
party in vote, social class, ideological self-positioning and business model preference have 
been recoded into ‘dummy variables’. Binary logistic regression is applied in this case as the 
dependent variable is also a binary variable. The relationships take the form: logit(p)=a+bixj 
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where p is the probability of a dependent binary categorical variable taking on a value y, x 
represents the independent binary categorical variables, b represents the logistic 
coefficients and a is a constant. The inverse natural logarithm of the logistic coefficient gives 
us the value of the odds ratio. 
  
The results can be interpreted in the following manner. An odds ratio value greater than 1 
indicates a greater likelihood that a particular constituency will vote for the BJP (or NDA in 
the second analysis) over another party, while an odds value less than 1 indicates the 
reverse. The three dummy variables and a series of dummy control variables (Age, 
Education, Gender) are tested for statistical significant at the 5% (p=0.05) level. For values of 
p greater than 0.05 we cannot reject the null hypothesis (i.e. that the relationship is 
statistically insignificant). Thus we establish a statistically significant relationship between a 
vote for the BJP (or NDA ally in the second analysis) if p≤0.05 (p is equal to or less than 
0.05). The results are discussed below. The results of this analysis are summarized in 
Appendix 3.1. 
 
The analysis shows that social class was highly correlated with voting for the BJP before, 
during and after the term of the NDA. In 1995, upper class and upper middle class voters 
were almost twice as likely (p=0.0001; odds ratio=1.907) to vote for the BJP over other 
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parties compared to the reference category of lower middle and lower class voters. In 2001, 
this correlation was still statistically significant but the likelihood of voting for the BJP 
decreased slightly (p=0.029; odds ratio=1.571). Following the end of the NDA government’s 
term, the correlation strengthened again with upper class and upper middle class voters 
more than twice as likely to vote for the BJP as middle and lower class voters (p=0.0001; 
odds ratio=2.079).  
 
In 1995 those voters self-positioned on the ‘right’ were twice as likely to vote for the BJP 
(p=0.0001; odds ratio=2.129) than those positioned on the left. However by 2001, voters 
self-identified on the right were four times as likely to vote for the BJP over voters on the 
left (p=0.0001; odds ratio=4.399). Following the term of the NDA government, the 
correlation dropped in strength slightly so that voters on the right were just over twice as 
likely to vote for the BJP over voters on the left (p=0.0001; odds ratio=2.448). There was 
therefore a strong correlation among voters who positioned themselves on the right and 
voting for the BJP, especially during the NDA government’s rule. 
 
An analysis of the final variable, business model preference, tells an interesting story about 
reactions to the NDA government’s economic policies. In 1995, as expected, there was no 
significant correlation among those who preferred a greater role for the private sector in 
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the economy and BJP voters (p=0.68). However in 2001, during the term of the NDA 
government, this relationship became significant, with voters supporting a greater role for 
private business less likely to vote for the BJP (p=0.0001; odds ratio= 0.650) than voters 
supporting a greater role for the government in the economy. Following the term of the 
NDA, voters preferring a greater role for the private sector in the economy were more likely 
to vote for the BJP (p=0.0001; odds ratio=2.403) than another political party. During the 
term of the NDA, supporters of a greater role for private sector business were less likely to 
support the BJP than another party. This may be indicative of a drop in confidence around 
such policies as the NDA’s privatization (disinvestment) initiatives which, as we have seen, 
raised some domestic controversy. Following the term of the NDA government, this group 
reversed their lack of support for the BJP indicating greater likelihood in voting for the BJP 
than another party. This could be indicative of a number of things. First, with the UPA 
government’s halting of privatization initiatives, due to the influence of the Left Front, these 
voters may have simply been indicating a desire for a political alternative. However, this 
could also be indicative of a retrospective approval of the BJP’s privatization initiatives. 
 
The regression analysis has yielded the following results. Upper class and upper middle class 
voters were consistently more likely to vote for the BJP than another party, although during 
the term of the NDA government, this correlation decreased in strength slightly. Voters on 
the on the ‘right’ of the political scale were consistently at least twice more likely to vote for 
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the BJP than another party and four times more likely to vote for the BJP over another party 
during the term of the NDA government. Voters with a greater preference for private over 
government owned businesses in the economy initially had no preference between the BJP 
over another party. During the time of the NDA government, these voters were less likely to 
vote for the BJP than another party. This relationship reversed when the NDA completed its 
term with these voters indicating a greater likelihood of voting for the BJP over another 
party. 
 
A second regression analysis examines the preferences of NDA voters as a whole (including 
BJP voters) and yields another series of interesting results. In 1995, political self-placement, 
gender level of education had statistically significant correlations with a vote for an NDA 
party. A voter who possessed at least a high school education (p=0.028; odds ratio=1.377) 
and positioned on the right of the political scale (p=0.0001; odds ratio=1.875) was more 
likely to vote for an NDA party over another political party. Meanwhile male voters were 
less likely to vote for an NDA party over another party (p=0.01; odds ratio=0.693). In 2001, 
these correlations began to change with gender (p=0.73) no longer statistically significant, 
political self-placement (p=0.0001; odds ratio=4.399) and education level (p=0.001; Odds 
ratio=1.772) statistically significant and class now statistically significant for the first time 
(p=0.004; odds ratio=1.749). Following the term of the NDA government, political self-
placement was still statistically significant (p=0.0001; odds ratio=3.179), class remained 
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significant (p=0.003; odds ratio=1.727) and pro-private business voters now significant for 
the first time (p=0.0001; odds ratio=2.003). 
 
At the outset, the social base of NDA voters as a whole appears to have been somewhat 
different than BJP voters. Male voters were less likely to vote for an NDA party while voters 
who possessed at least a high school education were more likely to vote for an NDA party 
over another party. An NDA voter would also place themselves on the right of the political 
scale. In comparison, during this period BJP voter was more likely to be upper or upper 
middle class, gender neutral, but also have a political self-placement on the right. By 2001, 
the social base of the NDA became more gender neutral, though voters with a high school 
education level were still more likely to vote for an NDA party. Support also shifted towards 
the upper and upper middle classes while still remaining strong among ‘right’ voters.  
 
However, following the end of the NDA’s term in government, individuals likely to vote for 
an NDA party had an identical social, political and economic profile to a BJP voter. In this 
period, upper and upper middle class individuals with a preference for private business and 
political self-placement on the right were more likely to vote for an NDA party than another 
party - identical in form to that of a typical BJP voter. This implies that for the NDA parties, 
electoral support for the entire coalition increasingly took on the profile of electoral support 
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for the BJP. This is significant because it indicates that rather than simply being a response 
idiosyncratic to BJP voters, voters for the coalition as a whole responded to the legacy of the 
BJP’s overall performance in an identical manner. Upper class, right of centre, pro-private 
business voters demonstrated a preference for the BJP or an NDA party over other parties 
once the NDA was out of power.  
 
How far can democratic accountability and electoral incentives be shown to have influenced 
the policy direction of the BJP? Among the voters who were aware of the effect of the 
economic policy direction (among the upper and upper middle classes), there was 
consistent support for the party. Given that the BJP's own statements and policies would 
have shifted slightly from advocating patriotic capitalism in 1995 to supporting neoliberal 
reform by 2001, this appears to be an indication of voter loyalty among the upper classes 
rather than an endorsement of the BJP's policy positions. For NDA voters as a whole, 
support for the NDA following the conclusion of the NDA government could be indicative of 
a retrospective approval of the NDA government’s economic performance. It could also 
indicate a rejection of the UPA’s policies of greater restraint in pursuing economic reforms 
due to the influence of the Left Front. 
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Among right of centre voters, support is also consistent in both analyses across all three 
periods and increasing significantly during the term of the NDA government. These results, 
while clearly indicative of consistent support for the party, may however signify support for 
more than the BJP’s economic policies. These results may well be indicative of support for 
not only the economic agenda but the overall policy agenda. At the very least, the 
consistency of support for the BJP and the NDA as a whole among right of centre voters in 
all three years demonstrates a level of voter loyalty unchallenged by the economic policy 
successes or shortcomings of the government.  
 
The consistent support for the BJP among voters on the ‘right’ is in marked contrast to the 
final indicator, where a response of purely economic significance changes across all three 
periods. Among voters with a greater preference for private business, there is a significant 
lack of support for the BJP in 2001 (while the BJP was in office). This then changes in 2006 
when these voters become more likely to vote for the BJP over another party. This implies 
very strongly that the BJP alienated this particular group of voters, sympathetic to economic 
reform, during its term in government. Concerns over the slow pace of disinvestment early 
in the NDA’s term, a policy directly related to a greater role for private business in the 
economy, could well have been the source for this lack of support.  However once the pace 
of disinvestment was increased through the removal of political obstacles (as we have seen 
above) the evidence suggests that these voters were satisfied by the BJP’s efforts. In fact 
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following the BJP’s term in government, voters in this category showed a greater likelihood 
to vote for the BJP or an NDA party. This strongly suggests a retrospective support of voters 
in favour of greater private business for the legacy of the NDA’s economic policies.  
 
Consistent support from Upper class and Upper middle class voters and right of centre 
voters may not have directly impacted on the economic policy formation of the BJP. 
However, it does demonstrate that within its core base, the party’s voter loyalty was not 
significantly tested by the process of economic policy reform implemented by the NDA. This 
cannot therefore count as a formative influence on economic policy making, even if voter 
consistency would have provided the BJP with an electoral ‘cushion’ as it carried out 
reforms that I have shown were unpopular among some quarters.  
 
In comparison, the support of pro-private business voters was wholly inconsistent. Initially, 
before the NDA came to power, these voters were indifferent to the BJP. Once the coalition 
came to power, this group expressed dissatisfaction with the NDA as it struggled to institute 
policies to cut subsidies, pursue disinvestment of Public Sector Undertakings and attract 
greater levels of Foreign Direct Investment. Could the early lack of support among this 
constituency have spurred the BJP to act and accomplish its subsequent policy reform 
successes especially in the area of disinvestment? While this is not likely in and of itself, 
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voter dissatisfaction in this constituency may well have contributed to the momentum for 
change that was developing among other domestic, international and transnational factors. 
How far did voters influence the economic reform policies of the BJP? This analysis shows 
that disapproval of the BJP’s early economic record among one cross-section of voters 
would have augmented the influence of other factors on at least one key economic reform 
policy. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
This chapter set out to accomplish two goals. The first was to demonstrate that the BJP’s 
economic agenda was reoriented from an early emphasis on the tenants of Integral 
Humanism to a new set of neoliberal priorities when the party was in power at the head of 
the NDA coalition government. This chapter has recounted the early economic positions of 
the BJP and has contrasted these positions with the major economic policy 
accomplishments of the BJP-led government. The latter included the implementation of a 
series of policies that decisively deregulated and privatized major functions of the economy, 
from insurance to trade and reductions in government expenditures.  
 
Having accomplished this, the second question asked how far this change in approach could 
be attributed to domestic influences. This chapter has examined the influence of three 
factors with varying results. Influence from coalition partners appears to have been largely 
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in the form of reactive 'pushback' to reform initiatives directed at politically sensitive topics 
such as rural subsidies or the privatization of Public Sector Undertakings. On the other hand, 
the BJP scored some victories with coalition partners, especially in the area of fiscal 
management commitments. The relationship between the BJP and its coalition partners 
therefore appears to have been a case of ‘give-and-take’ with coalition partners able to 
influence policies on issues that were of particular concern to their regional electoral bases. 
However, while subsidy reform may have been taken off the agenda, the BJP was able to 
secure the agreement of coalition partners on the broader goal of fiscal policy reforms.  The 
dynamic of coalition politics therefore sheds some light on the process of economic reform 
and the reciprocate nature of influence from coalition partners. 
 
Policy influence also came from organized interest groups.  Among those groups that had 
access to the government on issues of economic policy, the nature of the relationship was 
not always convivial. FICCI advised the government on the priorities of the business 
community and this partially resulted in the introduction of some key reforms (e.g. the 
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority Bill). Ironically, the BJP maintained a tense 
relationship with the SJM which took a confrontational line with the government on some of 
its key economic policies.  
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During the course of the NDA government, key policies regarding agriculture, the rural 
sector and disinvestment were opposed by the SJM, without gaining any traction with the 
government. There is some indication that towards the end of the NDA's term, the BJP’s 
stronger line with WTO deliberations earned plaudits from the SJM. However, it is not clear 
whether this was a result of the pressure exerted by the SJM or the BJP’s coalition partners. 
Thus the BJP’s economic agenda appears to have been partially formed through its 
relationship with one interest group even as it resisted the influence of another. What this 
analysis does not demonstrate is why the BJP preferred the advice of one group, FICCI, over 
another, the SJM, especially when the latter was part of its Hindu nationalist constituency. 
 
Finally among voters, the evidence suggests a consistent support for the BJP among upper 
class voters and a consistent support for the BJP and the NDA among right of centre voters. 
This is strongly suggestive of a broad support for the BJP’s economic policies among the 
social groups that would most benefit from greater economic reform and integration with 
the global economy. However, a key economic constituency (pro-private business voters) 
opposed the BJP’s policy during its first years in government. Possibly due to a combination 
of pressure from these voters and other influences, the BJP accomplished a change of 
course on privatization in the latter years of the NDA government, even earning the 
retrospective approval of this constituency.  
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Taken together, the analysis of domestic factor influence demonstrates the key role of 
coalition partners defining the boundaries of economic policy reforms, shows that interest 
groups served in both supportive and adversarial capacities on particular policy issues, and 
that voters provided consistent support for the party or disapproval on specific economic 
policies depending on their constituency. Each of these domestic factors can account for 
some aspect of the reform process: how far it was allowed to go unobstructed, how it was 
shaped by domestic constituencies and levels of support among ordinary citizens. However, 
they cannot account of the actual origin of the neoliberal orientation of these policies.  
 
Why, for example, did the BJP prioritize fiscal consolidation? Why did the BJP alienate 
members of its core constituency by deregulating the insurance sector? In this chapter, I 
have shown how these initiatives were pursued and how they were shaped at the domestic 
level. However, one question that remains unanswered is why the BJP’s economic policies 
took on a neoliberal orientation in the first place. For this we must examine another set of 
influences. In the next chapter, I will examine whether external factors can explain why the 
BJP’s economic policies assumed this orientation. 
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Chapter 4: Home and the World: Hindu Nationalism in the 
International Political Economy 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter examined how domestic factors such as the NDA’s coalition partners, 
interest groups and voters influenced its economic policies. It concluded that while 
domestic factors did play a formative role in the formation of economic policy, their 
influence was chiefly in the form of constraints imposed on the BJP by coalition partners, 
the advice provided by interest groups and reactions among voting constituencies. These 
factors cannot explain the actual origin of the BJP’s economic re-orientation in the NDA 
government, even if they are helpful in understanding the limits, shape and popular 
responses to these policies. To look at the root causes I must turn the focus elsewhere. 
 
This investigation therefore turns ‘outwards’. Having examined the most significant 
domestic factors in the formation of the BJP’s economic policy, and found them only 
partially illuminating, the search for adequate explanatory factors telescopes outwards to 
international factors. This analytic leap takes its cue from prominent streams of political 
economy literature which portray the process of economic policy reform, especially in 
developing countries, as primarily driven by international factors (Amin 1976; Stallings 
1992). Thus any account of economic policy reform in India under the NDA government 
should involve a discussion of international factors.  
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What are these factors? Hegemonic foreign nations, international institutions and private 
multinational corporations (corresponding to Realist, Liberal and Marxist approaches 
respectively) are some of the chief external influences to which economic policy reforms are 
attributed. This chapter focuses on the role of international institutions, especially the 
International Monetary Fund, World Bank and the World Trade Organization in influencing 
the economic policy formation of the NDA government. In taking this approach this chapter 
does not imply that the role of states or multinational corporations is irrelevant to the 
formation of economic reform policy. Instead, this focus reflects a recognition of the key 
role these institutions have played in the formation of economic policy in developing 
countries since the 1980s. These institutions set the policy environment within which other 
factors in turn operate. Towards the end of the chapter I will show how at least one other 
factor (multinational corporations) responded to the incentives put in place by international 
institutions. 
 
The focus on institutions rather than states draws from an existing debate on the 
propagation of power in the international system between the neoliberal and neorealist 
schools of international relations (Schweller and Priess 1997, 1-3). While both recognize the 
role of institutions in the international system, the former views them as autonomous 
catalysts towards achieving cooperation, while the latter views them as a reflection of 
underlying power relationships among states. Traditional realists view institutions as tools 
170 
 
 
 
 
of legitimacy captured by powerful states (Schweller and Priess 1997, 13) and therefore 
simply reflections of underlying state power dynamics. Against this view is the classic liberal-
institutionalist assumption that 'state actions depend to a considerable degree on prevailing 
institutional arrangements' (Keohane 1984, 89). 
 
What is at stake for this analysis is not whether or not institutions constitute an 
independent actor in the international system, but rather whether they act as significant 
'vectors' of influence in the international system. The question is, do they influence the 
formation of economic policy, rather than whether they do so independently. On this point, 
there does not appear to be much controversy as both schools depict international 
institutions as capable of influence, either due to their own legitimacy or the underlying 
state power structures. This chapter will demonstrate how far international institutions 
influenced the Indian economy under the NDA government.  
 
Historically, the influence of these institutions on developing countries took on a new 
significance in the 1980s. As developing countries defaulted on international loan 
commitments when interest rates in the United States were increased to contain domestic 
inflation, the World Bank and IMF assumed a function far beyond their original mandates. 
Assistance to developing countries was provided in exchange for Structural Adjustment 
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Programmes (SAPs) through which developing countries were required to implement major 
changes in economic practice (O'Brien and Williams 2004, 223-224). These policies initiated 
a new phase of external influence on developing country economies by international 
institutions. The package of Structural Adjustment Programme policies described variously 
as an application of the ‘Washington Consensus’ or ‘neoliberalism’ prioritized 
macroeconomic stability through the containment of inflation and reduction of fiscal 
deficits, trade and capital account liberalization, privatization and deregulation of domestic 
markets (Gore 2000, 790).  
 
Critics point out that far from its original mandate of requiring borrowing countries to 
pursue policies that enhanced economic stability, loan conditionalities became 'a way for 
the IMF to regulate the entire gamut of a country's economic policies' (Peet 2003, 57). In 
fact, Structural Adjustment proved to be a highly formative and often highly destabilizing 
economic influence on developing countries (Orford 2003, 112). In real policy terms, Peet 
maintains that Structural Adjustment simply meant the IMF’s advocacy of neoliberal 
policies. While the adverse effects of a universal adoption of Structural Adjustment and 
neoliberal priorities were eventually identified (Stiglitz 2002; Rodrik 2007) and even 
recognized by international institutions themselves (Mallaby 2006), the legacy of these 
policies remains undiminished.  
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Among developing countries, India is the largest single borrower from the World Bank (Kirk 
2005) and experienced at least one highly formative episode of IMF policy intervention 
(Chaudhry et. al. 2004, 61). The World Bank, and to a lesser extent the IMF, continued to 
have close interactions with the Indian economy throughout the 1980s and 1990s through a 
series of Structural Adjustment Loans from the World Bank and two IMF loans. The World 
Trade Organization by comparison is a relatively newer organization, but its ability to exert 
influence through binding international resolutions (as I will show in this chapter) make it a 
key institutional influence deserving investigation. International institutions offer a clear 
starting point to investigate the role of international influences on the NDA’s economic 
policies.  
 
Due to the ubiquity of the category of 'influence' in this analysis, this term merits some 
clarification at the outset. Influence is the term used to describe the capacity of one actor to 
modify the behaviour of another (Woods 2003, 3-4). Even if it is granted that the IMF and 
World Bank exert influence on states, how is this influence identified? Influence from these 
institutions can be traced to the economic policy direction pursued by governments. Cox 
and Jacobsen's landmark study on the influence of international institutions describes the 
chief sources of influence as the 'rule-creating' and 'rule-supervisory' capacities of these 
institutions. Through these mechanisms, international institutions both create and apply 
rules by instruments such as conventions or agreements among states (Cox and Jacobsen 
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1973, 427). It is these rule-creating and rule-supervising capacities, mainly in the form of 
structural adjustment conditionalities (IMF, World Bank) and trade regulations (WTO), that 
constitute the main arms of influence by the international institutions examined in this 
analysis.    
 
This chapter will investigate the influence of international actors on the NDA’s economic 
policies. In particular it will look at the role of three international institutions: the IMF, 
World Bank and World Trade Organization (WTO). In each case it will show that the 
influence of these institutions on the NDA government’s economic policies is demonstrable 
through this government’s adoption of certain economic policies. Again, like the domestic 
factors examined in chapter 3, this influence not entirely sufficient to explain all of the 
major economic policies undertaken by the NDA government. In fact, on some policies there 
were clear instances of resistance to the influence of these institutions.  
 
With only partial answers provided by exclusively examining the influence of institutions, 
the chapter broadens its focus to ask what other international incentives might have 
motivated particular economic policy directions undertaken by the NDA government. 
Foreign Direct Investment by multinational corporations is identified as one such incentive 
and the attempt to utilize policy reforms to attract such investment is examined as another 
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possible source of influence. The chapter concludes with an assessment of how it has 
addressed some of the ‘why’ questions that remained at the conclusion of the last chapter. 
However it also points to some remaining blind-spots that are taken up in chapter 5. 
 
In the next section I provide some theoretical background on the analysis undertaken in this 
chapter. This is followed by sections that examine the influences of the IMF, World Bank and 
World Trade Organization. A further section looks at the influence of multinational 
corporations and a concluding section brings together the inferences reached in this 
chapter. 
 
4.2. Naming the NDA’s reforms 
Economic transitions have been studied from a number of theoretical perspectives in order 
to explain how and why they occur. Economic transitions constitute an economic policy 
movement from a centralized economic model towards the privatization and liberalization 
of economic activity, the imposition of budget constraints on public spending and the 
creation of institutional and legal frameworks to ensure efficient market activity (Oleh and 
Thomas 1999). Taken together as a ‘package’ of policy reforms, they have been described 
variously as 'neoliberal' or an illustration of the 'Washington Consensus'. Left-critiques of 
the process of economic transition in India commonly use the term 'Washington Consensus' 
as a short-form for the advocacy of free market policies since the early 1990s (The Indian 
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Express 2011, July 12). Since both terms have come to symbolize this policy approach in 
India, they deserve some scrutiny.  
 
The Washington Consensus view is attributed to Williamson (1989). By his own account, the 
term originated in a paper describing the economic policies pursued by Latin American 
states toward the end of the 1980s. He takes pains to assert that the term originated as an 
observation of the policies pursued by these states rather than as a proscriptive policy 
formula that emerged from policy evangelists in Washington D. C. Thus he attempts to 
portray this scheme as a positivist inference rather than an ideological prescription. He 
therefore argues that the formulation of these policies was a matter of convergence around 
practices that were already widespread among the OECD, the US government and 
international financial institutions present in Washington, with some scope for 
disagreement and refinement.   
 
However, Williamson asserts polemically that this set of policies does not equate to 
neoliberalism or market fundamentalism. Instead, it is based around the following 
principles: fiscal discipline, public expenditure and tax reform, competitive exchange rates, 
liberalization of interest rates, prioritizing FDI and trade, privatization, deregulation and the 
establishment of property rights (Williamson 1989, 17). He objects to criticisms by the 'Left' 
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that place these policies alongside neoliberalism or market fundamentalism as populist, 
anti-imperialist rhetoric that has gained rhetorical capital at the expense of conceptual 
accuracy. This point is recollected here in the interests of factual accuracy. However, as 
demonstrated below, on a number of policy priorities the Washington Consensus aligns 
strongly with neoliberalism. This distinction may not therefore be entirely significant for this 
chapter. 
 
As discussed in the introduction, neoliberalism is a highly contested term which has evolved 
in the course of the last century. In its current use, the term is problematic in that it acts as a 
negative marker for the undesirable consequences of economic globalization rather than as 
a particular set of policy agendas (Stiglitz 2002, Chomsky 2011). Thorsen (2009, 10) traces 
the first use of the term in the twentieth century to a doctoral dissertation in 1950 where 
neoliberalism was the term used to depict a revival of classical liberal economic ideas in the 
face of post-War Keynesian.  He traces the later currency of this term in the English-
speaking world through the work of the Belgian-American economist Wilfred ver Eecke who 
employed the term idiosyncratically to denote both the state’s proactive role in the German 
Social Market model and Reaganist monetary policies which minimized the role of the state. 
However, from this point on, neoliberalism served as largely an umbrella term for the latter: 
policies through which a state prioritized the functioning of the free market (Peters 1983).  
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Neoliberalism as a political philosophy is chiefly distinguished from its economic offshoot by 
an agnostic commitment to political freedoms: economic neoliberalism may take place 
under the conditions of democratic freedom or dictatorship; all that is required is the state’s 
commitment to the market economy. Williamson and others place the zenith of neoliberal 
economic policies in the Reagan-Thatcher era and their demise with the East Asian financial 
crisis (Stiglitz 2008, 43; Harvey 2005, 50, 57, 72). Within this span of time, developing 
countries were encouraged, both by International Financial Institutions and OECD 
governments to move beyond state centred developmental approaches and to adopt 
policies in favour of privatization, deregulation and liberalization. Even as Williamson 
attempts to make a distinction between the Washington Consensus and neoliberal 
approaches to economic policy, this distinction is not always explicit in the sources 
examined below. While taking Williamson's protests into account, this chapter will assume 
that the categories ‘Washington Consensus’ and ‘neoliberalism’ are complementary. 
However, it will use the latter term to denote the adoption of the policy priorities that these 
approaches emphasize.  
 
Having examined these two concepts, what application, if any, do they have to the case of 
the BJP-led NDA government’s economic policies? Chapter 1 offers a justification for the 
application of this term. Here I will provide a short recap of this argument. Key studies of 
economic reform policies pursued by both Congress and BJP governments since the 1990s 
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assume the label ‘neoliberal’ as an accurate description of economic policies pursued by 
both governments (Panagariya 2008, 16, 18; Kohli 2006, 1251). Critics are especially prone 
to describe such policies as neoliberal (Chandrashekar and Ghosh 2005). These studies also 
clearly see the policy reform momentum initiated by Congress to have carried on under the 
NDA. Thus these policies did not originate as the economic counterpart to the prestige-
seeking nationalist politics of the BJP but as a continuation of policies already put in place by 
a Congress government acting under the requirements of an International Monetary Fund 
stabilization package. Chapter 3 has illustrated the further expansion of policy provisions 
made by the BJP-led government towards privatization, fiscal consolidation and 
deregulation despite opposition from domestic constituencies. Thus even though the 
implementation of such policies was limited by domestic constraints, as far as such policies 
were a priority for the NDA government, they may be most properly described as 
‘neoliberal’. 
 
4.3. International influences on the Indian economy 
What impact have international institutions had on the economic policy of the NDA? To 
answer this question I must step back briefly to examine what role international influences 
have had in general on the Indian economy. The central planning model instituted in India’s 
post-independence economy emphasized a highly regulated local industry and trade 
regime. Despite its relative isolation from the global economy, there were significant points 
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at which international influences such as aid and even war had a deep policy impact on the 
Indian economy. Popular accounts of the liberalization of the Indian economy in the 1990s 
also point to the significance of international influences. These include the balance of 
payments crisis and the Iraq war in 1990 as the chief catalysts for the subsequent pursuit of 
economic reform (Kohli 2006a, 1251).  
 
The adoption of neoliberal economic reforms in the early 1990s was widely understood as a 
condition of the IMF loan provided to address this crisis. In one popular narrative of 
economic reform in India, the economy was thereby finally 'unshackled' of its excessive 
regulation and subsequently experienced unprecedented growth through the exponential 
development of its informational services sector. While widely quoted, this narrative 
reflects what Pedersen (2000, 267) refers to as the bias of the Dependency Debate. This bias 
assumes that the reform policies were solely the result of external pressures from 
international markets and institutions (Jenkins 2003, 71-80), without adequately accounting 
for other (domestic) factors that might have affected the Congress government’s decision. 
Indeed current studies tend to place the origins of liberalization further back to the mid-
1980s under the Prime Ministership of Rajiv Gandhi. 
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In the case of the NDA, however, I have accounted for the major domestic factors in the 
previous chapter and have found them of limited utility in explaining the origins of the 
NDA’s economic reform policies. On looking outwards, international influences provide the 
next possible iteration of factors that can be examined for influence. International 
institutions provide a locus for the introduction and implementation of economic policy 
changes absorbed from a global neoliberal economy.  
 
This analysis therefore moves to the arena of international influences, because a previous 
analysis of domestic influences has proven to be only partially successful in identifying key 
influences that moved the BJP’s economic policies in a neoliberal direction. Under the aegis 
of international institutions, economic reforms would bear the mark of a Structural 
Adjustment agenda, especially in the areas of privatization, trade liberalization and fiscal 
conservatism. Was this in fact the case? The next two sections examine the influence of 
three international institutions, the IMF, World Bank and WTO to determine if and how far 
these institutions influenced the economic policy formation of the NDA government.  
 
4.3.1 International institutions: The International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank  
The purpose of this section is to identify the influence of the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank on the economic policies of the NDA government. The most direct 
method of influence are the conditionalities attached to loan mechanisms. Bajpai points to 
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the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) mechanism in 1979 as the chief 
means by which the World Bank began to exert a broad-based influence on developing 
country economies, beyond its original mandate. The SAL provision was originally 
implemented in the climate of rising interest rates post-1979 to enable developing countries 
to support their balance of payments positions without adversely affecting domestic 
economic demand.  
 
The relative inflexibility of the provision, in comparison to other lending instruments, 
however, also means that the World Bank was able to exercise influence on the recipient 
state since 'disbursement of SALs is always conditional on the elaboration of an appropriate 
set of specific measures that the concerned government will take either to increase or save 
foreign exchange earning' (Bajpai 1990, 791). Quoting another study, Bajpai lists policies 
specifically targeted in exchange for the SAL provisions as: import quotas, tariffs, budgets, 
interest rate policy, prices and subsidies (Bajpai 1990, 791). Thus the major focus of SAL 
conditionalities are fiscal (budgets, subsidies), trade (quotas, tariffs) and monetary policies 
(interest rates). 
 
While in opposition, the BJP had made strong pronouncements against the 'interference' of 
external institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank as part of its message of national 
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self-sufficiency. The local national daily The Hindu (no connection to the BJP or the religious 
tradition) succinctly summarized local perceptions of the IMF's position: 'the IMF has almost 
habitually harped on such initiatives as privatisation, export policy, further trade 
liberalisation, financial sector reforms… and the widening of the tax net.' It appears that this 
suspicion was mutual as the IMF similarly believed that the BJP-led government lacked the 
will to continue with broad based economic reforms due to the party’s original swadeshi 
platform (The Hindu 1998, September 30). However this rocky start was temporary and local 
newspapers would soon be 'quoting BJP leader Madan Lal Khurana's admission, that [union 
minister of state for internal affairs] Rao said the NDA's budget was prepared as per 
guidelines of IMF and World Bank' (The Times of India 2000, April 20).  
 
India's direct assistance from the IMF has amounted to three loans, made in 1965, 1982 and 
1991. There were no IMF loan arrangements made during the term of the NDA government 
although payments were continued on outstanding loans. Thus this section must try to 
ascertain a channel of IMF influence on the NDA government that was not as direct as loan 
conditions, yet still bearing the mark of the Fund in crucial ways: namely in maintaining and 
expanding the economic policy agenda adopted in 1991.  
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In the case of the World Bank, however, a series of Structural Adjustment and Sector 
Adjustment Loans had been granted since 1991, requiring the consolidation of economic 
policies in line with World Bank conditionalities. Between 1998 and 2004, India obtained 
seven World Bank SALs totalling $1.77 billion. In comparison to other major borrowers 
among developing economies, Brazil received nine SALs totalling $4.44 billion and Turkey 
received six loans totalling $5.669 billion (Appendix 5.1). While it would be tempting to 
propose an arithmetic proportionality between the total size of loans and level of influence, 
this is clearly not the case. For example in the case of Turkey, high deficits seemed to 
accompany the highest level of SAL borrowing of the three countries (Karadag 2010). Thus 
the influence of the World Bank must be determined in a more deliberate way. The sub-
national lending approach developed by the World Bank in the mid-1990s offers a 
particularly appropriate avenue thorough which to determine this influence. I will take this 
up further below. 
 
The rest of this section examines the statements of the IMF's Article Four consultations and 
World Bank Country Assistance Strategy papers on India to gauge support and criticisms for 
the policies of the NDA government. The Article Four consultations and Country Assistance 
Strategy papers are the major reports published by these respective institutions that 
provide their estimations and analysis of the current economic state of affairs in a member 
state.  As might be expected, the bulk of the Article Four recommendations centre on 
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monetary and fiscal policies with some attention to deregulation, financial and trade 
liberalization. Meanwhile, the World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy papers consistently 
target fiscal management, infrastructure and governance (World Bank 2001, 2). The level of 
influence can be inferred from the statements made by the two institutions in their official 
documents. Where they explicitly make demands and match or support subsequent NDA 
economic policy, the exercise of influence may be inferred.  
 
Fiscal Policies remained a central concern of the Fund's Article Four recommendations 
throughout the term of the NDA government. This in itself was not unusual, in that it 
continued a pattern that can be observed prior to and following this NDA’s tenure. On the 
formation of the NDA government the Fund expressed concerns about what it considered a 
high level of fiscal deficits, arguing for immediate 'front-loaded' reforms by the centre and 
by the states (IMF 1998). There was a special concern about the fiscal situation of states 
(Business Line 1998, April 15). The Fund expressed support for the Prime Minister's 
Economic Advisory Council which advised a course of removing fiscal subsidies and creating 
better public sector efficiencies (IMF 2001). Over this period the Fund maintained that 
consolidating the fiscal situation at the centre and among states was vital to guarantee 
investment in other areas (infrastructure and social sector) (IMF 2000). The IMF welcomed 
the eventual implementation of reform measures through the signing of fiscal reform MoUs 
(discussed in chapter 3) between the NDA government and nine state governments (IMF 
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2000). This implies that that NDA’s reform policies may have owed something to the 
influence of the IMF, although this conclusion must await an analysis of other factors. 
 
The World Bank's influence was more explicit in its emphasis on the need for fiscal and 
governance reforms. In fact, early in the NDA government’s tenure, the Bank asserted that 
the implementation of such reforms would become an increasingly important condition of 
continued support (World Bank 2001, 32). The Bank's newly minted sub-national lending 
programmes in India were explicitly linked to states that had initiated reforms in fiscal 
management and governance (World Bank 2003b, 17). Although initiated during the United 
Front’s government in 1997, this lending strategy was closely aligned with the NDA’s own 
economic priorities. The model partner of this program in India was the state of Andhra 
Pradesh, which was governed by the NDA’s external ally the Telegu Desam Party (Kirk 2011, 
106).   
 
In three states (Uttar Pradesh, Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka), the Bank pointed to the 
introduction of medium-term fiscal frameworks as an actual response to its policies. These 
‘frameworks’ refer to the MoUs signed between the NDA and state governments referred to 
in chapter 3. While the previous chapter discussed the mutual influence of the BJP and its 
coalition partners on the issue of fiscal reform, by restricting its scope to domestic factors it 
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was not able to show why the BJP attempted to influence its coalition partners to undertake 
fiscal reforms. The present discussion shows where the motivation for these reforms 
originated: namely through the World Bank’s sub-national lending policies and the NDA’s 
attempts to coax state governments (some led by NDA coalition partners) to take advantage 
of World Bank lending programmes by agreeing to more stringent fiscal management. What 
we have therefore is an explanation for the origin of one aspect of the NDA’s fiscal policy. 
Through a new lending strategy, the World Bank was actually able to influence the NDA 
government to pursue fiscal policy reforms.  
 
However, other policy priorities pushed the NDA towards a less stringent overall fiscal 
policy. While the NDA was able to secure commitments towards spending controls at the 
state level, new private and public priorities required new spending commitments from the 
centre.  With the economy experiencing rising growth, domestic (business) groups began to 
make the case for expansionary spending in order to support private business activities. This 
appeared to confirm IMF fears of public spending 'crowding out' private investment. These 
pressures created further concerns at the Fund as it cautioned against expansionist 
monetary and fiscal policies required by domestic industrial groups (The Hindu 1998, 
September 30). Furthermore, a government review of public sector benefits and salaries 
under the Sixth Pay Commission increased both provisions (benefits and salaries) 
significantly, also attracting criticisms from the IMF and World Bank (The Statesman 2003, 
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July 07). Thus even as the influence of international institutions on the NDA’s fiscal relations 
with states is discernible, the influence on overall fiscal policy does not appear to have been 
universal. The NDA clearly broke with policy recommendations from the institutions in order 
to address the demands of domestic constituencies.  
 
While fiscal policies were a significant point of concern for the IMF and World Bank during 
the NDA government, the second policy area discussed in chapter 3, disinvestment, received 
surprisingly little attention in World Bank and IMF policy documents. The program of 
disinvestment received a substantial profile domestically among the economic policies of 
the NDA government. Whether we consider the NDA’s enthusiastic formation of the 
Disinvestment Ministry or the trenchant criticisms of disinvestment policies by its 
opponents this policy clearly attracted significant attention. The lack of interest in 
disinvestment on the part of the IMF and World Bank is even more curious, given that 
privatization forms one of the key pillars of Structural Adjustment and neoliberalism more 
generally.  
 
Given the high rate of Structural Adjustment lending to India, which continued into the era 
of the NDA government, it is not immediately apparent why disinvestment received very 
little attention among these institutions. To be sure, the Article Four Consultation and 
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Country Assistance Strategy documents do regularly mention disinvestment (IMF 2002; 
World Bank 2002, 1; 15), but usually as one among several other policy priorities or as a 
means of achieving other goals (e.g. power sector reform). It is not until 2003 that this 
policy elicited the direct input of the institutions. In this year, at the request of the NDA 
government, the World Bank engaged in a joint consultation on disinvestment with the 
leading economic think-tank in the country, the National Council for Applied Economic 
Research (World Bank 2003b, 7). This raises two important questions. First, why is it that 
these institutions do not comment more on the disinvestment process? Second, given the 
seeming indifference of international institutions and opposition on the domestic front, how 
was the process of disinvestment created and sustained? 
 
In response to the first question, there is clearly a discontinuity in the manner in which 
disinvestment was regarded domestically and internationally. While politically controversial 
on the domestic front, disinvestment was only one of several policy areas on which these 
institutions emphasized change through Structural Adjustment conditionalities. Thus, at one 
level, disinvestment did not secure greater attention from the institutions than any of the 
other economic policies instituted by the NDA. Furthermore, the institutions seemed far 
more concerned with basic macro-level issues pertaining inflation, fiscal deficits and 
monetary policy than the specifics of privatization. From the perspective of these 
institutions, there were therefore more important economic issues than disinvestment that 
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required attention and discussion. This leaves the following question unanswered: if not 
from the institutions, from where did the incentive for disinvestment come? A response to 
the second question is provided in chapter 5 where it is argued that transnational elite 
advisors to the government served as the both the advocates and facilitators of this policy.    
 
Even as disinvestment received negligible attention, another pillar of Structural Adjustment 
and neoliberalism more generally, received almost as much attention as fiscal policy. This 
policy area was the deregulation of local industry, financial markets and trade. On financial 
markets, the IMF advocated a predictable mixture of policies promoting greater exchange 
rate flexibility (which up to this point had remained limited) and the introduction of financial 
innovations such as derivatives. Financial sector reforms in India had already begun under 
previous governments, which began to make the first moves towards greater capital 
account liberalization and deregulation on the recommendations of two advisory 
committees convened in 1991 and 1998 respectively. The committees’ work was supported 
by a key IMF-World Bank consultation on the Indian financial sector (World Bank 2003b, 8). 
Here we have an example of direct IMF and World Bank input into policy recommendations 
to governments preceding the NDA. 
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Although advisory committees and international institutions moved financial market policy 
towards greater deregulation, the NDA government eventually broke with the 
recommendations of the committees and the IMF. In response to the Asian Financial Crisis 
and fears of global financial contagion affecting the Indian economy, the NDA implemented 
measures to curb foreign exchange demand and speculation. These measures were 
subsequently opposed by the Fund (1998). However, the IMF’s criticism received little 
sympathy from within the country with one business publication maintaining that the IMF 
had not 'learned its lessons' from the Asian financial crisis (Business Line 1998, April 15).  
 
Once the NDA government's earlier inclinations toward greater convertibility were 
withdrawn, the Fund once again began to make a case for more flexible exchange rates to 
facilitate trade and capital account liberalization (IMF 2003). In fact, the Fund went even 
further, suggesting the introduction of innovative structural changes including a foreign 
exchange market and hedging instruments to further attract global capital (IMF 2002). Even 
though foreign exchange markets continued to expand under the NDA government and 
hedging instruments were finally introduced three years after the conclusion of the NDA's 
term, there remained no movement on the issue of convertibility.  
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Policy regarding financial deregulation, therefore demonstrates the clear influence of 
international institutions at the outset as the World Bank and IMF worked closely with the 
advisory committees struck by a Congress government. However these recommendations 
were deflected by the NDA government due to larger global economic trends (namely the 
Asian Financial Crisis). Despite some sympathy within the NDA for such reforms at the 
outset, larger global economic trends derailed the possibility of their implementation. In this 
particular case, the NDA’s resistance to the influence of the institutions is evident. Even as 
the IMF and World Bank advocated certain policies, the timing of these policies against the 
larger backdrop of global economic trends resulted in their non-implementation.  
 
The timing of policy recommendations appears to have been key to the NDA government’s 
early acceptance and later rejection of this particular policy recommendation. Key to this 
quality of timing was broad simultaneous consensus among various stakeholders on the 
importance of a particular policy proposal from one of the institutions. When a policy 
recommendation from an institution was concurrent with a broad range of support from 
advisors and important stakeholders, the influence of the institution was more likely to be 
successful. On the other hand, with a lack of consensus or even unfavourable external 
conditions, the influence of the institutions was likely to be less successful. In the case of 
financial deregulation, despite consensus among the institutions and key advisory 
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committees, global financial conditions mitigated against the NDA’s adoption of the 
recommended policies. 
 
On the other hand where consensus was present, the adoption of policy recommendations 
was more likely. In a bid to promote industrial growth, the Fund argued for the de-
reservation of small scale industries and more flexible labour laws (IMF 2000). This policy 
found support with the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council which produced 
recommendations on structural reform including small scale sector privatization and labour 
law reform (IMF 2001). In its 2001 Country Assistance Strategy, the World Bank spoke 
approvingly of reforms focused on easing small business registration. These reforms were 
implemented on the basis of proposals from the management consulting firm Price 
Waterhouse Coopers and the Confederation of Indian Industries (World Bank 2001, 5-6). In 
this particular case, the institutions’ recommendations were implemented in tandem with 
the advice of private, commercial interest and advisory committees. The deregulation of 
local industry was achieved when institutional influence was enhanced by the influence of 
other agents from private, interest group and advisory agents.  
 
Taken together, what can be said about the influence of the World Bank and IMF? Far from 
the caricature commonly drawn up of an institutional duopoly forcing its particular policy 
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agenda on developing economies, the picture that emerges in this chapter is somewhat 
more complex. While the NDA government appears to have implemented the institutions’ 
recommendations on fiscal policy reforms, similar recommendations on financial 
deregulation were not accepted. Thus the influence of these institutions was not universal 
or even inevitable across all policy areas. Policy recommendations were accepted when they 
aligned with other factors. Thus international institutions were able to exert influence most 
effectively where there was an alignment between their own policies priorities and the 
priorities of domestic stakeholders or larger global economic conditions. Finally, in policy 
areas such as disinvestment, the institutions’ influence appears to have been negligible, 
indicating that we need to look elsewhere to identify the source of this policy. However, 
before tackling disinvestment (in chapter 5), I will examine the influence of other 
international actors to see if they can explain further aspects of the NDA’s economic 
reforms.  
 
4.3.2. International institutions: World Trade Organization  
This section discusses the influence of the WTO on the NDA’s trade policy reforms. The 
origins of the WTO from the post-war GATT framework have been discussed elsewhere so 
will not be recounted here (Narlikar 2005). In comparison to the World Bank and IMF, 
whose influence on developing countries stretched back at least to the 1980s, the WTO 
(inaugurated in 1995) was relative a ‘newcomer’ as an international institutions. However, 
its effect on the economic policies of the NDA government appears to have been no less 
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significant. The very fact that the WTO came into existence a mere three years before the 
NDA came to power, meant that the NDA government was entrusted with a major portion 
of the adjustments that were necessary to bring the country in line with the new global 
trade regime. To properly appreciate the significance of this, some historical background on 
the BJP’s approach towards international trade is necessary. 
 
Predictably while an opposition party anticipating threats to the small scale sector and the 
agricultural sector, the BJP's reaction to the WTO draft proposals was strongly protectionist. 
The BJP also took a suspicious line on the Dunkel proposals to bring the Uruguay round of 
GATT to a conclusion (and inaugurate the WTO). The party argued that this was detrimental 
to the country particularly because the proposals extended the scope of Intellectual 
Property Rights and facilitated the opening of developing economies to exploitation by 
developed economies. Without access to licensed patents, the party worried that prices of 
pharmaceuticals would be significantly inflated while lower customs tariffs would reduce 
government revenues (BJP 1992c, 175). Furthermore, the party saw the proposals as 'anti-
farmer' in that they would deny farmers the use of patented seeds from their own crops and 
potentially hinder future progress in the agricultural sector of the kind achieved under the 
Green Revolution (BJP 1993b, 166). The BJP called for massive public protests against the 
adoption of the Dunkel proposals (BJP 1994, 151-154). 
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While an opposition party, the BJP clearly resisted trade reforms and engaged in anti-WTO 
activism. However, once in power, the party maintained a shrewd stance on WTO 
requirements. The BJP argued that since a previous government had committed to these 
requirements, the NDA was now obliged to follow through. This was a significant reversal of 
the BJP’s earlier approach toward the WTO. The sheer range of trade policy reforms 
implemented by the NDA included de-reservation of agricultural implements, auto 
components, chemicals and drugs, removing reservations on small scale industries, phasing 
out export controls and the extension of futures and forwards trading over all agricultural 
commodities (Ministry of Finance 2002-2003). Subsequently, one of the BJP's final 
statements on the WTO outlined a rationale for decreasing non-tariff Quantitative 
Restrictions even though it questioned the maintenance of agricultural subsidies among 
developed countries (BJP 2001, 61-73). In contrast to its opposition and resistance to the 
WTO while an opposition party, the BJP’s accommodation to WTO regulations in 
government is clearly evident. Was this change of heart a result of WTO influence? Or does 
this difference merely reflect the tempered realism of a party in power contrasted with its 
political opportunism while in opposition?  
 
If the WTO did influence the NDA government, how did it do so? While Structural 
Adjustment was the chief influence mechanism of the World Bank and IMF, for the WTO, 
influence was rendered through two mechanisms. The first consisted of a rule-supervisory 
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Trade Policy Review and Dispute Resolution mechanism. The second mechanism was the 
Biennial WTO Ministerial Conference. These ministerial meetings provided a forum for 
states to negotiate their ‘starting positions’ in the new global trade regime.  
 
The NDA government was represented at the WTO ministerial meetings in Seattle (1999), 
Doha (2001) and Cancun (2003). In Seattle, developing countries were at the receiving end 
of a number of trade policy adjustments propagated by ‘developed country’ members. 
These meetings therefore constituted a significant avenue of influence for the WTO over 
developing countries. However, by the Doha round the meetings became a channel for 
developing countries to exert counter-pressures. Thereafter, these meetings were used by 
the NDA (and governments of other developing countries) to varying degrees of success to 
forestall the implementation of rules and policies that these countries believed would be to 
the detriment of their economies.  
 
The Trade Policy Review is a mechanism through which the WTO reviews the trade policies 
of member states and makes recommendations. The process results in a pair of policy 
documents: one from the WTO's Trade Policy Review Department and a response document 
from the government of the member state. This exercise was carried out in 1998 and 2002 
during the tenure of the NDA government. A facility under this mechanism allows states to 
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resolve disputes on trade conflicts with binding resolutions passed by a Dispute Resolution 
Body. While the Trade Policy Reviews present a picture of a country's trade environment to 
the world, and therefore have an influence in the general impression a country makes in the 
global environment, the Dispute Resolution Mechanism applies direct force onto a member 
state's trade policies. 
  
Under the NDA government, India was a respondent sixteen dispute resolutions. The major 
themes of these resolutions were patent protections for the chemical and agricultural 
sectors (brought by the US and EC), reductions in Quantitative Restrictions (brought by the 
US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Switzerland, EC), local content and export balancing 
requirements in the automotive sector (brought by the US and EC), anti-dumping measures 
(brought by the EC, Bangladesh, Taipei) and indirect taxes on the imports of wines and 
spirits. Tariffs remained a contentious issue for the NDA within the dispute resolution 
mechanism with no less than three disputes either carried over from the previous 
government or initiated in the early years of the NDA government. However the most 
significant policy adjustments pertained to Quantitative Restrictions and intellectual 
Property Rights. These adjustments had wide implications for greater trade openness and 
the activity of multinational corporations.  
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Reductions in Quantitative Restrictions constituted one of the major trade policy 
adjustments undertaken by the NDA. In fact, the evidence points to the NDA significantly 
accelerating the pace of reforms on this front. For example, while a previous Congress 
government had negotiated the phase out of Quantitative Restrictions by 2003, the NDA 
brought the timetable of the phase-out forward to 2001. Critics argued that this was a 
wholly unnecessary step, brought on by factors outside of purely WTO commitments: 
When this restriction was removed in 2000, it was done in a bilateral agreement with India and the 
United States of America. It was not binding on us that we have to remove the Quantitative 
Restrictions by 2000. Our Government could have waited up to 2003 because a number of countries 
belonging to the European Union agreed to extend the time for lifting of the Quantitative Restrictions. 
It is because of removal of Quantitative Restrictions that it has ruined [sic] the farmers of our country 
(Basu Dev Acharia, Lok Sabha Debates 2004, December 22).  
 
This particular critic hints that the bilateral influence of the USA was chiefly responsible for 
the removal of Quantitative Restrictions earlier than required under WTO rules. In response, 
Agriculture Minister Nitish Kumar maintained that the quotas were being removed early not 
due to external pressure (from the WTO and the USA) but due to the improved balance-of-
payments position (The Hindu 2001, February 25). A former secretary of the Commerce 
ministry described the position of the Ministry in the following way: 
This was an obligation which was taken up by the Government of India that we should remove the 
skewers [sic] by 2000, there was no escape from that. Because the main aim of the WTO when it was 
formed was to please remove [sic] as much as [sic] non-tariff restrictions as possible. You can have a 
tariff structure to suit your economy but QRs were nothing but a non-tariff restriction, and pretty 
arbitrary on occasions.  So we were required to do that; remove those. What we had to do [was] to 
ensure that the local industry was not affected [so] we… set up a group to monitor the import of 
some of the materials that were considered sensitive (P. Sengupta, Telephone Interview, September 
13 2012). 
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The Ministry therefore viewed Quantitative Restrictions as an arbitrary and unnecessary 
restraint on trade. The dismantling of QRs by member states of the WTO was also viewed as 
inevitable. In and of itself, the repeal of Quantitative Restrictions was therefore a moot 
point simply because the government was already committed to their dismantlement. 
However, the timing of this roll-back, just a year into the NDA’s full term government and 
three years earlier than required by the WTO, is a clear indication of the trade policy reform 
priorities of the NDA government. 
 
With movement Quantitative Restrictions (and other trade policy areas) made possible 
through the Dispute Resolution mechanism, the Trade Policy Review from 1998 was positive 
(WTO 1998). Interestingly, the Review maintained that rather than simply the outcome of 
the Dispute Resolution mechanism, the NDA’s trade reforms had been accomplished due to 
the government's recognition of the link between growth and trade. For example, the 
report discussed the NDA’s Special Economic Zone initiative which sought to leverage the 
new trade regulations while immunizing industries from infrastructure and administrative 
bottlenecks in the rest of the country (WTO 1998). Thus the WTO was able to exact changes 
in domestic policy that then became part of the growth strategy pursued under the NDA 
government.  
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Among remaining trade restrictions, only a high customs tariff remained which, despite 
efforts made by the government, remained difficult to rationalize (WTO 2002). However in a 
nod to an IMF observation on the need for tax reforms, the report maintained that since 
customs tariffs formed 30% of government tax revenue, tariff reforms would ultimately 
depend on broader taxation reform (WTO 2002). The Dispute Resolutions in themselves 
were therefore somewhat limited in what they could achieve in the absence of larger 
economic reforms (e.g. taxation). A broader stream of reforms would need to keep apace in 
order to maximize the impact and scope of trade policy reforms. 
 
Inertia in other areas of economic policy therefore served to dampen the scope of the WTO 
influence on trade reform policy. However, more intentional mechanisms were also utilized 
to confront and even challenge the influence of the WTO. Much as the Dispute Resolution 
mechanism and Trade Policy Review mechanism were the avenues through which the WTO 
influences the policies of member states, the WTO Ministerial Forum served as occasions for 
the application of counter-pressure from member countries. This was a channel through 
which the NDA was able to exert some counter pressures to offset the policy changes 
demanded under the WTO’s Trade Policy Review and Dispute Resolution mechanisms. 
Indeed the 1999 BJP election manifesto maintained that India should be strongly 
represented at the WTO and that tariffs would not be calibrated down to East Asian levels 
(as per Congress plans) but according to the needs of local industry (Business Line 1999, 
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August 17). The domestic sentiment before the Doha Round was captured by a business 
publication article which maintained that a new round of talks should be pursued only if 
they supported local business interests (Business Line 2001, February 17). In order to gauge 
the potential for counter-pressure a brief diversion into the domestic policy arena is 
necessary. 
 
Following a series of difficult discussions at the Doha round (2001) NDA Commerce Minister 
Murasoli Maran maintained that in negotiations to launch a new round of trade talks, the 
NDA government would welcome trade ‘isolation’ if national interests were threatened. The 
boldness of this statement appears to have been brought on by the perception that 
‘developed’ member WTO countries were promoting their own private agendas at the 
discussions rather than promoting mutually beneficial proposals (The Financial Express 
2002, October 05). On this the NDA government had the support of even its political 
opponents where, in a telling statement, senior Congress official Pranab Mukherjee asserted 
that there were no major differences between the Congress and NDA on WTO issues 
(Business Line 2001, October 20). This level of domestic support may have gone some way 
towards emboldening the attitudes reflected in Maran’s statement.  
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The potential for resistance however appears to have been deepened through the support 
of some of the same domestic actors discussed in the previous chapter. The agricultural 
sector in the country had until now largely remained shielded from external pressures due 
to concerns about self-sufficiency. This was chiefly accomplished through import and export 
controls and state trading (canalization) restrictions. However the WTO as well as some local 
observers maintained that many of these provisions were counterproductive, with buffer 
stocks now at unsustainable levels (WTO 2002, part 5).  
 
The NDA government's response to this WTO criticism was an attempt to decentralize food 
grain production, storage and distribution. This early attempt was, however, rejected at the 
state level by both BJP allies (Akali Dal and the Telegu Desam Party government in Andhra 
Pradesh) and Congress (SM Krishna's Karnataka government and Digvijay Singh’s 
government in Madhya Pradesh) (Tribune News Service 2002, March 23). Following the later 
implementation of food production and distribution reforms stemming from the Doha 
round (2001), the Akali Dal (NDA coalition partner) publicly complained of interference in 
what it considered to be a policy area solely within the state-level policy ambit (The Indian 
Express 2001, November 26). 
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Predictably, the NDA earned further ire from the constituency of Hindu nationalists on the 
issue of trade. Sangh affiliates such as the Swadeshi Jagaran Manch consistently maintained 
a hostile view of the WTO in particular. The former convenor of the SJM expressed this in no 
uncertain terms: 
The SJM is opposed to the WTO itself as a concept. We trust the global trade will be increasingly 
based on geopolitical realities and not by economic reasons [sic]. WTO needed a global order founded 
on the superiority of the West - read US - which is fast disappearing (S. Gurumurthy, Email Interview, 
2012).  
Following the SJM, the Sangh's Bharatiya Kisan Sangh farmer trade union also broke ranks 
with the BJP on WTO directed reforms. In response to the NDA’s WTO directed reforms, the 
vice-president or the organization, Babasaheb Takwale rehearsed the classic criticism that 
'the BJP Government at the Centre has failed to appreciate the concept of the self-reliant 
villages and has ignored the interests of small and marginal farmers in its new agriculture 
policy' (The Hindu 2000, September 05).  
 
Responding to such concerns in discussions before the Doha round, newly appointed 
Commerce minister Arun Jaitley asserted that farmer interests would take priority. These 
interests included the maintenance of subsidies and tariffs and asking developed countries 
to reduce their own import tariffs on agricultural products. A concerted effort by developing 
countries to put up a united front further facilitated the resistance offered by the NDA 
government. Summing up this situation one senior official in the NDA Commerce Ministry 
related: 
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There is no doubt that sometimes the WTO wanted to pursue things that we did not consider suitable 
for countries like India. But I would not like to say that the WTO was dominated by Western interests 
only. That will not be fair. But the most important thing one has to keep in mind is that by the end of 
the 20
th
 century the voice of the developing countries has become much more important and much 
more vocal than it was even five years back. And India did try our best to ensure that the developing 
countries act[ed] together and put up a common front in the international negotiations. So by the 
nature of the development of geopolitics the developing countries have become more important at 
the negotiating table; and India also plays a large part in catalysing those views (P. Sengupta, 
Telephone Interview, September 13 2012). 
 
What can we say about the influence of the WTO on the NDA’s trade policies? It is apparent 
that as an international institution, the WTO was able to exert influence on the NDA’s 
economic policies through a number of channels. Most significantly, the Dispute Resolution 
Mechanism provided a means through which the institution could exert binding 
requirements on its members such as India. Beyond these requirements, the evidence 
demonstrates that the NDA was even keen to increase compliance by accelerating the pace 
of reforms on other areas such as non-tariff Quantitative Restrictions. However, while 
appearing to capitulate on such requirements, the NDA was able to assert itself through 
other channels. At the biennial Ministerial Conferences the NDA was able to resist further 
trade reforms through domestic support and concerted coordination with other developing 
countries sharing similar concerns. I conclude therefore that while WTO influence on the 
NDA’s economic policies is clearly discernible, it was not universal across all policy areas and 
even encountered some resistance. 
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4.4. Multinational Corporations 
This chapter has so far examined the role of international institutions on the economic 
policies of the NDA government. It has shown how particular mechanisms such as Structural 
Adjustment Conditionalities and Dispute Resolution influenced the economic policies of 
NDA government. It has also demonstrated that the influence of these institutions is 
discernible in some specific policy areas. However, in other areas there is evidence of NDA 
policy agendas either being defined against the recommendations of these institutions or of 
NDA policy priorities (such as disinvestment) that did not attract significant attention from 
these institutions.  
 
As far as international influences are concerned, the NDA’s economic policy formation 
process was therefore not a simple case of point by point adherence to Structural 
Adjustment or Trade Policy Review priorities. This opens up the possibility that there may 
have been other international incentives at play. What were they and how can they 
contribute to an understanding of the NDA’s economic policy making process? This section 
shifts the focus of this chapter to ask whether the rationale of these policies can be 
explained by other international incentives. What explains a reform agenda where some 
reform policies were influenced by international institutions and others seemed to carry a 
momentum of their own? What other sources of international influence can be identified? 
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In order to get to the root of the question, the notion of economic reform must be re-
visited. To what end is economic reform pursued? In developing countries pro-market 
economic reforms were pursued in order to enhance macro-economic stability and create a 
suitable environment for growth. Among relevant international factors, the investment of 
foreign capital and technology constitute two of the key drivers of growth. If the economic 
agenda set by the NDA was not purely formed out of a response to the requirements of 
international institutions, can the goal of attracting investment and technology shed any 
further perspective?  
 
The attraction of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been one of the consistent goals of the 
economic reforms in India since the 1990s. Foreign Direct Investment constitutes the 
simultaneous inflow of capital, knowledge and technology (Balasubramanyam 1996). 
Multinational corporations in high-income countries are one of the key sources of FDI for 
developing countries (Chakraborty and Nunnemkamp 2008, 1193). Multinational 
corporations transcend the sharp distinctions between state and economy and act as 
significant vehicles of economic globalization (Gilpin 2001, 278). These entities therefore 
offer an alternative channel of investigation. They can help to determine how far the NDA’s 
economic agenda was shaped by international incentives beyond the influence of 
international institutions. These incentives constitute the efforts to attract inputs of capital, 
knowledge and technology (FDI) from high-income countries. 
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On coming to power, the NDA government set an annual FDI target at 10 billion (Business 
Line 1999, August 17). In order to meet an annual target of $10 billion in FDI, then 
Commerce and Industry Minister Murasoli Maran created a Secretariat for Industrial 
Assistance (SIA). This body was charged with coordinating all activities related to FDI, ‘so 
that the investors at the highest corporate level become aware that Government of India is 
fully committed to ensuring that the FDI inflows into the country are smooth and 
implementation of projects is quick’ (Press Information Bureau 2001, October 17). The 
Secretariat was charged with contacting appropriate parties including industrial apex 
organizations such as the CII and FICCI in India (and corresponding bodies abroad), trouble-
shooting with the appropriate Ministry/Agency or State governments and involving Indian 
missions abroad in the coordination of FDI (Department for Industrial Policy and Promotion 
2003). This shows quite clearly that the NDA government was highly committed to working 
closely with multinational corporations. 
 
This is significant because, much like some of the economic policy areas discussed in chapter 
3, multinational corporations offer another illustration of ideological adjustment on the part 
of the BJP. The BJS had a mixed view of multinational corporations, encouraging their entry 
only where multinationals could add value to the economy by providing new capital and 
knowledge. On the other, it opposed multinational corporation involvement in the area of 
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consumer goods that, the BJS argued, could be produced by local small scale industries. 
Early statements from the BJP resolutions seemed to largely inherit this view. The BJP took a 
critical line on multinational corporations in its early days. It pegged ongoing economic 
problems, such as high unemployment, on the entry of multinationals into economic sectors 
the party claimed were formerly the preserve of domestic and small scale cottage industries 
(BJP 1986, 228-231). The Bhopal industrial disaster (1984) added further fuel to both the 
political and public scepticism regarding multinational corporations. The BJP criticized what 
it called the Congress 'love affair' with multinational corporations (BJP 1986, 233) which 
allegedly focused on increasing presence of these actors in the economy at the cost of the 
domestic small scale sector.  
 
Following the 1991 reforms, multinational corporations representing virtually every area of 
business gained access to the economy, especially those in the areas of information 
technology and business processing. Once again, the BJP's stance was suspicious, 
maintaining that the: 
Production of consumer goods by multinationals and big industries should be statutorily banned. 
Consumer goods which can be manufactured in cottage industries should not be produced by other 
sectors. Whatever can be produced by small scale industries should not be produced elsewhere (BJP 
1987b, 240). 
 
However, the actual experience of working with multinational corporations during this 
period provided precedents through which this initial suspicion and hostility evolved to 
209 
 
 
 
 
active cooperation. Perhaps the most significant instance of collaboration with multinational 
corporations the years immediately preceding the NDA government's tenure was the case 
of the Dabhol Power plant in Maharashtra. This initiative involved a partnership between 
the Maharashtra State Board Power utility provider and a consortium of multinationals 
including Enron, Bechtel and General Electric. This case is significant because it 
demonstrates how Hindu nationalist political parties (in this case the BJP and Shiv Sena) 
changed course on their former opposition to multinational corporations. 
 
The proposal and initial construction of the Dabhol plant was completed under a 
Maharashtra Congress government between 1992 and 1995. The project began in 
inauspicious circumstances that fed the existing suspicion of multinational corporations 
within the BJP and Shiv Sena. A former Secretary of the NDA government’s Ministry of 
Power described the experience with the following cynicism: 
So the first shot at [power sector] reform was to select eight project developers including Enron and 
Hinduja and there was a no competitive bidding procedure. It was just selecting arbitrarily [sic] and 
there was no way to pin them down to a competitive price or FDI in competitive terms. So the 
enthusiasm was to push through projects; they somehow mistook reform [for the desire to] to push 
through projects at any cost, bending the rules, bending competition and bending transparency (E.A.S 
Sarma, Telephone Interview, July 26 2012).  
 
The haste brought on by enthusiasm for new developments, resulted in a lack of 
transparency and due process that seemed to reinforce the well-worn reasons to be 
suspicious of multinational corporations. While the project itself did not reach completion 
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under this consortium of multinationals, as an episode of multinational activity in the Indian 
economy, this case is significant for two reasons. First, it demonstrated the early difficulties 
of multinational corporation involvement in an imperfect and nascent emerging market 
economy. Second, it demonstrated the potential for conciliation with the idea of 
multinational corporations playing an active role in the economy, even among Hindu 
nationalists (Purkayastha 1995). 
 
During the 1995 Maharashtra state election campaign, the Hindu nationalist Shiv Sena party 
(a future NDA ally) campaigned partly on a platform of 'throwing out' multinationals from 
the state. With the election of a BJP-Shiv Sena coalition government, a commission to 
review the project headed by Deputy Chief Minister (the late) Gopinath Munde 
recommended discontinuing the project due to inflated costs and proposed tariff rates, lack 
of transparency and suspicions of corruption. The original version of this report was written 
by the convenor of the Swadeshi Jagaran Manch, S. Gurumurthy. However, significant 
diplomatic efforts involving Enron executives and even the American Secretary of the 
Treasury Robert Rubin created a split in the Hindu nationalist ranks. Newly elected Chief 
Minister Manohar Joshi (not to be confused with NDA minister Murli Manohar Joshi) was in 
favour of renegotiation while Sangh hardliners were eager to press the advantage of the 
recent election and terminate the project entirely (Sanotra and Jain, 1995). 
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Eventually, the original contract between Enron and the State of Maharashtra was 
renegotiated and construction of the plant continued. Opinions differ as to why this 
happened and range from fears about losing arbitration proceedings initiated by Enron to 
strong support for the project among state bureaucrats (Outlook 1995, October 18). Within 
five years, the project became defunct due to the collapse of Enron (Ray 2007, 300-303). 
However, the project did not terminate before the Shiv Sena and BJP effected a reversal in 
their earlier decision to end multinational involvement in the project. 
 
Even if it was the result of opportunism on the part of the BJP-Shiv Sena government, the 
adjusted attitude towards multinational corporations set the precedent for the BJP’s own 
change of course in at the head of the NDA government (Ray 2007, 299-300). The NDA 
government pursued initiatives to increase the presence of multinational corporations. It 
pursued such initiatives despite the BJP’s earlier reluctance regarding the role of 
multinational corporations in the economy and opposition from quarters within the broader 
Sangh. In order to accommodate the entry of multinationals, Prime Minister Vajpayee 
provided a fresh nuance to the notion of swadeshi. In a somewhat convoluted argument, 
swadeshi was reinterpreted as the means of helping domestic companies successfully 
compete with multinationals (Business Line 1999, August 17; Oza 2012, 84). This implied 
welcoming multinational companies into the country where they could contribute to the 
success of various economic sectors. 
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Taking advantage of new intellectual property provisions under the WTO, multinational 
corporations were able to establish themselves even in politically sensitive markets. 
Missouri based multinational corporation Monsanto's efforts to introduce a genetically 
modified cotton variety received much negative publicity. This publicity centre around the 
rumoured inclusion of terminator technologies within these genetically modified cotton 
varieties and the expense of high input methods (fertilizers, chemicals) required to grow the 
variety (Shiva 2005, 148). This was a particularly sensitive issue, given the growing rates of 
farmer suicides in the country largely caused by an increase in the overhead costs of 
agriculture. Speaking on the issue of a genetically modified variety of cotton (Bt. Cotton) a 
member of the opposition, stated: 
 
Last year, after much debate, Bt. Cotton was allowed to come into this country. Today, to our utter 
horror, we have found that the Bt. Cotton, which has been brought to us, is not giving us the yield 
that we need. At Mallapur in Mahbubnagar district, the cotton crop has failed after Bt. Cotton seed 
was given to us. To compound our injury, we had to spend large sums of money on the additional 
pesticide to keep this crop going at a high premium. We did not ever recover that (Renuka 
Chowdhury, Lok Sabha Debates 2003, March 03).  
 
The failure of such varieties to demonstrate the very properties (high yield) they were 
created for was only one of several concerns about the introduction of new crop varieties by 
multinational corporations. An equally urgent concern, expressed by another opposition 
Member of Parliament was the suspicion of so called ‘terminator technologies’:  
An American multinational seed company known as Monsanto… is selling various seeds of transgene 
genes variety. This company is also selling cotton seeds in Dharmapuri district of Tamil Nadu… the 
farmers of Dharmapuri district are in the grip of fear about the nature of these seeds… the farmers 
are afraid that the seeds sold by Monsanto could be terminator seeds… It is reported that these 
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seeds, like terminator seeds, will affect the soil and the water resources. The farmers are not sure 
whether they can save seeds even for one crop. This fear in the minds of the farmers might lead to 
abandoning the cotton crop (K. P. Munusamy, Lok Sabha Debates 1999, March 11). 
 
Highly publicised crop burnings and a major demonstration by the KRRS farmer union took 
place in Karnataka. Even high profile personalities such as former Prime Minister V.P. Singh 
warned against the entry of multinational corporations into the agricultural sector (The 
Times of India 2001, November 02). However, this variety of genetically modified cotton was 
sold and gained sufficient market share as to encourage other multinationals to enter the 
market. For example, the American company Aventis quickly followed Monstanto’s lead by 
introducing a genetically modified variety of mustard (Business Line 2002, March 22). 
 
The role of multinational corporations adds a further layer of explanation to the influence of 
international institutions in other policy areas. The IRDA bill introduced in December 1999 
was the NDA government's first definitive step towards opening the economy to foreign 
investment through the deregulation of domestic industry. In fact the agenda to open the 
insurance sector was adopted by the BJP leadership well in advance of the formation of the 
NDA government. Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha (1999-2002) maintains that his own 
position, communicated to both future Prime Minister Vajpayee and the influential future 
Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani, was that opening up the monopoly insurance sector to 
private investment would increase flows of FDI, increase the range of insurance products in 
a diversifying economy and encourage competition among local providers (Sinha 2007, 83-
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87). In short, among the major benefits of such a policy was the attraction of foreign 
investment. 
 
Despite major opposition from within the cabinet and other members of the Hindu 
Nationalist Sangh Parivar, which described these policies as a 'reckless concessions for the 
entry of multinational companies' (Singh and Saxena 2003, 18), the IRDA bill opened up the 
insurance sector to private and foreign ownership in an area that had previously been a 
government monopoly. The bill allowed the entry of foreign companies into the domestic 
insurance sector for up to 26 percent stake in joint ventures. Once again, both major 
political parties were committed to the opening of the insurance sector for minority share-
holding by foreign companies, with the only significant notes of dissent coming from the 
Left parties (The Hindu 1999, August 19). Provocative criticisms of the bill came from 
members of the opposition Communist Party of India such as Ajoy Chakraborty:  
This is nothing but an infringement of economic sovereignty of our country. It is anti-national. More 
than one crore people have put their signatures and submitted to the House for its discontinuance 
[sic]. I would like to submit, through you, that the Government should not come forward with this Bill. 
It should instead be referred to the Select Committee for re-consideration. I strongly oppose IRDA Bill. 
The whole nation is opposing it (Lok Sabha Debates, 1999, November 29).  
 
By criticizing the bill as anti-national and appealing to issues of national sovereignty, such 
criticisms accused NDA government policies of being opposed to the very core values of the 
BJP. The reference to the ‘whole nation’ in these remarks referred to a series of protests 
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against the bill undertaken by employees of the existing government owned insurance 
companies as well as the All-India Insurance Employees’ Association (Mahalingam 1999). 
However, given general consensus between the BJP and Congress on the issue, the protests 
were not successful in halting passage of the Bill. The response by multinational 
corporations was initially encouraging with AIG New York Life and Standard Life in London 
among the companies that undertook joint ventures by the following year (Business Line 
2000, April 19).  
 
Despite such promising initiatives the actual record of FDI remained well below the targeted 
$10 billion, growing from $2.168 billion in 1999 to $5.335 billion in 2004 (UNCTAD 2004, 
2005). Lack of infrastructural capacity, restrictions on convertibility as well as a lack of 
labour law reform, were listed as some of the chief reasons as to why this ceiling would not 
be broached until the Congress-led UPA government in 2005. In addition, the process of 
Public Sector Undertaking privatization was largely accomplished through domestically 
owned companies. While making a significant contribution to government revenues, this 
policy did not encourage a significant inflow of FDI. In fact the actual method of 
privatization, through the issuance of shares rather than assets, is thought to have 
contributed to the lack of attractiveness to foreign investors who would have been keen on 
mergers and acquisitions (Ram Mohan 2007, 3). 
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This section has asked what international influences beyond international institutions would 
have acted on the NDA’s policy formation. As a source of growth stimulating foreign 
investment, multinational corporations are clearly a factor of the global economy that could 
have affected the economic policy formation of the NDA.  However, I stop short of 
concluding ‘influence’ as defined in the introduction of this chapter as it has not been shown 
that a multinational corporation was able to direct policy changes in the manner of an 
international institution. Instead, a symbiotic relationship between the reform agenda and 
multinational corporations can be inferred. In this relationship, the NDA government sought 
out multinational investment and multinational corporations sought out opportunities in an 
economic environment newly primed for international investment through the 
implementation of policies influenced by international institutions. The role of multinational 
corporations was therefore dependent on the pre-existing policy influence of international 
institutions without which it is doubtful that the economy would have attracted their 
attention. However, on putting the necessary provisions in place, the NDA was clearly eager 
to attract the attention of multinational corporations. 
 
4.5. Conclusions  
Following the argument of international theorists, can the economic policy reforms 
instituted by the NDA government be explained primarily by international influences? This 
chapter answers that while international influences are discernible, they do not entirely 
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explain the policy decisions of the NDA government. International institutions were able to 
exert influence on policy issues through binding mechanisms such as World Bank Structural 
Adjustment and WTO Dispute Resolutions. These policies were successfully implemented 
with the cooperation of state governments keen to attract investment (in the form of World 
Bank loans) and with the support of advisory councils and interest groups keen to 
implement the deregulation of economic sectors. The alignment among multiple 
stakeholders (state governments, interest groups) or economic conditions (the global 
economy) appears to have been a key factor in determining how fertile the policy landscape 
was for the implementation of policies recommended by international institutions. However 
these factors only directly influenced a relatively narrow stream of economic policy. In order 
to broaden the scope of investigation other incentives, such as the effort to attract Foreign 
Direct Investment were examined. Once again the evidence painted a mixed picture.  
 
On the one hand, multinational corporations began to respond to reforms undertaken at 
the behest of international institutions. Lower fiscal deficits, robust intellectual property 
rights and the deregulation of former government monopolies (such as insurance) made the 
economy more attractive for investment. However, with the overall FDI targets unmet from 
year to year, indications are that significant constraints remained on the ability of the NDA 
to successfully obtain the benefits of neoliberal reforms. These constraints largely consisted 
of a lack of alignment between reforms in various policy areas. While the NDA was keen on 
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attracting investment, the achievement of this priority was held back by at the lack of 
infrastructure or restrictions on currency convertibility.  
 
This attribute of ‘alignment’ suggests a means of understanding the scope of international 
influences. International institutions were able to exert influence most effectively when 
there was a level of alignment among multiple stakeholders or conditions. Conversely, they 
were unable to influence the NDA’s economic policies without such an alignment. As I have 
shown above, state level fiscal consolidation was accomplished through an alignment 
between the investment priorities of state governments (e.g. Andhra Pradesh) and the 
World Bank’s preferential lending schemes. On the other hand, a lack of alignment led to 
other policy recommendations being resisted. A lack of alignment between the IMF’s 
proposals for greater convertibility of the Rupee and the global economic conditions 
following the East Asian Crisis explains why the IMF was unable to influence the NDA to 
adopt this policy. In this case, concerns about the larger global trend of financial ‘contagion’ 
mitigated against the IMF’s recommendations which would have made the Rupee more 
vulnerable to such global shocks.  
 
In the case of trade policy, the WTO’s formative influence on the NDA’s trade policies was 
successful partially by virtue of the fact that the NDA government's tenure coincided with 
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the new global regime and regulations on trade. Thus the NDA's trade policy reforms were 
in part a reflection of a larger global policy compliance momentum instituted by the 
creation of the WTO. The reduction in Quantitative Restrictions also drew from an 
alignment between WTO priorities and bilateral interests between the USA and India. On 
the other hand, the resistance of NDA coalition partners to the reduction of subsidies, 
successfully challenged the influence of the WTO at Ministerial Conferences. Thus when 
there was a lack of alignment with domestic interests (state governments), WTO influence 
was unsuccessful. Finally, the NDA’s ambitious Foreign Direct Investment targets explain 
why WTO requirements to implement intellectual property rights and IMF-World Bank 
recommendations to deregulate domestic industries were successful. On the latter policy, 
the government also had the support of domestic constituencies such as FICCI. Concerns 
from opposition parties and domestic unions were not sufficiently strong to overcome the 
momentum of these policy changes. 
 
What this suggests is that International institutions influenced the economic policy reforms 
of the NDA government in so far as they aligned with other factors such as domestic 
priorities and larger global trends. Where there was a lack of alignment, these institutions 
were not able to successfully exert their influence. There is therefore an element of 
arbitrariness in the level of influence these institutions were able to exert. Policies were only 
successful when there was alignment among multiple stakeholders.  
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As a rationale for the economic policy formation of the BJP this is unsatisfactory. For 
example, significant questions remain unanswered. For example, did the successful 
implementation of an economic reform depend on the alignment of a certain number of 
factors? In addition, why did these successful economic policies largely take on a neoliberal 
shape? Alignment appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for policy change. 
To complete the picture, we still require some underlying rationale as to why certain 
economic reform policies were successful and why they took on a neoliberal orientation. 
The next chapter will argue that the role of transnational elites provides the best possible 
response to these questions. 
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Chapter 5: The net of Indra – transnational networks and the process of 
neoliberalization 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
The previous chapters have examined the influence of both domestic and international 
factors in the formation of the economic policies of the NDA government. While they have 
revealed the extent to which some factors have influenced the NDA’s economic policies, 
they stop short of providing an explanation for the actual origins of these policies. This 
chapter will demonstrate that these policies originated within a new global context. The 
neoliberal informational global economy constitutes the continuum within which these 
factors operated and established the rules and logic through which they interacted. This 
chapter will investigate two elements of this continuum in particular to illustrate their 
formative influence on the NDA’s economic policy: globalized spaces and transnational 
elites. It will show how the neoliberal economic policies pursued by the BJP-led NDA 
government were directed by transnational bureaucrats and advisors to the benefit of 
professionals living in globalized urban spaces.   
 
The fact that domestic and international influences generally converged on a mode of 
neoliberal reform, owed much to the concerted and deliberate effort of a class of 
transnational bureaucrats and advisors within the NDA government. By making this 
argument, the purpose of this chapter is not to supersede the previous chapters with 
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another hypothesis. Rather, the purpose is to bring together the perspectives of the 
previous chapters into an underlying logical framework. As part of the inner circle of the 
BJP-led NDA government's leadership, transnational bureaucrats and advisors were intent 
on creating reforms that matched their own neoliberal ideals. These ideals were drawn from 
professional and educational experiences at international institutions and western 
universities. In the introductory chapter I discussed the shape of this inner circle around the 
Prime Minister. This chapter will attempt to connect the policies examined in chapters 3 and 
4 to the work of these individuals. It will thereby show the key role these individuals played 
in neoliberal economic policy formation.  
 
While economic policy addresses one aspect of the global context (namely neoliberalism), 
the informational sector addresses the second. The informational sector is premised on the 
technology of the microprocessor and digital communications (Castells 1996, 105). While 
enhancing the network mobility of capital, the microprocessor has cloned corresponding 
social and cultural practices: namely the culture-ideology of consumerism in globalized 
urban centres (Sklair 2002, 36). It is this aspect of the informational economy: its social and 
cultural practices and its radical reordering of space that I identify as a key incentive in the 
process of neoliberal economic reform. While other aspects of the informational economy 
such as the radical transformation of commercial, organizational and communicative 
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practices are also implied in this process, it is these urban social and cultural aspects of the 
informational economy that I will emphasize in this chapter. 
 
This chapter will therefore explore the policy forming role of transnational elites based on 
the incentives created by the culture-ideology of consumerism in newly globalized urban 
spaces. These themes have been synthesized in a sociological approach which examines the 
process of 'neoliberalizing space' (Peck and Tickell 2002, 392-399). This view, inherited from 
the literatures on global cities and urban studies, seeks to examine the effects of neoliberal 
policy on the everyday lives of individuals and communities within urban centres. Echoing 
the earlier notion of 'actually existing socialism' which attempted to distinguish the policy 
goals of socialist governments from their actual effects on the lives of people, 'actually 
existing neoliberalization' seeks to weigh the claims of neoliberal policies against the 
experience of those who inhabit the spaces where the policies are being implemented. The 
goal of engaging this perspective is to critically assess the impact of neoliberal economic 
policy. It attempts to identify who has benefitted most significantly from the 
implementation of neoliberal economic policies. Applied to this chapter, this approach will 
serve to illustrate that the BJP-led government’s economic policies were directed at the 
aspirations of the newly emerging class of professionals in the neoliberal informational 
economy.  
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The chapter will proceed in the following manner. It begins with an historical overview of 
economic policy transitions showing how transnational elites are implicated in the process 
of economic reform. The next section introduces the concept of transnational elites and 
discusses the application of this concept in this thesis. It then recounts the main concepts 
from the literature on global cities and discusses comparative studies of global cities in India 
to show how the reorganization of space to the benefit of transnational consumers was one 
of the key incentives for neoliberal reform. Following this this chapter presents 
transnational bureaucrats and advisors as the key instigators of the economic policy reforms 
of the NDA government. This section will also show how these transnationals form the 
policy forming link between the domestic and international policy influences discussed in 
previous chapters. A concluding section summarizes the argument.  
 
5.2. How do Economic Transitions take place?  
This section reviews the literature on economic transitions and discusses its application to 
the Indian case. A global trend in which individual states began to successfully transition 
from planned and centralized economic models towards free market models began in the 
1980s. This trend was largely driven by economic factors, but also by new developments in 
technology. Concurrent to this restructuring of economies in the developing world, was the 
information technology revolution. Technological advancements in micro-computing and 
software, which began in California’s Silicon Valley during the 1970s, created new 
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possibilities for information processing, communications and commerce. This enabled the 
creation of a new global economy, in which the very notions of space and time were 
reconfigured around instantaneous information flows and decentralized production chains. 
The compression of space and time meant that private capital could maximize its gains by 
seeking out new comparative advantages across national borders. This encouraged the 
cross-border search for new sources of economic growth (Castells 1996, 151-200).  
 
Foreign Direct Investment from advanced industrialized countries moved to the developing 
world, economically restructured through IMF and World Bank conditionalities and newly 
open to foreign investment. Production chains, formally situated within large industrial 
complexes in North America and Europe, were more efficiently fragmented into a series of 
smaller linked facilities in Asia, Central America and Africa. This resulted in what Sassen calls 
the increasing 'financialization' of the economy and the concurrent rise of global cities as 
informational nodes providing the service and support industries to facilitate the global 
diffusion of capital. Sassen describes these service and support functions as 'producer 
services' which include international legal, accounting and consulting services and a 
subordinate category of 'ancillary services' which include entertainment, transportation and 
health for the professionals providing producer services (Sassen 1991, 8). Economic 
restructuring and the information technology revolution were therefore two important 
milestones in the search for new sources of prosperity. 
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Recent work on global economic transitions, and assessments of the Indian experience in 
particular, have attempted to extend this narrative in more critical directions. In particular, 
this work attempts to revise the Dependency perspective that assumes that the economic 
reform process was entirely reactive to international influences (including the oil shock of 
1990 and IMF/World Bank conditionalities).  
 
According to one prominent summary, this literature identifies both the source of the 
reforms and their characteristics (Haggard 2000, 22). To begin with, the literature delineates 
two steps in the process of reform: (i) the initiation and (ii) the propagation of reform. At 
the very outset, such an inquiry confronts a paradox: why would a state undermine itself by 
initiating a reform process that essentially equates to the diminution of its own powers? The 
answer most relevant to the Indian case, is that in the process of transition the need for 
skilled technocrats, to manage privatization, financial and trade liberalization, actually 
strengthens the state in what Kahler calls the ‘orthodox paradox’ (Kahler 1990, 55). Thus 
while creating an economy free from restrictive controls in the minutiae of commerce, the 
state assumes an even more powerful role as the leader of a dynamic new economic 
process.  
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Key to this stage is an elite group of bureaucrats, committed the reform process and able to 
create a break from the status quo while deflecting the political start-up costs of reform 
(Haggard and Kauffman 1992, 17-18). Stallings (1992, 52-55) has used the term ‘linkages’ to 
describe the source of such reforms. Linkages comprise a general consensus among the top 
bureaucrats and technocrats in developing countries on a normative set of ‘orthodox’ 
(neoclassical and monetarist) ideas about the economic reform process. Senior economists, 
advisors and policy makers within developing countries were largely western educated and 
counted furloughs at international organizations and multinational corporations within their 
professional experience. These officials were often the chief negotiators between 
developing countries and International Financial Institutions in the process of economic 
transition.  
 
The evidence suggests that these elites had been active in promoting a reform agenda in the 
Indian government since at least the late 1970s. Among others, they included L.K. Jha a 
graduate of Trinity College Cambridge, former ambassador to the USA and senior economic 
advisor to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi; Jagdish Bhagwati, a Cambridge educated Columbia 
University professor and former member of the Planning Commission; and I.G. Patel, former 
Director of the London School of Economics, former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India 
and Commerce Secretary under Indira Gandhi.  
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Technocrats, private sector entrepreneurs and some professional interest groups 
maintained a steady pressure to initiate economic reforms in the 1980s. They achieved 
some modest success until the Oxford educated (and then) Finance Minister Manmohan 
Singh and a coterie of advisers in the Finance Ministry (including Harvard Business School 
trained P. Chidambaram) were able to institute the reforms of the 1990s. Concurrently, 
advancements in telecommunications policy and infrastructure led by the American 
educated telecommunications entrepreneur Sam Pitroda (University of Illinois) initiated a 
quantum leap in the country’s information technology sector when the Department for 
Electronics obtained export concessions for clusters of small service companies that 
supported government research enterprises in the cities of Bangalore and Pune (Saxenian 
2002, 180). Within a decade, these companies became the leading information services 
exporters in the country. 
 
Once able to account for the process of 'break' from an entrenched policy, there remains 
the trend of continuity to account for. The initiation of reforms in India was brought about 
under a Congress government and severely criticised by the BJP-led opposition. Why and 
how is it that the reforms were then sustained and even expanded under the BJP-led NDA 
coalition? Explanations for this vary. Nayyar (2000, 792) argues that this continuity was 
based on what he calls the 'centrist tendency' in Indian politics. Waterbury (1992, 215-217), 
on the other hand, argues that continuity is enabled through the broad consolidation of 
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expectations based on a new set of ‘irreversible incentives’. A government with stable 
coalitions of political and private support possesses at least the tacit acquiescence of major 
opposition parties. These parties 'free-ride' on progressive policies without risking the loss 
of political support if these policies prove unpopular. Incentives remain even if the 
governing party changes, so that a newly elected party maintains the policy course of its 
predecessor, taking credit for beneficial outcomes and redirecting any costs to the party 
formerly in power. Accordingly, on forming its coalition government, the BJP gained more 
from continuing with the economic reforms (which produced some economic benefits), 
while deflecting any political costs onto the Congress Party which had initiated them.  
 
However, this only partially explains the BJP's record once in government. Rather than 
merely maintaining these reforms, the BJP greatly expanded the reform agenda through its 
own initiatives.  Studying the involvement of the state in the earlier economic periods of 
industrialization and Structural Adjustment, Evans (1992, 139-181) provides a 
complementary explanation by coining the term ‘embedded autonomy’. By this term, Evans 
draws together what he considers to be two ingredients of a successful developmental 
state. The first of these is an autonomous bureaucracy staffed through the meritocratic 
recruitment of candidates within coherent and long-term career oriented state institutions. 
The second is extensive networks between such institutions and industry at large through 
which policies can be implemented and then refined.  
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Somewhat parallel to this second characteristic of embedded autonomy, Jenkins shows why 
constituencies such as state governments and the business sector would not necessarily 
oppose economic reforms that could potentially be destabilizing. After the inaugural fissure 
with the status quo, the process of reform creates long-term institutional and organizational 
changes. Political parties learn how to maintain patronage though new channels and even 
seek out new patronage opportunities while established business groups support economic 
reforms in exchange for special privileges from the government (Jenkins 1999, 86; 114). The 
close relationship between apex groups like FICCI and the BJP serves as an illustration of 
this, especially given the FICCI’s influence over the course of economic policy making. This 
chapter will however focus on the former aspect of embedded autonomy: an autonomous 
bureaucracy staffed by long-serving officials in state institutions and advisory capacities. It 
will show that these individuals provided the key link for a general continuity in economic 
reform policy between the Congress and BJP coalition governments. 
  
5.3. Who are the Transnational Elites? 
In the introductory chapter, the concept of transnational elites was briefly introduced. This 
section focuses on the crucial role of these transnational elites in catalysing neoliberal 
economic reforms during the BJP led NDA coalition government. Transnational elites form 
part of the neoliberal informational context which linked domestic and international factors 
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along neoliberal policy priorities. This conceptual category therefore deserves some 
preliminary discussion.  
 
This thesis understand transnational elites as a hybrid concept derived from a synthesis of 
the social concepts ‘elite’ and ‘transnational’. The first of these concepts emerged in the 
social sciences towards the end of the 19th century from concerns over a particular 
antinomy in democratic systems. The latter concept, transnational, has become increasingly 
significant as a means of uncovering the labyrinthine networks of culture, movement and 
capital which underpin the logic of globalization. 
  
Transnationalism is the first root concept considered here. Vertovec (1999, 2-13) provides a 
useful categorization of six particular premises through which transnationalism is 
manifested: social, consciousness, cultural, capital, politics and location. Social and cultural 
transnationalism refer to the commonality of values and associations among individuals 
situated in transnational contexts. Examples of such associations include attendance at 
common global universities, memberships in global associations and the possession of 
values sometimes at odds with those of the local context in which an individual lives. 
Capital, politics and location refer to the physical contours of transnationalism 
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encompassing globally mobile capital and political priorities formed to encourage this 
mobility.  
 
Despite the recent interest in this topic due to the onset of globalization, scholars are 
cautious to point out that transnationalism is not a recent phenomenon. Bamyeh (1993) 
places the origins of transnationalism in medieval European trans-local economies, and 
early global trade necessitated by the limitations of natural resources in any particular 
locality. The resultant economic activity created the conditions for the abstraction of capital 
from the local to the transnational level and a transnational class whose interests thereby 
transcended national borders. The onset of modernity further enhanced these 
characteristics through greatly expanded trade (with colonies and the new world) and the 
search for ‘universal’ values that transcended local cultures (Bamyeh 1993, 17-19).  
 
In the contemporary context, transnationalism inherits and enhances the above 
characteristics through vastly improved communications and the expanded mobility of 
individuals. Transnationalism also occurs across scale so that these premises could apply to 
a Transnational Corporation or to a small ethnic community in Los Angeles. Historically, 
transnationalism in the twentieth century became significant on the establishment of the 
Bretton Woods institutions, created to ensure a stable global economy in which capital 
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could move freely. In addition, immigration reforms in North America and Western Europe 
set against the backdrop of cold-war competition for skilled labour also contributed to the 
reality of transnationalism (Williams 1996, 23). With growing numbers of migrant groups in 
developed countries, and the spread of transnational corporations, transnationalism 
emerged as networks of communities in different physical localities sharing a common 
consciousness and means of cultural reproduction, engaging in common commercial 
activities and political concerns and creating new transnational spaces (Appadurai 1996).  
 
By the time Bamyeh’s study was published, the methodological challenges in gauging the 
exact parameters of these various transnational categories was understood. It would 
therefore be suitable to limit the scope of what is meant by transnationalism in this section. 
Here transnationalism refers particularly to a group of shared economic orientations drawn 
from a common set of values largely derived from common educational backgrounds and 
professional experiences. Transnational linkages among key bureaucrats in the Prime 
Minister’s Office and economy-related ministries was central to the economic reform 
process of the NDA government. However, before discussing this in any detail, a short 
exploration of the second root concept is necessary.  
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The question of the role of elites has largely emerged in the contemporary context as a 
means of deducing where the benefits of globalization accrue. However, the problem of 
elites has a lengthier pedigree. In the context of the modern state, Weber proposed the 
problem of bureaucratic elites which emerged from an examination of the way democracy 
actually functions. The bureaucratic rationalization of the modern state creates inevitable 
tensions that arise when decisions affecting the citizenry at large are made by small groups 
within the bureaucracy. On the one hand, Weber maintains that bureaucratic specialization 
and the technical knowledge that comes with this specialization is a necessary function of 
the modern state (Weber 1997, 65). However, this situates the holders of this knowledge, 
and their work which directly affects the citizenry, at a distance from democratic 
accountability. Both the specialized knowledge and state bureaucracy are not easily 
accessed by the citizenry and this is problematic for democracy.  
 
Weber’s solution to this dilemma is rigorous parliamentary accountability so that the actions 
and priorities of the bureaucracy are led by democratically elected politicians. However the 
prospects for democracy, even under the  ideal conditions for parliamentary accountability, 
are most aptly summed up by Pareto (1997, 51) who argues that, ‘a political system in which 
‘the people’ expresses its will… without cliques, intrigues, ‘combines’ and ‘gangs’ exists only 
in the pious imagination of theorists’. The role of specialists is therefore inevitable in any 
realistic account of democracy. 
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I have examined the categories ‘transnational’ and ‘elites’ above. The synthesis of these 
individual concepts results in the idea of transnational elites. For Sklair the class of 
transnational elites constitutes a key element of the hegemonic order of neoliberal 
globalism. It comprises a cross section of political and economic elites, including owners and 
controllers of transnational corporations (TNCs) and their local affiliates, globalizing 
bureaucrats and politicians, globalizing professionals and the consumerist elite (Sklair, 2001, 
17).  Sklair’s analysis is the contemporary formulation of a line of inquiry that stretches as 
far back as Weber in trying to ascertain the tension between emerging democratic systems 
and class and bureaucratic elites (Abbink and Salverda 2012). 
 
This chapter focuses on the agency of bureaucrats, government advisors and globalizing 
professionals (namely knowledge industry professionals) in the formation of the NDA 
government’s neoliberal economic policies. One reason for this choice is that this is a study 
of the political circumstances of economic reform and therefore the most relevant factions 
of this group are key government and economic agents such as bureaucrats and 
informational professionals. Another reason for this choice relates to a weakness of Sklair's 
approach. While he does provide a useful taxonomy to identify individual agents of 
transnationalization, he leaves the issue of causation unsolved: do transnational cultures 
create transnational agents or do transnational agents create a transnational culture?  
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For this particular analysis, causation is established in the following manner. The evidence 
demonstrates that Indian bureaucrats absorbed transnational values through exposure to 
transnational cultures during professional and educational furloughs in western countries. 
While transnationalist consumer culture in India was still very much in a formative phase 
during the period of the NDA government, the benefits that the new professional class 
enjoyed in the nascent transnational consumer economy reinforced the policy directions 
taken by transnational politicians and bureaucrats. This is especially apparent in the 
reconfiguration of space within the new global cities for the professional classes.  
 
In the context of India, a bureaucratic elite emerged with the birth of the modern state. The 
development of technical know-how was key to the Nehruvian vision of a developed state. 
Nehru’s equation of development with modernity, scientific methods and techniques 
necessitated the creation of a group of skilled technocratic cadres in government 
bureaucracies (Guha 2007, 216). Highly selective admission into the Indian Institutes of 
Technology and Management followed by competitive recruitment into the Civil Service or a 
Public Sector Undertaking was the usual route to social and financial privilege under the 
planned economy dirigisme (Evans 1995, 66).  
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In the era of free-market reform that followed, highly trained professionals found new 
routes to financial and social privilege in the expansion of the middle class. Given the 
technical nature of the economic reforms themselves, the role of technocratic elites in the 
state bureaucracy was significantly retrenched. Thus in the era of neoliberalism, the new 
elites, social and bureaucratic, engaged in a somewhat complimentary relationship: in the 
market, professional elites trained in the technocratic skills of the global economy formed a 
new class of social elites practicing transnational consumer lifestyles. Their existence in turn, 
was premised on the policies implemented by transnational bureaucrats and advisors in key 
policy forming roles. These bureaucrats were able to utilize their own set of common 
transnationally oriented experiences and skills to further the course of neoliberal reform. 
 
A change in the ruling political party would not reverse or substantially redirect the overall 
pursuit of reform, if it were driven by an isolated elite of civil service bureaucrats. The NDA 
coalition (1998-1999), the third government since the economic liberalization of the 1990s, 
furthered the course of reform, through the recommendations of reform-minded ministers 
and senior advisers. The same pattern was echoed in the full-term BJP led NDA government 
(1999-2004) where a group of pro-reform minded advisers and senior civil servants 
populated the inner circle of Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee. Civil servants such as the 
Harvard trained Chief Economic Adviser Shankar Acharya, appointed under the pro-reform 
Congress government, continued to exert their influence by remaining in their positions well 
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into the NDA government's tenure. Significantly, until joining the government, none of these 
individuals carried membership in any of the Hindu nationalist political organizations and 
were therefore harbingers of ideas and approaches outside of this tradition.  
 
Having examined the notion of transnational elites as a concept and the particular elite 
categories relevant to this chapter, the next two sections discuss the role of the new 
professional class and transnational bureaucrats in the economic policy formation of the 
NDA government. 
 
5.4. The Global City: The neoliberalization of space 
The analysis in chapters 2, 3 and 4 looked at the influence of domestic and international 
factors in the formation of economic policy. While discussed individually in the preceding 
chapters, policy formation at these individual levels was not disconnected. In fact, the 
actions of domestic and international factors are deeply linked within transnational 
networks which provide the logic and structure within which domestic and international 
factors influence economic reform. These networks also mediate the effects of economic 
reforms at the social and cultural level. These social and cultural factors comprise part of 
what I term the neoliberal informational context. This section seeks to accomplish two 
goals. The first is to demonstrate the emergence of a novel transnational phenomenon in 
India: namely the global city. The second is to implicate neoliberal economic reform in the 
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radical reordering of urban spaces to facilitate the emergence of these global cities. By 
doing this I uncover the major incentive for neoliberal reform: namely access to 
transnational lifestyles afforded by the growth of the global informational sector. Having 
established the motive for neoliberal reform, the next section will demonstrate the means 
by which this reform was brought about: the agency of transnational bureaucrats within the 
NDA government. 
 
The re-ordering of space ultimately derives from a reordering of the role of the state in the 
everyday lives of citizens. Critical engagements with neoliberalism have questioned the 
equation between the roll-back of economic regulation and the diminishing of the state. 
Harvey examines the function of neoliberalism as a mask for the greater involvement of the 
state in the everyday life of citizens (Harvey 2005, 79-81), while Foucault describes 
neoliberalism as part of the larger complex used by the state to exert biopower (Foucault 
2008). Thus the seemingly benign connection between economic reform and the everyday 
experience of citizens is opened up to scrutiny. Economic reform policies shape the lives of 
citizens in fundamental ways that must be recognized in order to understand the logic of 
neoliberalism.  
 
241 
 
 
 
 
In a global neoliberal informational economy in which capital searches out new 
opportunities among developing economies newly open to investment, global cities emerge 
as crucial information processing nodes that enable this flow of capital. The embeddedness 
of neoliberal policies within the urban context of global cities make them intensive sites of 
neoliberal 'creative destruction' (Brenner, Peck and Theodor 2005, 11). The global city is the 
theatre within which intensive neoliberal policy activity is translated into the everyday 
experiences of citizens. Global cities epitomize the impact of neoliberal reform on 
individuals within a rapidly changing economic landscape. These cities are therefore the 
ideal arena to illustrate the overall impact of neoliberal policies that encourage market 
oriented growth and elite consumption patterns. These policies include fiscal austerity, 
prioritization of the inflows of financial capital and trade and the shrinking of governance in 
a public private partnership service provision model which emphasizes private sector 
priorities (Brenner, Peck and Theodor 2005, 12).  
 
Saskia Sassen describes global cities as nodes in a network of electronically connected 
centres of financial activity, which create a distinct urban phenomenology (Sassen 2001). 
The global city is the fundamental unit of the global informational economy. The value of 
Sassen’s description lies in the explanatory power of this concept to describe a pattern of 
urban life that is ultimately premised on the priority of finance capital. Sassen and others 
(Harvey 2010, 158) have described this urban phenomenology as 'time-space compression' 
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across the network of global cities and within their individual physical configurations. Urban 
phenomena such as gentrification and suburban growth have been ascribed to the 
informational-finance complex that lies at the heart of the urban economy of a global city. 
These are the current manifestations of what urban theorist Henri Lefebvre called the 
subordination of history and the formulation of solutions to the logic of space (Nair 2005, 
122).  
 
An application of these considerations to the new globally oriented urban context in India 
yields some intriguing results. Chatterjee performs an analysis in which he links the 
neoliberalization of trade policy and urban governance to two fundamental changes in the 
urban spaces of Ahmedabad (Chatterjee 2009). On the one hand, he argues, neoliberal 
economic reforms ultimately led to the steep decline of the textile industry and the urban 
neighbourhoods of textile industry workers. On the other hand, these policies catalysed an 
exponential growth of the information services sector and the ancillary real estate, 
consumer and retail industries. Chatterjee ultimately links these trends, the decline of the 
textile industry and the growth of the informational sector, to the marginalization of 
minority groups and the larger theme of communal tensions. While this (connection to 
communal politics) is not the argument pursued in this chapter, Chatterjee’s paper 
demonstrates the highly formative effects of neoliberal economic policies on urban spaces.  
 
243 
 
 
 
 
The emergence of global cities, in the Indian context has a lengthier history than the NDA 
government’s tenure. This trend can be traced from the mid-1980s when tentative steps 
towards economic reform were taking place under the Congress government led by Rajiv 
Gandhi. Under these piecemeal reforms, the encouragement of the domestic electronics 
industry in particular aroused the interest of multinational corporations. The multinational 
Texas Instruments established a presence in the city of Bangalore in 1985 (Patibandla 2006, 
111). Following the economic reforms of 1991, and given a critical mass of specialized 
expertise among the various government research and public sector units already in the 
city, Bangalore turned from an idyllic government and private technology base into a 
thriving metropolis barely able to keep its infrastructure apace with the speed of growth 
(Srinivas 2001, 12).  
 
The greatest source of growth during this period was the information technology services 
sector, which had grown from a collection of small private units established in the early 
1980s to some of the largest software and business processing service providers in the 
world. These companies provided the necessary information and knowledge processing 
services to facilitate the transfers of capital around the world in a global neoliberal 
informational economy. Attracting substantial numbers of highly trained, consumer 
oriented workers, the growth of the information and knowledge processing industry created 
a renewed premium on space in the city. The development of Electronic City and the 
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International Tech Park in Whitefield formed an information technology corridor that was 
the source of a new economy around which ‘ancillary services’ such as private residential 
and retail developments mushroomed.  
 
Bangalore serves to illustrate the spatial reordering of old urban centres under the influence 
of neoliberalism. However, the spatial effects of neoliberal reforms were even more 
apparent in the development of entirely new urban centres. In the early 1980s, the village of 
Gurgaon came to the attention of the public as the site for a new industrial development. 
Given its proximity to the New Delhi airport, Gurgaon was chosen as the site for the first 
Maruti car plant in 1981 (Becker-Ritterspach 2007, 2). From this small industrial base, 
Gurgaon emerged through the 1990s as a major centre for Knowledge and Business Process 
Outsourcing.  
 
The growth of the informational sector in turn catalysed an exponential demand within the 
real estate and retail sectors and new opportunities for private developers. An 
astronomically heightened experience of the consumer lifestyle became available to the 
educated and well-travelled informational professionals who moved to self-sufficient 
private development complexes where a range of amenities from shopping to schools and 
Swedish spas became accessible without having to step out from a private compound into 
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the public space (Meerman 2009). New shopping malls targeted at these professionals 
constituted sealed cocoons of consumerism, with visual aesthetics, personal security and 
ambient temperatures almost diametrically opposed to the surroundings (Voyce 2007, 
2056). The vocational focus and lifestyle aspirations of these professionals were far more 
integrated into a transnational socio-economic and cultural environment than the local 
context. I will continue to refer to this transnational professional group as the professional-
consumer class. 
 
The benefits of reform, however, largely remained within this class of professional-
consumers. The growth of the informational sector soon began to outgrow the 
infrastructure capacities of the city of Gurgaon and other global cities in the country 
(Srinivas 2001, 12). The influx of informational professionals was mirrored at the other end 
of the income scale. Low skilled work (textiles, casual labour) was adversely affected by 
global economic trends even as this boom in the informational economy transpired. A small 
but active hub of textile firms was set up in Gurgaon during the 1970s. The repeal of 
Quantitative Restrictions under the NDA government gave consumers access to more 
competitive imports, even as access to US and EU markets did not deliver expected export 
returns to the local textile industry (Narayanan 2008, 130). Additionally, the trend towards 
'Toyotism' (industrial decentralization based on the Japanese model) and the greater 
fragmentation of garment and automotive production chains during the time of a 
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simultaneous boom in the informational sector created the conditions for the pronounced 
income polarization of the city (The Times of India 2011, December 7; Robinson 2004, 15).  
Luxury apartment complexes and office towers sat cheek by jowl with slums housing 
domestic staff and other informal workers (New York Times June 9, 2008).  
 
The pronounced income polarization was felt acutely as a lack of urban infrastructure 
capacity. In the absence of solutions from municipal and local government, new public-
private partnerships attempted to address these infrastructural capacity problems. 
However, these efforts were primarily concerned with way these problems impinged on the 
lifestyles of the professional-consumers.  A senior official at one of the largest national 
information technology and business process outsourcing trade associations in the country 
(NASSCOM) described the information and knowledge sectors’ incentives in trying to create 
solutions to such urban capacity problems: 
There has been some discussion about the IT hubs existing as centres of excellence and as silos and 
the rest of the city's infrastructure not being that great. We certainly recognize that you cannot have 
these kinds of major disparities. And certainly even the people of the industries also suffer from it. 
When you are stuck in a traffic jam and get to your office in less than two hours then something has 
to be done. People from NASSCOM and the industry are part of several civic bodies that are looking at 
how we can have equitable development of the city (S. Eashwar, Telephone Interview, January 03 
2011). 
 
While recognizing the significant disparities in physical infrastructure, the concerns 
expressed largely relate to the experience of professional-consumers. Proposed solutions to 
these problems included better public transportation and pavements: 
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For instance there is one initiative for the building of mobility hub bus terminals and bus routes that 
cover the arterial roads so that not  everyone has to go around in private transport. There's another 
initiative to develop the pavements of the city because truly from my own experience it's very difficult 
for a pedestrian to be walking around in the city today. So there is a recognition that something needs 
to be done because it's our own quality of life ultimately that is affected… The large so called 
underbelly of the city: they service the industry so there is even a self interest in contributing to 
equitable development (S. Eashwar, Telephone Interview, January 03 2011). 
 
Once again, the phrase ‘quality of life’ seems to suggest the perspective of a professional-
consumer on urban capacity problems. Even when concerns extend to other social sectors 
(the ‘underbelly’ of the city), these are formulated in relation to the perspective of the 
information and knowledge sector.  
 
At the regional level, Karnataka Chief Minister S.M. Krishna (Congress) convened a special 
advisory group, the Bangalore Agenda Task Force (BATF), to advise on some of the most 
urgent urban capacity problems. This group was composed of representatives from some of 
the major local corporations and various municipal and regional departments representing 
policy areas such as planning, development, sanitation, transport and telecommunications 
(Smitha and Sangita 2008, 12). Pani notes that key members of this body were executives 
from the Indian software company Infosys (Pani 2006). NGOs and groups representing the 
interests of sectors outside of the government-private industry nexus were excluded. 
Discussions around urban capacity problems led by such NGOs and organised groups were 
already taking place and emphasized the need for better basic services including 'land 
development and planning; water, power and telecommunication and services, public 
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transportation enforcement of traffic management; enforcement law and order; and last 
but not least municipal budgeting' (Ghosh 2005, 4916). However, such priorities were 
overlooked by an ambitious informational sector aspiring to transnational global city status.  
 
A summit organized by the BATF, brought together representatives from the corporate 
sector to discuss a coordinated urban development plan. These representatives managed to 
extract promises from public sector 'stakeholders' (reduced to the status of observers at the 
meeting) with the audacious goal of ‘converting’ Bangalore into a new Singapore (Nair 2005, 
123). The prioritization of a newly proposed international airport and the idealization of 
Singapore as a model city ensured the primacy of global interconnectivity and an urban 
environment ordered to facilitate transnational producer-consumer services over and 
against fiscal prudence and the particular socio-urban challenges of Bangalore. Such 
idealization only increased the social and physical isolation of transnational producer-
consumers from workers in the informal sector. 
 
A struggle between the public use of space and the increasing appetite for privately 
developed housing reached an extreme as new townships in Bangalore were re-imagined as 
transplanted Southern California information technology metropolises complete with ‘CEO-
mayors’ (Nair 2005, 135). The appropriation of villages in the peri-urban areas and 
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encroachments on green spaces were accompanied by the forcible eviction of casual 
labourers from land originally zoned for public development. The re-zoned private 
developments catered to what sociologists call a middle class a flight from the realities of 
the city behind the boundary walls of gated communities. Here residents enjoyed entire 
lifestyle packages, including premium spaces such as jogging paths free of traders, shopping 
and education without the need to engage with the people and spaces outside of their 
private compounds (Smart and Smart 2003, 273; Nair 2005, 135). 
  
Such development efforts were largely targeted at creating an enhanced living environment 
for the emerging producer-consumer class with little attention to the impact upon other 
social sectors. Land procurement proposals to improve urban infrastructure did not 
incorporate adequate consideration of slum populations. The focus on infrastructure 
development for the services sector therefore largely overlooked the needs of a large 
majority of the urban population. Significantly, Fernandes argues that such models of urban 
development demonstrated a new mode of state intervention on behalf of the new middle 
classes rather than the supposed retreat of the state under neoliberalism (Fernandes 2006, 
156).  
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The unbalanced priorities of urban development elicited reactions from other parts of the 
social spectrum, often through novel channels of protest. Significantly, these protests were 
directed at the symbols of the transnational consumer lifestyle. A series of disruptions by 
the KRRS (Karnataka State Farmers' Association) farmers’ union had begun in 1993 to resist 
WTO restrictions on long standing farming practices. In 1996 the ire of the group was 
directed at the global franchise Kentucky Fried Chicken with members occupying and then 
vandalizing a newly opened outlet on Bangalore's Commercial Street (Assadi 1996, 1184). 
Other targets included global retailer Metro Cash and Carry outlets, singled out by local 
traders who maintained that the entry of the German conglomerate was threatening their 
livelihoods (Business Line 2003, October 23). The Miss World contest in Bangalore held in 
1996 witnessed further protests from groups across a wide political spectrum, from 
Communists concerned about the entry of foreign capital into the country to Hindu 
nationalists concerned about notions of 'feminine purity' (Fernandes 2006, 161). At the 
time, these protests, however, were largely viewed as the reactionary politics of ‘eccentric’ 
interest groups. However, in retrospect, they could easily be interpreted as protests against 
the signs and symbols of the neoliberal economy by urban constituencies that had been 
marginalized in the growth of the global city. 
 
In sum, the formation of India’s global cities according to the priorities of neoliberalism was 
oriented to a new class of transnational elites. These elites comprised the highly skilled 
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professional-consumers who maintained and propagated the transnational economy 
through their increased productivity and consumer lifestyles. This emphasis is further 
illustrated by the fact that the urban development policies within these cities intentionally 
targeted the lifestyle demands and aspirations of this these elites, at significant cost to 
other urban constituencies. The economic productivity of these elites as well as their 
consumption oriented lifestyles in turn was premised on the process of neoliberal economic 
reform. To understand the productive and consumer aspects of the global city therefore 
requires an understanding of the neoliberal policies that created them. It is to an 
examination of this that this chapter now turns.  
 
 
5.5. The Neoliberalization of the economy under the NDA: The role of transnational 
elites 
Having examined the role of professional-consumers within globalized urban spaces, this 
sections turns to the role of transnational agents within the government. This study 
recognizes that the transnationalization of government policy takes place at a number of 
levels, through central government ministers and technocrats to regional politicians and 
their advisers. One mode of transnationalization involves what some scholars refer to as the 
'iconization' of the models of modernization. This encompasses a strategy of legitimizing 
particular development priorities by portraying them as expressions of the individual 
personalities of political or bureaucratic leaders (Pani 2006; Rudolph and Rudolph 2001). 
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Through this process, these figures are projected to embody the actual reform process 
itself. They act as a point of reference for the growing constituency of middle classes within 
urban regions. The Rudolphs point to the significant fact that post-1991 the chief icons of 
economic development were no longer Prime Ministers as was the case under Nehru. 
Rather this mantle was taken up by regional chief ministers who were viewed as the 
dynamic and entrepreneurial agents of development and key deal-makers with the thriving 
corporate sector (Rudolph and Rudolph 2001, 1541). Both NDA supporter Chandrababu 
Naidu, chief minister of Andhra Pradesh and his Congress counterpart in Karnataka, S.M. 
Krishna are illustrations of this kind of iconization.  
 
While not discounting the crucial role of charismatic regional politicians, this analysis 
focuses on the role of the technocrats who were able to give the politicians' rhetorical 
skeleton of reform goals its policy based ‘sinews’. Such work was often beyond the technical 
abilities or experience of these politicians themselves. In New Delhi, the key to the 
promotion of neoliberal economic reforms was the cadre of advisers in the Prime Minister's 
Office (PMO) which, since the time of Rajiv Gandhi, had begun to take on an increasing 
profile in the overall governance of the country. These advisers were largely drawn from 
senior positions among the various government ministries and shared common formative 
influences in their career paths. Careers usually consisted of at least two decades within the 
central government's prestigious administrative services (IAS) interspersed with sabbaticals 
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spent obtaining academic credentials (notably at the Kennedy School of Government, 
Harvard), working at international institutions (UNDP, World Bank) or even in the private 
sector (J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs).  
 
Reform proposals in the NDA government often originated with specially convened advisory 
councils and commissions set up by the PMO. These bodies were staffed by transnationalist 
bureaucrats and were the basis upon which the major policy milestones of the NDA were 
created. Jenkins confirms that the initiation of key reforms in India was not always carried 
out through the politically charged venue of parliament. Often reform was accomplished 
through individual government departments, sometimes even through the use of 
obfuscation and stealth (Jenkins 2000, 172-207). This allowed ‘safe passage’ of reform 
proposals as they were developed within ministries until their introduction into parliament 
through the aegis of influential ministers. In the words of one Lok Sabha critic: 
It is because everything is being done by the PMO, by the number of Nav-Ratnas sitting there, the 
former bureaucrats sitting there. You see how many documents are there or how many calls they 
have made. The Ratnas sitting in that PMO are ruling the roost. They are determining everything, 
finalising everything (Rupchand Pal, Lok Sabha Debates 2002, July 23). 
 
The telling analogy here references the Nav-Ratnas (nine jewels), a closed circle of courtiers 
around the Mughal emperor Akbar. By equating the role of the advisors in the PMO to these 
figures, this critic paints a picture of important policies originating among an unelected 
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cadre of modern day ‘courtiers’ around the Prime Minister rather than through a 
democratic process.  
 
Another Lok Sabha critic, discussing amendments to existing patent laws proposed by the 
PMO, expressed concerns regarding the introduction of these amendments in parliament 
despite protests from a wide variety of quarters, even from within the BJP: 
How could it happen? Senior Members of BJP are against it. A number of ruling party Members are 
against it. Known scientists, economists and the powerful trade unions are against it. Under this 
background, how could this happen? (V. V. Raghavan, Lok Sabha Debates 1999, March 09) 
 
Once again this particular critic placed the responsibility for the unresponsive style of policy 
formation in the hands of a powerful PMO attempting to bypass democratic procedure: 
There is a talk in the Lobby and in the Central Hall that everything originates from PMO. Nowadays, 
there is a talk that PMO is more powerful than the Prime Minister himself and all the policies 
originate from PMO. I would not say that they do not have a right but they cannot deny the right of 
the House to know it [sic]... PMO cannot ignore or by-pass the House. We will not allow them to 
proceed like this (V. V. Raghavan, Lok Sabha Debates 1999, March 09).  
This almost alarming portrayal of a closed and powerful PMO creating policy proposals in 
isolation from democratic mechanisms somewhat oversimplifies the nature of the PMO’s 
policy forming modis operandi. The PMO’s policy recommendations were in fact based on 
close consultations with industry and other sectors of the economy through its two advisory 
councils.  
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The PMO convened two permanent advisory councils on economic policy. The Council on 
Trade and Industry included representatives from all of the major industrial conglomerates 
in the country and representatives of both apex chambers of commerce (FICCI and CII) (The 
Financial Express 1999, November 15). A second Council of Economic Advisers (EAC) was 
staffed by veteran transnational bureaucrats including I. G. Patel (former director of the 
London School of Economics), M. Narasimhan (chair of the Narasimhan banking reforms 
committee), Montek Singh Ahluwalia (former IMF director), Kirit Parikh (MIT alumnus and 
former senior UNDP official), Ashok Gulati (former Director of the International Food Policy 
Research Institute), and N. K. Singh.   
 
The very appointment of the councils elicited criticism from members of the opposition, 
such as former Prime Minister H.D. Deve Gowda who was concerned that the role of these 
councils limited the importance of sectors such as agriculture: 
The hon. Prime Minister constituted two councils – the Industrial Advisory Council and the Economic 
Advisory Council. He forgot the agriculture sector… He gave more emphasis to the industrial sector 
and constituted an Industrial Advisory Council. On the economic situation, he wanted the advice of 
experts and so constituted an Economic Advisory Council. But he forgot the agriculture sector. He 
should now think over and ponder over whether such an advisory council consisting of agricultural 
economists and farmers is required. They may not be experts but at least they can ventilate [sic] their 
feelings in such an advisory body (Lok Sabha Debates 2002, December 04).  
 
The implication of these remarks is clear – the advisory councils were formed to address a 
narrow spectrum of economic concerns. This lop-sided policy focus in the Prime Minister’s 
Office would marginalize other crucial policy areas such as the rural sector.  
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Concerns about policy focus aside, it is clear that the advisory councils were widely 
perceived as bodies that had the ability to set the policy agenda. How far can these bodies 
be shown to have actually influenced the policy making process? One former member 
described the Economic Advisory Council's work in the following way: 
We used to meet regularly in formal meetings and discuss a particular agenda. So we used to decide 
before the budget or before the WTO [meeting] what should be the approach. Of course senior 
economist such as I.G. Patel used to tell [sic] this is what we feel, but you [the Prime Minister] have to 
take a political decision. But as an economist this should be the right approach for the interests of the 
economy. But now what are its political repercussions [sic]; that you [will] have to deal with… But 
Vajpayee said one thing, 'I am prepared to pay the price, go ahead. Don't bother about its electoral 
repercussions. If it is in the interests of the country, let us go on' (J. Shettigar, Personal Interview, 
December 21 2010).  
 
In the view of this EAC member, the body’s role was to provide advice on current issues, 
independent of political pressures. What is especially telling is the manner in which the 
Prime Minister attempted to isolate the Advisory Council from possible political 
repercussions. This appears to match the aspect of embedded autonomy that emphasizes 
the isolation of bureaucratic elites engendering economic reforms. According to another 
former member, 'we had discussions among ourselves. As well, Mr. N.K. Singh was there 
and occasionally we met the Prime Minister. So what I think [is] that yes, when we thrashed 
out the issues it probably helped the PMO to make up its mind (Kirit Parikh Telephone 
Interview, July 26 2012).  
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The notion that the Economic Advisory Council set the economic policy agenda is also borne 
out by the policy record. For example in the widely cited report of 2001, Economic Reforms: 
a Medium Terms Perspective, the EAC recommended the phased elimination of tariffs and 
small industry preferences, the privatization of key public sector units (power, telecom, 
ports) the paying down of public debt with disinvestment receipts, reductions in the stake of 
public sector banks and reviews of kerosene and food subsidies. In these proposals there 
are the outlines of the reforms listed in chapter 3 and 4 related to trade policy, budget 
deficits, financial reform and subsidy reduction. The impact of these recommendations were 
felt (along with other committee recommendations) in the finance budget that followed 
that very year, and explicit connections between the EAC's recommendations and reforms 
were made in the media and official opinions (IMF 2001). In the words of one member of 
the council, ‘we prepared the document on the economic reforms state [sic], which was to 
be carried out further and it was implemented in the very next budget’ (J. Shettigar, 
Personal Interview, 2010). 
 
The Prime Minister’s Council on Trade and Investment made similar agenda setting 
recommendations. These recommendations lent the support of industry to some of the key 
economic policies undertaken by the NDA government. To take the example of 
disinvestment policy (discussed at length in chapter 3) the recommendations of the Council 
on Trade and Industry are apparent in the actual policy record.  A ‘Special Subject Group’ of 
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the Council tasked with producing a set of recommendations for disinvestment was headed 
by three transnational elites. These individuals were G.P. Goenka the Harvard educated 
head of one of India’s largest business conglomerates and former FICCI president, Nusli 
Wadia the head of a major multinational textile corporation (Bombay Dyeing) and Rajeev 
Chandrashekar the head of one of India’s largest mobile telecommunications providers (BPL 
Mobile). Among the major recommendations contained in this document was the need to 
set up a Disinvestment Ministry to replace the existing Disinvestment Commission, which 
the Special Subject Group felt would only be able to accomplish disinvestment on an ad hoc 
basis. In their own words: 
There must be Disinvestment Ministry (DM); other ministries can be co-opted only if absolutely 
necessary. The Secretary of DM must preferably have capital market experience. DM will be 
responsible for taking the proposal to a Cabinet Committee on Disinvestment consisting of the Prime 
Minister, the Finance Minister, the Disinvestment Minister and any other economic ministry 
considered necessary. There is no need for a Disinvestment Commission. The DM will have an 
Advisory Board consisting of members who have sufficient capital market and international investor 
experience and there will be a transparent and strategic approach (Goenka, Chandrashekar and 
Wadia 2000). 
 
The rationale presented here emphasized the need for the disinvestment process to be 
carried out in a systematic matter in coordination with other key economic ministries. It also 
described the profile of the senior government official in the Ministry (Secretary) as 
requiring extensive capital market experience. As discussed in chapter 3, the minister 
ultimately placed in charge (Arun Shourie) was a former World Bank official who obtained a 
Ph.D. in economics from the USA. 
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The document goes on to discuss the rationale for disinvestment as well as a road-map for 
disinvestment. A three-pronged rationale behind disinvestment was presented in the 
following manner: to create a healthy context for entrepreneurship and foreign investment; 
to reduce deficits and make publically owned companies more efficient; and to shift 
government expenditures into areas of need such as basic education and agriculture. This 
report also recommended disinvestment of Public Sector Undertakings (publically owned 
companies) up to the 26% mark (in all non-strategic enterprises) exactly as proposed by 
disinvestment policies discussed in chapter 3. When the Disinvestment Ministry was finally 
established, the profile of officials and advisors as well as the actual level of disinvestment 
the NDA government’s disinvestment policy closely followed the recommendations of this 
Special Subject Group of the Council on Trade and Industry.  
 
Other committees were constituted as ad hoc bodies to advise the PMO on specific policy 
proposals, and were often facilitated by a key transnationalist bureaucrat or minister. N.K. 
Singh, a veteran of the Indian Administrative Service, and graduate of St. Stephen's College 
and the Delhi School of Economics, was retained as an Officer on Special Duty in the PMO 
after his retirement as Secretary of Commerce. Singh was tasked specifically with the 
pursuit of economic reforms (The Statesman 2001, February 19). Under Singh’s leadership, 
reform policies appeared to carry a momentum quite apart from the initiative of the 
relevant government departments and ministries. In fact, critics even claimed that these 
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reforms were sometimes carried out in the absence of the minister of the relevant portfolio 
(The Statesman 2001, February 19). The Prime Minister was seen as merely rubber stamping 
the agenda of senior bureaucrats such as Singh with whom the BJP and RSS experienced 
increasing friction and whom they accused of wielding undue influence (Outlook 2001, April 
02).  
 
Even when Singh was persuaded to leave the PMO in favour of a seat in the upper house of 
parliament, he was replaced by Prodipto Ghosh, an IAS cadre and alumnus of Carnegie 
Mellon University (The Statesman 2001, May 09). One of the key legacies of N.K. Singh was 
the Steering group on Foreign Direct Investment, which recommend increases in FDI up to 
one hundred percent across a number of sectors, including telecom, real estate, banking, 
insurance, airports and trade. These recommendations were supported by the secretaries of 
key government departments (industry, external affairs), regional chief ministers (including 
Chandrababu Naidu) and representatives from FICCI and CII. Subsequent upward revisions 
in FDI restrictions, especially with regards to the infrastructure and insurance sector 
outlined in chapter 3, were the direct result of the influence of this body (The Financial 
Express 2002, September 4).  
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In his role as minister of finance, Yashwant Sinha (1998-2002) left the greatest reform-
footprint. Sinha's biographical details match those of other reform minded bureaucrats. 
Sinha was a veteran of the IAS with stints in Bonn and Frankfurt during the creation of the 
European Economic Community, followed by a number of senior roles in the ministry of 
commerce (New Delhi) and the government of Bihar (Sinha 2007). Sinha's major policy 
reforms also drew from commissioned reports headed by transnational bureaucrats. The 
recommendations of the Committee on Fiscal Reforms headed by E.A.S Sarma (a Harvard 
educated career bureaucrat), were introduced into parliament as the 'Fiscal Responsibility 
Legislation Act'. This Act had a crucial role in the reduction of fiscal deficits under the NDA 
government as recounted in chapters 3 and 4.  
 
A profile of membership in these committees confirms the crucial role of transnational elites 
in the formulation of their neoliberal recommendations. Often committee members held 
cross-appointments in private banking houses and global institutions. For example, the 
authors of the Tarapore report on Capital Account Convertibility included S.S. Tarapore 
(former IMF researcher), Dr. Surjit S. Bhalla (former adviser to the World Bank, Goldman 
Sachs, Deutsche Bank), M.G. Bhide (adviser to J.P. Morgan and UNDP) and Kirit Parikh 
(former adviser to UNDP). While the recommendations of this committee were not 
implemented due to the climate of caution that followed the Asian financial crisis, the 
transnational profile of these committee where these policies originated is clear. 
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Even within government ministries such individuals were crucial to the smooth progress of 
reforms. For example, within the finance ministry, Sinha was aided by transnational advisors 
such as Vijay Kelkar (Ph.D. Berkley) who implemented the global depository receipt (GDR) 
guidelines to increase capital account convertibility without the risks of full convertibility 
(The Financial Express 1998, August 28), before going off to join the IMF as an executive 
director (The Financial Express 1999, July 20). In the often difficult negotiations with the 
WTO ministerial meetings, Commerce minister Murasoli Maran, was especially dependent 
on the expertise of senior officials such as Special Secretary Nripendra Misra (Harvard 
educated former IMF Director 1981-85) and Commerce Secretary Prabir Sengupta, a veteran 
of several reform initiatives in various government ministries.  
 
As recounted in chapter 3, traditional factions in the Hindu nationalist movement were 
vehemently opposed to the implementation of such policies. While they criticized the 
policies themselves these critics were quick to point to their source: key ministerial berths 
occupied by candidates who did not have their support. The ministry of finance was a 
particularly contested entity. Traditionalists in the BJP proposed candidates such as Murli 
Manohar Joshi or L.K. Advani, both of whom had reputations as ‘hard-liners’, to lead the 
ministry. Even coalition partners such as the AIADMK proposed their own candidates; in 
their case it was the self-styled swadeshi economist Subrahmanian Swamy.  
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Yashwant Sinha was the compromise candidate agreed upon after the Prime Minister's 
preferred technocrat candidates, Arun Shourie and N.K. Singh were blocked by traditionalist 
factions in the party (The Financial Express 1998, March 11; Frankel 2005, 758). Similarly, 
when the Congress Party appointed Chief Economic Adviser, Shankar Acharya (a Harvard 
alumnus and former World Bank executive) completed his term of appointment in 2001, a 
replacement was proposed by the PMO from the ranks of the EAC. This was in opposition to 
the SJM and RSS candidate, Bharat Jhunjhunwala (The Statesman 2000, October 10). Such 
appointments disillusioned some Hindu nationalist leaders to the point of stating, 'this is not 
our government. Only, some of our party leaders are its members' (The Statesman 2000, 
May 18).  
 
As with government policies, committee recommendations also earned the ire of Hindu 
nationalist critics who expressed frustration at the prioritization of neoliberal reforms. These 
critics included the prickly, Harvard trained Subrahmanian Swamy whose proposals for 
swadeshi-focused economic policies were rebuffed by successive governments. As an 
individual, Swamy’s case is of particular interest in that he represents particularly 
traditionalist economic viewpoints despite his educational background and continuing ties 
to Harvard University where he served as a summer session lecturer until recently. This 
appears to suggest that transnational experiences are therefore a necessary, though 
apparently not sufficient, condition for an overall transnational orientation. On the other 
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hand, Swamy is among one of many economists who claims to have authored (as a minister 
in the Chandra Shekar government) the blueprint for the economic reforms pursued by the 
Congress government in 1991 (Debroy 2000). 
 
Swamy’s alternative and typically nationalist counter-proposals to the EAC report in 2001 
included giant public works to generate employment, a new public distribution system for 
essential commodities, making all savings income tax-deductible, cutting the cost of capital 
or interest rates for Indian entrepreneurs, demanding liberalized immigration to the West in 
exchange for economic liberalization and making Mumbai a free port along the Hong Kong 
model (The Hindu 1998, October 27). However, such criticisms of committee 
recommendations had little effect on the work of the committees which scarcely looked for 
consensus outside the ambit of their own membership. As discussed in chapter 4, the 
criticisms of traditionalists were ‘neutralized’ further down the policy chain, in the pre-
budget meetings between the government and groups such as the Swadeshi Jagaran 
Manch.   
 
5.6. Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that transnational elites are the key factor that explain the origin of 
the NDA government’s economic reforms. These elites formed the crucial policy forming link 
between domestic and international factors aligned towards neoliberal economic priorities. 
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Beginning with the literature on economic reform, this chapter has shown how an isolated 
core of bureaucratic elites played a key role in this process. The reconstitution of urban 
spaces in India’s new ‘global cities’ made possible by neoliberal reforms enabled a new class 
of informational professionals to practice transnational consumer lifestyles. The economic 
productivity of these professionals and their consumer lifestyles were premised on the 
neoliberal economic policies formed by transnational bureaucrats and advisors.  
 
In the case of the BJP-led NDA government, the process of neoliberal reform was initiated 
and propagated by transnational elites within the Prime Minister’s Office and senior 
government ministries. These individuals possessed similar educational and professional 
backgrounds what were sympathetic to the emerging neoliberal paradigm. They instituted a 
series of reforms through their positions in key advisory bodies in the Prime Minister’s 
Office, ad hoc committees convened by the PMO and in key government ministries.  Such 
policies were often at odds with traditional factions within the BJP. The latter expressed 
severe discontent and criticisms of the policy directions taken by these key individuals and 
the inordinate influence they seemed to wield over policy formation. Nevertheless, these 
criticisms were largely side-lined, as the government progressed with its neoliberal 
economic agenda.  
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By identifying transnational elites as the source of the NDA’s neoliberal economic policies, 
this chapter has also established an underlying logic for the influence of the factors 
described in chapters 3 and 4. The adoption of a particular economic policy required 
alignment among multiple domestic and international factors. Transnational elites linked 
domestic policy formation with the priorities of international institutions. Alignment 
between domestic and international influences was translated into actual economic policy 
through the proposals formulated by transnational elites.  
 
In chapters 3 and 4 I examined the influence of domestic and international factors on three 
areas of policy: fiscal policy, disinvestment and deregulation. It is especially significant that 
reform in these policy areas was initiated through proposals originally formulated by the 
Prime Minister’s two advisory councils. Heavily staffed by transnational advisors, the 
reforms proposed the Councils bore a distinctively neoliberal profile in their emphasis on 
the reduction in government and their emphasis on the role of the free market. These 
reforms emphasized fiscal consolidation, aggressive disinvestment and vigorous trade 
deregulation. These policy proposals were then implemented through the support of 
multiple domestic and international factors. Transnational elites therefore provide the 
keystone that supports the collective argument of this thesis: transnational elites with 
neoliberal priorities shaped the economic policy of the NDA government by linking domestic 
policy formation with the priorities of international institutions. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion: from discontent to government, the BJP since 2004 
 
 
6.1. Introduction  
This thesis has attempted to address a neglected area in the study of Hindu nationalism: 
economic policy. It has focused on the process of economic policy formation and the 
implementation of economic reforms during the tenure of the BJP-led NDA coalition 
government during the years 1998-2004. The key question this thesis has attempted to 
investigate is: what influenced the neoliberal orientation of key economic policies instituted 
by the National Democratic Alliance government (1998-2004) led by the Hindu nationalist 
Bharatiya Janata Party?  In this chapter I recount the major conclusions of this thesis and 
demonstrate what they contribute to the existing state of knowledge on the subject. I will 
then discuss the limits of this analysis and possible directions for future inquiry. Finally, this 
concluding chapter will discuss the BJP’s compelling re-emergence, the leadership of 
Narendra Modi and the implications for the BJP’s future economy policies.  
 
6.2. Findings 
This thesis has made the following conclusions. First it has shown that there has been a 
definitive shift in the way Hindu nationalist political parties have viewed economic issues. 
Historically, Hindu nationalism demonstrated a desire to chart a distinctive economic course 
from the central planning model of successive Congress governments. Historically, the 
Hindu nationalist economic approach emphasized economic self-sufficiency and 
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decentralized economic production. The policies advocated by the Bharatiya Jana Sangh 
emphasize these priorities quite clearly. Yet soon after the formation of the BJP, this 
approach began to evolve. This evolution reached its apex in the neoliberal economic 
policies of the BJP-led NDA coalition government. 
 
Why did this drastic change in economic approach occur during the era of the BJP-led 
government? This thesis has attempted to explain why this change occurred by examining a 
range of influences on the NDA government’s economic policy making. Political partners 
within the NDA coalition had a particular interest in economic policy. On the one hand, keen 
to attract investment from international institutions, the NDA government and state 
governments cooperated to adopt fiscal austerity measures. On the other hand, where 
measures proved to be too politically costly (such as in the case of subsidies), coalition 
partners were able to push back against the BJP’s reform agenda. The dynamic between the 
BJP and its coalition partners on issues of economic policy appears to have been reactive to, 
and largely dependent upon, the political pressures to which they were individually 
subjected.  
 
For regional state governments, this pressure came from constituencies within their own 
states, while for the NDA government this pressure came from international institutions. In 
the realm of coalition politics the competing pressures of domestic and international 
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influences collided upon the fault line of economic policy making. This may give the 
impression that the economic policy that resulted was merely the result of compromise – an 
equilibrium position between international and domestic influences. However on further 
examining other domestic factors and even the role of international influences, a more 
consistent rationale for the NDA’s economic policy making can be exposed.  
 
Outside the ‘active zone’ of coalition politics, the government found itself caught between 
organized interest groups vying for the government’s attention. The record shows that 
commercial chambers of commerce consulted closely with the NDA government on the 
formation of pro-market policies. However, the ‘natural’ political allies of the BJP among 
Hindu nationalist groups such as the Swadeshi Jagaran Manch were held at arm’s length. 
This was among the more surprising conclusions of my research. When necessary, the BJP-
led government was willing to advance its neoliberal economic agenda even at the risk of 
alienating core Hindu nationalist support.  
 
Yet these policies had an uneven effect among the BJP’s supporters. While groups within 
the Sangh constituency had significant disagreements with the BJP on economic issues, 
individual voters reacted somewhat differently. Upper and upper middle class voters 
demonstrated a consistent support for the BJP. This point is significant in that it is a 
demonstration of the co-existence of nationalist sensibilities among those who nevertheless 
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self-identified among the socially advantaged. This contravenes the dubious but often 
assumed oppositions between democracy, economic neoliberalism and identity based 
politics (Barber 1995). In addition, voters who advocated a greater role for private business 
in the economy were initially unsupportive of the BJP during its term in government. As the 
level of support within this constituency reversed following the end of the NDA 
government’s term, there is an indication that the BJP may have been reacting to 
disapproval among some voters when it enhanced some of its pro-business policies (e.g. 
disinvestment), mid-way through its term in office.  
 
We are left with the picture of a government whose economic policies were supported by 
some domestic constituencies and opposed by others. However we do not yet have an idea 
of why some constituencies were more successful than others in influencing the NDA 
government. Why for example did the BJP prefer the economic advice of the Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry over that of its Sangh partner the Swadeshi 
Jagaran Manch? Were there other actors who tipped the balance in favour of one group 
over another? 
   
This thesis went on to examine whether international institutions were the catalysts who 
tipped the balance of policy. It examined the influence of three institutions in particular: the 
IMF, World Bank and World Trade Organization. This is what my analysis has revealed. The 
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IMF conveyed its preferred policy directions through its regular policy country-specific 
statements though it lacked the leverage to actually implement these policies. The World 
Bank and WTO exercised greater influence. The Bank exerted influence through conditional 
loan agreements which required recipients to adopt specific economic policies. Additionally, 
membership in the WTO required radical steps to reverse the highly controlled trade policy 
developed under the aegis of import substitution. The fourteen World Bank loans provided 
under the Structural Adjustment facility under the NDA government, had a direct influence 
on the fiscal arrangements between state governments and the centre. The creation of the 
WTO three years before the BJP came to power implied that the NDA was saddled with 
several of the trade policy adjustments that were required by the global trade regime.  
 
Thus among these international institutions at least two had a significant influence on the 
NDA government. However once again it is not clear why in some cases the influence of 
these institutions was resisted. For example, due to the pressures of coalition politics 
agricultural subsidies were allowed to continue despite World Bank conditionalities. The 
analysis shows that policy adjustments were successful where they aligned multiple 
domestic and international factors that sought to influence policy in the same direction. This 
explanation potentially provides a richer basis on which to understand the NDA’s economic 
policy formation. It can incorporate multiple factors (domestic and international) to 
determine when particular influences would converge upon the formation of a particular 
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policy. However, even given such alignment between domestic and international factors, is 
it merely satisfactory to describe the economic policy formation of the NDA government as 
an exercise in the ad hoc alignment of policy priorities among multiple factors? Given the 
scope and depth of these reforms, such an explanation is not satisfactory. We need to 
identify how a deliberate and consistent program of neoliberal economic reform was 
implemented by the NDA government. What turned the alignment of domestic and 
international influences into a neoliberal economic policy? 
 
Transnational bureaucrats situated in government ministries, the Prime Minister's Office 
and in independently convened advisory committees are the most compelling candidates 
for such an explanation. These globalizing bureaucrats linked domestic policy formation 
with the priorities of international institutions.  It is the policies that originated with this 
group which resulted in the BJP-led government’s neoliberal economic record when they 
found the support of aligned domestic and international factors. 
 
What can be concluded from this analysis? The political economy of Hindu nationalism in 
India during 1998-2004 reflected a complex and multiple array of influential factors, 
domestic and international, which contributed to the pursuit of the NDA’s neoliberal policy 
priorities. However the most compelling source of influence, which links together all other 
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factors in an intentional web of neoliberal economic priorities, was the presence of 
transnational elites in key advisory positions and senior positions in the bureaucracy.    
 
While I have been able to demonstrate this through my research, other relevant questions, 
strictly outside of the scope of the present work, are opened up for further investigation. 
One prominent theme in the literature on neoliberalism concerns the social impacts of the 
radical restructuring of the economy. In many cases, these social impacts constitute conflict 
across class and identity. A major theme in the recent history of Hindu nationalism is 
identity based violence. The concurrence of identity based violence and economic 
restructuring since the 1990s in India suggests the need to scrutinize what contribution 
neoliberal restructuring has made to the large scale incidents of communal violence that 
occurred both before and during the NDA government’s tenure (Desai 2007; Sandbrook and 
Romano 2004).  
 
For example, is it simply coincidence that two of the most significant instances of communal 
violence in post-independence India occurred in cities (Mumbai and Ahmedabad) that had 
witnessed radical shifts in their economic bases? Declines in long-standing textile 
manufacturing sectors occurred as these cities transformed into the new hubs of the 
neoliberal informational economy. While suggestive, such observations will require a 
rigorous engagement with the extensive work already done on communal violence in India 
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(Brass 2003; Wilkinson 2004; Varshney 2003). Such an analysis would investigate the 
relationship between neoliberalism and the politics of identity in the context of Hindu 
nationalism in India. 
 
6.3. The BJP since 2004 
This thesis cannot conclude without some comments on the remarkable trajectory of Hindu 
nationalism in the last decade. The BJP's electoral defeat in the 2004 general election stalled 
a nearly two decade long ascent of Hindu nationalism on the political scene.  It was a 
reversal in the political fortunes of the party even as the 1980s and 1990s had been a 
harbinger of success. Since the election in 2004 the BJP lost two consecutive elections. 
Significantly, by the end of its term, it appeared that the mass appeal around the icon of 
Ramjanmabhoomi and Ayodhya, the core of the BJP's electoral strategy in the 1980s and 
1990s, had largely dissipated.  
 
The Congress Party as the leader of the United Progressive Alliance witnessed a slow re-
consolidation, building successful coalitions with a series of national and regional partners. 
The first UPA government (2004-2009) held 219 parliamentary seats out of a total of 543 
against the NDA coalition's total of 189. The UPA was a minority coalition government, 
receiving additional external support, most notably from the 'Left Front' with a total of 61 
seats (The Hindu 2004, May 20). In a second election in 2009, the NDA coalition obtained 
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159 seats (net loss of thirty) while the UPA obtained 262, a net gain of 43 seats (The Hindu 
2009, May 26). 
 
Political analyses vary as to the cause of the BJP’s electoral defeat in 2004. While some 
attribute the loss to the party's growing disconnection from the electorate, epitomised the 
'India Shining' theme of its 2004 campaign, other explanations are more straightforward. 
These explanations point to the loss of NDA allies (namely the AIADMK) and suspicions 
among the electorate stemming from the communal violence in Gujarat during 2002 
(Gowda 2011). In the words of one senior economic advisor to the NDA government: 
I think that the NDA lost the election due to some very practical tactical reasons: [loss of] alliance 
partner in Andhra Pradesh [and] alliance partner in Tamil Nadu... but the Left has very successfully 
portrayed the defeat of the NDA as the defeat of India Shining, as the defeat of these kinds of forward 
looking high GDP policies and this has really set the clock back on the willingness of senior politicians 
and bureaucrats to support high growth policies. Today people might do it but they would be 
embarrassed to do it (A. Shah Telephone Interview, July 16 2012).  
 
Whether this loss can be attributed to the NDA’s suspicions surrounding communal 
incidents or loss of coalition support, the electoral loss was interpreted as a significant 
chastisement to the project of making Hindu nationalism a mainstream political presence 
(Hannon 2010).  Moreover the influence of Left parties in the subsequent UPA government 
meant a moderation in the economic policy agenda that had been pursued since the early 
1990s. 
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Following the electoral defeat of 2004, the BJP's election of the 'hard-line' former Home 
Minister L.K. Advani as party leader was interpreted as a retrenchment of its conservative 
factions. The analysis in chapter 3 demonstrated the tensions among factions within the 
Hindu nationalist movement during the term of the NDA government. In particular, it 
focused on tensions between the Swadeshi Jagaran Manch and the progressively minded 
government ministers, ministry officials and advisers in the Prime Minister's Office.  The 
electoral loss of 2004 was interpreted among the conservatives in the party as a loss of 
confidence among its traditional voters as the party’s election theme focused on gaining 
mainstream support. However, under Advani's leadership the party experienced even more 
significant losses in the 2009 election. Unable to win the election with an appeal to 
traditionalists, it also failed to recapture the middle-voters. Strategies, including personal 
attacks on a much admired Prime Minister (Manmohan Singh) were widely criticised as 
misguided (Daily News and Analysis 2009, May 20).  
 
In recognition of these shortcomings the party went on to recruit Varun Gandhi (of the 
Nehru-Gandhi family) and Nitin Gadkiri, a former Maharashtra state minister, into key 
leadership roles to widen its appeal to younger and more progressive voters. What was 
conspicuous in these efforts to reconfigure the leadership of the party was the absence of 
the charismatic chief minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi. This implies that even as of the 
previous election (2009) there was either indifference or a residual caution within the BJP 
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around associating too closely with the Gujarat chief minister who was suspected of at least 
tacitly supporting the pogrom of anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat in 2002. 
 
What of economic policy after the NDA government? The BJP initially continued to make 
statements on economic policy in line with its course during the NDA government. In its 
manifesto for the 2004 election, the BJP conveyed the aspirations of a party expecting to 
remain in power. In particular it envisioned the country as an economic superpower with a 
focus on manufacturing, knowledge and higher education. There was particular attention 
devoted to completing the current set of reforms to the financial sector. Within six months 
of the election, the party promised to revisit (increasing) FDI in the insurance sector and 
bringing state level revenue deficits to zero by 2006. Appearing to follow an IMF Directors' 
recommendation, the party even outlined a new initiative to 'educate' farmers on the more 
controversial elements of its economic policies such as the early repeal of Quantitative 
Restrictions (BJP 2004).  
 
The 2009 manifesto, in contrast provides a revealing glimpse a party returning to the 
traditional economic stances of Hindu nationalism. What was immediately evident was a 
lack of concern with economic reforms and a greater focus on issues of national security. 
Economic priorities were briefly cited as, 'reviving the economy, re-orienting it towards 
agriculture, rural development, and unorganised [sic] and informal sectors; creating 
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adequate employment opportunities for the youth; pushing back the price line;  and, 
investing heavily in infrastructure' (BJP 2009). There was a definitive turn towards a 
moderately swadeshi oriented economic policy. This could be ascribed to the absence of key 
pro-reform transnationals such as Arun Shourie in senior BJP positions and the loss of 
linkages established by senior officials in the Prime Minister's Office as they moved on to 
jobs in the private sector or international institutions, 
 
In the meanwhile, the economic record of the UPA government was somewhat mixed. 
Between the years 2004-2009, and with the external support of the Left Front, greater 
restraint was exercised on the extent of neoliberal policy implementation. At the outset, a 
national 'Common Minimum' programme, outlining the minimum policy commitments of 
both coalition parties and their external supporters, proposed a general continuation with 
the policies of the NDA government. This included further capital market development, 
increased incentives for FDI in sectors, reductions in the gap between fiscal revenues and 
expenditures and the privatization of non-competitive public sector units (Government of 
India 2004).  
 
However, the actual record of economic policies undertaken by this government showed 
significant divergences from this proposed programme. The NDA's Disinvestment Ministry 
was disbanded and the process of disinvestment placed on hold. Fiscal expenditures were 
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also increased, with the implementation of a new Rural Employment Guarantee Act and the 
report of the Sixth Pay Commission which recommended substantial increases in public 
sector salaries and benefits. These moves were broadly perceived as the result of the 
external influence of the Left Front on the UPA government. Finally increases in the cap for 
foreign investment in the insurance sector were also vetoed by the Left Front (Aiyar 2011, 
4).  
 
Despite such moves, a World Bank Country Strategy Progress Report for 2005-2008 
enthused about the government’s overall economic record, citing the UPA government's 
improved record on inclusive growth as well as governance reforms in the areas of 
transparency and decentralization (World Bank 2007, 1-3). A senior official from the CII, 
contrasted the UPA’s inclusive economic agenda with the NDA’s economic approach: 
The current [UPA] government has focused much more on what they call inclusive growth. Because 
the previous [NDA] government was seen to fall on the fact that they projected too much of India's 
image: the campaign of India Shining where they said that all of India was doing really well due to the 
reforms… the current government started its campaign of inclusive growth and they have focused 
much more on say the social sector: things like increasing spending on things like health and 
education (B. Ganguly, Personal Interview, December 22 2010).   
 
In a significant shift from the NDA’s fiscal conservatism, the UPA emphasized government 
expenditures to ensure basic levels of access to education, healthcare and employment. In 
the latter case, the UPA ironically addressed a fundamental concern of the traditional Hindu 
nationalists: full employment. However, this was achieved through work guarantees rather 
than ‘appropriate technology’.  
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The WTO's Trade Policy Review Board document for 2007 also pointed approvingly to the 
halving of tariffs over the period 2001-2007 (initiated by the NDA coalition but continued 
under the UPA) and measures adopted by the UPA to further simplify the entry of FDI. It did, 
however, also note with caution the stalling of further disinvestment in 2006 (WTO 2007). In 
the case of FDI, the UPA managed to achieve notable successes, increasing levels 
exponentially from $3 billion to $25 billion per annum towards the end of the government's 
first term (Ram Mohan 2007, 7). Disinvestment was revived once again with the formation 
of the second UPA government in 2009.  
 
Under the UPA the WTO witnessed decreasing levels of influence with lower levels of trade 
disputes than during the NDA’s tenure. The prevalence of World Bank conditional lending 
also seems to have dissipated, with most of the loans provided under the UPA’s tenure 
falling into alternative categories – namely Development Assistance and Technical 
Assistance. Without the accompanying policy commitments in terms of conditionalities, 
these loans did not exercise a similar level of influence. This may have enabled the UPA to 
exercise greater discretion on its fiscal policies targeting health, education and employment, 
which diverged from the World Bank’s emphasis on fiscal restraint. 
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With no significant Structural Adjustment Loans or Trade Policy Dispute Resolutions 
occurring during this period, neither the World Bank nor the WTO possessed the same level 
of influence under successive UPA governments as they had under the NDA. Indeed the UPA 
seems to have been less influenced by international institutions than by its bilateral 
relationships with other states such as the USA. In a marked contrast with the NDA, the 
UPA’s greater success in strategic cooperation with the USA may have been partly 
responsible for its success in accomplishing the increases in FDI.  
 
6.4. The return of the BJP 
Since the writing of this thesis began the electoral fortunes of the BJP have reversed. 
Following a decade of failed electoral campaigns, a new electoral strategy based on the 
politics of ‘charisma’, facilitated by transnational media consultants (namely media guru 
Rajesh Jain and lobbying company APCO Worldwide) has delivered the BJP’s best electoral 
performance to date (The Economic Times 2012, December 09). In fact, by winning an 
outright majority, the BJP has formed the first majority government in India since the 
election of 1984. While this reversal has been attributed to a widespread anti-Congress 
reaction among voters, this historic electoral success of the BJP cannot be attributed simply 
to anti-incumbency sentiment.  
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It is the central attribute of Narendra Modi’s carefully engineered public persona, the 
promise of entrepreneurial leadership and economic revival (The Economist 2014), which 
makes his election as Prime Minister especially relevant to this thesis. Key to these 
expectations is a narrative of Modi’s successful economic stewardship of Gujarat against the 
supposed economic mismanagement of the UPA government. According to this narrative, 
the UPA was responsible for a sharp drop in growth rates from 2010-2013, steep price 
increases and successive corporate corruption scandals.  
 
Even if this narrative were true, what factors would determine how Modi leads a reversal in 
the country’s economic fortunes? What kind of challenges will such a program face? Early 
indications are that the economic ambitions of this government will not be without its 
challenges. Of the deluge of commentary about Narendra Modi in the last year, the 
polarizing nature of his candidacy is perhaps the most undisputed and this has significant 
implications for the pursuit of economic policies. A pracharak from his early adulthood, 
Modi’s leadership style has been attributed to his role as an RSS mobilizer more adept at 
‘campaign-style’ politics than consensus-building statesman-like leadership (Jaffrelot 2008). 
The application of this leadership approach to the national level, epitomised by the almost 
presidential-style election campaign this year, would almost certainly put him at odds with 
what has been called the ‘collegial’ and consensus seeking culture among the leaders of the 
various Sangh organizations (The Times of India 2014, May 24). Modi’s strained relationship 
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with some Sangh organizations, such as the VHP and RSS, is thought to have originated from 
a series of sensitive political and policy decisions made during his tenure as Gujarat chief 
minister. A lack of consultation over some of Modi’s urban development plans in Gujarat, 
that included the demolition of derelict temples in Gujarat, riled the VHP to the point of 
harsh and open criticism of the BJP chief minister. Meanwhile Modi’s almost unprecedented 
direct appointment of BJP political candidates in Gujarat without the prior approval of the 
RSS was a great source of irritation within the Sangh (The Times of India 2008, November 
13).  
 
As we have seen above, even though the BJP and Sangh organizations had disagreements 
over economic policy, the willingness to include groups such as the Swadeshi Jagaran Manch 
in deliberations on economic policy may be what sets the previous NDA’s economic policy 
forming method apart from the present government. How the BJP will deal with the 
demands of NDA coalition partners presents another interesting question in that coalition 
partners no longer hold the balance of power in parliament. The assignment of ministerial 
berths in the cabinet already point to the marginalization of coalition partners, raising 
concerns even among stalwart Hindu nationalist coalition partners such as the Shiv Sena 
(The Indian Express 2014, May 27). It remains to be seen whether this will translate into less 
influence on economic policy priorities for regional coalition parties.  
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Additionally, while the BJP’s political fortunes in Gujarat can justifiably be attributed to 
Modi’s leadership, similarly ascribing the state’s economic performance to the same source 
is somewhat dubious. A prominent narrative in the current election has been the promise 
that Modi will lead a reversal of the country’s declining economic trends. The premise of 
this narrative, the exceptional economic growth of Gujarat due to Modi’s leadership, is 
suspect given that Gujarat’s economic growth has been at par with the country’s best 
performing states since at least 1991 (well before Modi was in office). Furthermore, states 
with Congress governments have performed at least as well as Gujarat (Times of India 2012, 
Jun 12). Furthermore, some studies indicate that in the last decade Gujarat’s performance 
has remained mediocre on social indicators (Ghatak, Ghosh and Kotwal 2014).  
 
What makes Gujarat’s success distinctive has been the close partnership with corporate 
actors in the achievement of industrial and infrastructure development (East Asia Forum 
2014, April 20). The stock market rally in response the election of Modi implies increased 
market exuberance at the prospect of a new economic agenda (Economic Times 2014, May 
20). The so-called Modinomics model, prioritizing the role of foreign investment, state and 
private sector cooperation, the development of infrastructure and greatly reduced 
regulation for the private sector, combines aspects of so-called ‘Asian Capitalism’ with 
elements of neoliberalism (Nayyar 2014). In the next five years, we can expect an economic 
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policy that seeks greater engagement with both the domestic and international corporate 
sector through Foreign Direct Investment and public-private partnerships. 
 
As described in chapter 5, the key determinant in economic policy formation for the 
previous NDA government was the appointment of advisory groups and transnational 
bureaucrats within the ministries of finance and disinvestment. During this election, Modi’s 
reliance on a close circles of political advisors including BJP strategists Rajendra Singh and 
Amit Shah, may provide the precedent for an economic leadership consisting of Modi and a 
similarly close circle of economic advisors (The Economic Times 2014, May 28). In fact, 
recent indications are that major policy will be set by the Prime Minister’s office rather than 
by the respective ministers and ministry officials (The Economic Times 2014, May 28). Close 
personal contacts have already been reported with former NDA Disinvestment minister 
Arun Shourie and pro-market Columbia University economists Arvind Panagariya and 
Jagdish Bhagwati. With economic policy originating among transnational advisors in the 
Prime Minister’s Office, we may very well expect an economic agenda that once again 
revives tensions with economic traditionalists within the Sangh Parivar.  
 
6.5. The Political Economy of Hindu Nationalism 
In its first term in office, the BJP at the head of a coalition government pursued a neoliberal 
economic policy. This policy was chiefly driven by transnational bureaucrats who catalysed 
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links between domestic and international influences into a neoliberal economic agenda. 
Since its electoral loss in 2004, two consecutive UPA governments pursued greater 
moderation on neoliberal policy initiatives. Now the BJP is once again poised to lead an NDA 
coalition in an aggressive program of economic policy development that will no doubt 
witness the tussle of domestic and international actors jostling to steer the economy.  
 
Where will the BJP government under Modi take economic policy? All indications are that 
within the support base of the party and the domestic and global corporate sectors there is 
an expectation of radical change from the current state of affairs. Relieved of the urgency of 
managing the influence of coalition partners and embodying a new managerial leadership 
especially eager to maintain a positive economic image, it is likely that the yet to be written 
story of this government’s economic policy formation will be substantially different from its 
previous incarnation. With this election, Hindu nationalism has shown its ability to adapt 
successfully to the new political landscape. How it will be able to do so for the economy 
remains to be seen.  
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Appendix 3.1: Voter Opinion 
 
BJP VOTERS 
Variables 
1995 2001 2006 
P Odds ratio P  Odds ratio P  Odds ratio 
Class 0.0001 1.907 0.029 1.571 0.0001 2.079 
Politics 0.0001 2.129 0 4.399 0.0001 2.448 
Business 0.068 1.336 0.009 0.65 0.0001 2.403 
Gender 0.265 0.841 0.52 0.895 0.229 0.807 
Age 0.855 0.971 0.098 0.752 0.399 0.864 
Education 0.051 1.372 0.123 1.308 0.077 0.721 
Urban 0.9 0.963 0.374 1.361 0.157 2.098 
Constant 0 0.142 0 0.253 0 0.171 
 
NDA (BJP+ALLIES) 
Variables 
1995 2001 2006 
P Odds ratio P  Odds ratio P  Odds ratio 
Class .263 1.177 .004 1.749 .003 1.691 
Politics 0.0001 1.875 0.0001 3.654 0.0001 3.177 
Business .154 1.225 .069 .760 0.0001 2.003 
Gender .010 .693 .073 1.328 .430 .883 
Age .310 .860 .625 .927 .198 1.220 
Education .028 1.377 .000 1.772 .282 .837 
Urban .253 1.376 .170 .623 .931 1.047 
Constant .000 .413 .000 .296 .000 .279 
Explanatory Notes on variables: 
- Class: indicates whether voters consider themselves upper or lower class. 
- Politics: indicates whether voters position themselves on the Right or Left of the political scale. 
- Business: indicates whether voters prefer a greater role for private owned business versus 
government owned business in the economy. 
- Age: indicates whether a voter’s age range is 18-40 or 41-99. 
Education: indicates whether a voter’s possesses at least a High School education 
- Urban: indicates whether a voter lives in an urban centre with a population of at least 500,000. 
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Appendix 5.1: Structural Adjustment Loans 1998-2004 
   Brazil     
ID Project Description Principal 
Approval 
Date Closing Date 
P063340 BR SOC SECURITY REF I 757569984 07-Jan-99 30-Jun-99 
P063351 BR SOCIAL PROTECTION 252520000 07-Jan-99 30-Jun-99 
P063341 BR ADMIN & FISC REF 505060000 30-Mar-00 31-Dec-00 
P060575 BR PRGM.FISCAL REFORM SAL 757580032 18-Jan-01 31-Mar-02 
P070640 BR Prgrm Financial Sector Adj I 404040000 24-May-01 31-Mar-02 
P066259 BR Prgrm.Fincl Sctr II 404040000 13-Jun-02 31-Dec-02 
P070641 BR-PRGM.FISCAL REF II 404040000 12-Jun-03 31-Dec-03 
 
Turkey 
ID Project Description Principal 
Approval 
Date Closing Date 
P066511 FSAL 777779968 21-Dec-00 31-Mar-02 
P068792 ERL 759600000 18-May-00 30-Apr-04 
P070286 ARIP 600000000 12-Jul-01 31-Dec-08 
P070560 
  
PFPSAL 2 
  
550000000 16-Apr-02 30-Jun-03 
800000000 16-Apr-02 30-Jun-03 
P070561   700000000 12-Jul-01 31-Dec-01 
    800000 20-May-04 31-Dec-09 
P074408 
  
  
  
SRMP 
  
  
  
500000000 13-Sep-01 31-Mar-08 
580000 13-Sep-01 31-Mar-08 
8820000 13-Sep-01 31-Mar-08 
1872000 13-Sep-01 31-Mar-08 
P082996 PFPSAL 3 1000000000 17-Jun-04 30-Jun-06 
 
India 
ID Project Description  Principal  
Approval 
Date Closing Date 
P009907 EXTERNAL SECTOR ADJU 300000000 24-Jun-93 31-Dec-93 
P010389 
  
  
SAL I 
  
  
250000000 05-Dec-91 31-Dec-92 
220000000 05-Dec-91 31-Dec-92 
30000000 05-Dec-91 31-Dec-92 
P055490 
  
KARN SAL I 
  
75000000 21-Jun-01 31-Dec-01 
75000000 21-Jun-01 31-Dec-01 
P059149 
  
KARN SAL II 
  
50000000 14-Mar-02 30-Sep-02 
50000000 14-Mar-02 30-Sep-02 
P065471 
  
UP FISCAL REFORM & PUBLIC 
SECTOR RESTRCT 
  
126270000 25-Apr-00 30-Oct-00 
125000000 25-Apr-00 30-Oct-00 
P073113 
  
Andhra Pradesh Economic Reform 
Ln/Cr 
  
125000000 14-Mar-02 30-Sep-02 
125000000 14-Mar-02 30-Sep-02 
P075191 
  
AP SAL II 
  
110000000 10-Feb-04 15-Aug-04 
110000000 10-Feb-04 15-Aug-04 
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Appendix 5.2: Comparison of the index of Trade Freedom for Brazil, India and 
Turkey 
The following comparison between the index of trade freedom has been obtained from a yearly 
report carried out by the American based conservative think tank the Heritage Foundation. The Y 
axis represents the index and the x axis represents year.  
 
Source: <http://www.heritage.org/index/visualize> 
Key: Black (World Average) Blue (Turkey) Green (Brazil) Red (India) 
Index of Trade freedom 
 
Year India Brazil Turkey
1995 0 56.4 74.8
1996 14 57 75
1997 13.2 57 77.8
1998 13.2 57.8 73.8
1999 24 57.4 74.4
2000 19.6 51 75
2001 25.6 57 73
2002 21.8 58 79.6
2003 23 59 73.6
2004 23.6 62.8 74.2
2005 38 65.2 76
2006 24 69 81
2007 51.2 69.8 81
2008 51 70.8 86.8
2009 51 71.6 86.6
2010 67.9 69.2 86.4
2011 64.2 69.8 85.4
2012 64.1 69.7 85.4
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List of Interviews 
 
Pradip Baijal 
Former Secretary, Ministry of Disinvestment (NDA Government) 
Interviewed by phone (July 14, 2012) 
 
Amit Chanchal 
Project Manager, Sustainable Urban International 
Interviewed by phone (September 04, 2012) 
 
Sucharita Eashwar 
Regional Director for Karnataka/Bangalore, National Association of Software and Services 
Companies 
Interviewed in Bangalore, India (January 03, 2011) 
 
Bidisha Ganguly 
Head of Economic Research, Confederation of Indian Industry 
Interviewed at the CII offices Gurgaon (December 22, 2010) 
 
Rajeev Gowda 
Former campaign director for Karnataka, Congress party 
Interviewed in Bangalore (June 21, 2011) 
 
Mohan Guruswamy 
Former Secretary, Ministry of Finance (NDA Government) 
Interviewed by phone from Canada (July 17, 2012) 
 
Sanjay Kumar  
Director of the Lokniti project, Center for the Study of Developing Societies 
Interviewed at CSDS, New Delhi (December 20, 2010) 
 
Ramnath Narayanaswamy 
Professor (spirituality and management) Indian Institute of Management 
Interviewed at the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore (August 2011) 
 
Kirit Parikh   
Member of the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council under Rajiv Gandhi  
Member of the Prime Minister's Economic Advisory Council under A.B. Vajpayee  
Interviewed in New Delhi by phone from Canada (July 26, 2012)  
 
EAS Sarma 
Former Secretary, Ministry of Finance (NDA Government) 
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Former Secretary, Ministry of Power (NDA Government) 
Interviewed by phone from Halifax, Canada (July 26, 2012) 
 
Chiranjib Sen 
Professor (Economics) Indian Institute of Management 
Interviewed in Bangalore, India (January 07, 2011) 
 
Prabir Sengupta 
Former Secretary, Ministry of Commerce (NDA Government) 
Interviewed by phone (September 13, 2012) 
 
Ajay Shah 
Former Advisor, Ministry of Finance (NDA Government) 
Interviewed by phone (July 16, 2012) 
 
Jagdish Shettigar 
Former member of the Economic Advisory Council of Prime Minister Vajpayee 
Former head, BJP economic cell 
Interviewed in Greater Noida Uttar Pradesh (December 21, 2010) 
 
Sanjay Srivastava 
Urban Sociologist, Institute for Economic Growth and resident of Gurgaon 
Interviewed by phone (December 01, 2011) 
 
Lisa Mary Thompson 
former New Delhi based journalist for The Economic Times and Gurgaon resident.  
Interviewed in London (July 14, 2012) 
 
Vijay Topa 
Special Adviser, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
Interviewed at the FICCI offices, New Delhi (December 24, 2010) 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
ABVP:  Akhil Bharatiya Vidhyarthi Parishad 
ASSOCHAM: Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India 
BJP:  Bharatiya Janata Party 
BJS:  Bharatiya Jana Sangh 
BMS:  Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh 
CII:  Confederation of Indian Industries 
CME:  Coordinated Market Economy 
EU:  European Union 
FDI:  Foreign Direct Investment 
FII:  Foreign Institutional Investor 
FICCI:  Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry 
IMF:  International Monetary Fund 
KRRS:   Karnataka Rajya Rayot Sangha (Karnataka Farmers' Association) 
LME:  Liberal Market Economy 
MNC:  Multinational Corporation 
NASSCOM:  National Assiciation of Software Services Companies 
NDA:  National Democratic Alliance 
PMO:  Prime Minister's Office 
QR:  Quantitative Restriction 
RSS:  Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
SAL:  Structural Adjustment Loan   
SAP:  Structural Adjustment Policy 
SJM:  Swadeshi Jagaran Manch 
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SVD:   Samyukta Vidhayak Dal 
US/USA: United States of America 
UPA:  United Progressive Alliance 
VHP:  Vishwa Hindu Parishad 
VoC:  Varieties of Capitalism 
WTO:  World Trade Organization 
WB:  World Bank 
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Glossary 
 
Artha:   wealth 
Antyodaya:  service to the least 
Bharatiya Sanskriti: Indian culture 
Bhoodan:  'Gift of Land' movement initiated by Gandhian Vinoba Bhave 
Bhuddi:  intelligence 
Dharma:  Law or the ordering principle of the universe 
Hindutva:  Hindu-dom 
Krishnajanmabhoomi: Birthplace (literally groun.d.) of Krishna 
Krita-Yuga:  The age of truth 
Mana:   Mind 
Marwari:  Member of a trading community originating in Rajasthan 
Pracharak:  A fulltime worker (propagator) of the RSS 
Purushartha:  Human purpose; the goals of human existence  
Poorna Yoga:  Integral full/complete system of yoga as propagated by Aurobindo. 
Ramjanmabhoomi: Birth place (literally groun.d.) of Ram 
Sangh Parivar:  Collective term for the parties in the Hindu nationalist movement 
Shaka:   local level unit of the RSS 
Shareer:  Body  
Swadeshi:  Self-reliance 
Vikendrikaran: Decentralization 
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